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U.S. Allegations on INF Verification Denied

LD0505175988 Moscow TASS in English 1725 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Sam Nunn, has alleged that there are major snags with verifying the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

He was speaking in an NBC television show on prospects for the treaty's ratification.

Another member of Congress, Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has claimed that the United States has run into serious problems in its attempts to deal with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, he asserted, had begun demonstrating that they were backtracking from their verification commitments.

Such assertions have been denied in competent Soviet circles.

All issues of monitoring compliance with the treaty have been completely hammered out by the sides and this has been reflected in the document itself.

Even if some technical disagreements arise, they are settled through diplomatic channels.

The Soviet Union does not see any problems that could hinder the normal process of the treaty being ratified by both countries.

One point deserves special mention: When the INF Treaty was being negotiated, the Soviet side went much further than the Americans in the verification issue. The U.S. proposals were much more modest.

But thanks to constructive attitudes displayed by both sides, a mutually acceptable, optimum solution to the issue has eventually been worked out.

As a result, the INF Treaty is really a new word in the field of verification and stipulates such verification arrangements as will make either party confident that the other fulfills its obligations without fail.

Attempts by certain circles in the United States to distort the Soviet position on the verification issue can only be seen as aiming to throw up an artificial impediment to American Congress ratifying this treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The trick is nothing new. It has been used frequently in the United States before to erect obstacles in the way of agreement for limiting and reducing armaments and armed forces.

One is surprised, however, that it is being employed once again at a time when a real possibility has emerged to translate the first accord on real disarmament into practice.

Korniyenko Discusses INF Ratification

AU0505075588 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 May 88 p 6

[Article by Olga Trofimova, NOVOSTI commentator: "Bringing the Agreement to Life; Prior to the Ratification of the Agreement on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles"]

[Text] The Foreign Relations Committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers will meet this month at a joint session to hear the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission (their working body) on the positive conclusion of the subject of ratifying the agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

I can recall what writer Chingiz Aytmatov said at the beginning of this year, speaking as a deputy:

It was neither simple, nor easy for us Soviet people to fight our way to this agreement. That is why we are unanimously in favor of its being approved. It opens up a new form of sensible coexistence. But it seems to our Soviet citizens that we have made greater concessions than necessary. Some even think that it is generally inadmissible to rely on any assurances in these matters. The old way of thinking in stereotypes, shaped for decades under the influence of mutual hostility, must necessarily lead to such a reaction....

The thorough and assiduous work of the Preparatory Commission (chaired by Deputy Georgiy Korniyenko) has been concluded.

It convened many times over 10 weeks—in public and closed sessions, attended by the staff of Soviet ministries and ministerial departments, various experts, and representatives of both Soviet and foreign social organizations. It studied many letters from Soviet and other citizens to the USSR's Supreme Soviet, and the copious mail that readers sent to the mass information and propaganda media.

Side by side with the Soviet people's prevailing, favorable stand on the agreement, there was also concern, particularly in connection with the USSR's having to eliminate a larger number of missiles than the United States, while British and French missiles are not taken into account at all. The commission weighed all the data on this problem and concluded that there is no objective reason to be concerned. The defense capability of the USSR and its allies will continue to be reliably ensured. Not only will the implementation of the agreement not weaken the security of its direct participants (or international security in general), it will even enhance it.

At the same time, the commission considers well-founded the Soviet people's concern about plans to "compensate" for the elimination of American missiles in Europe by modernizing and accumulating other nuclear devices, which is being considered by NATO. In fact, while voting with one hand for the agreement in the form in which it was signed, the U.S. senators in the Committee on Armed Services are using the other hand to brandish a report on "weaknesses" in the bloc's military machinery and on the imperative need to "counterarm."

The Preparatory Commission studied in detail the subjects of verification and of social, economic, ecological, and other impacts of the implementation of the agreement. It also dealt with problems connected with the very elimination of the missiles. Special places have been set apart for this in several areas of the USSR; the technical preparations for appropriate facilities are under way. Thus, the elimination of OTK 23 and OTR 22 shorter-range test and combat missiles is being tested in Staryozek (Kazakh SR).

Mikhail Gorbachev recently characterized the agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles as creating an initial infrastructure of disarmament, linked with the creation of the various instruments, forms, and methods that are needed for progress in this process.

In this light, what are the commission's conclusions about the inspection system for eliminating nuclear missiles, about the complex of confidence-building measures and measures to verify the implementation of the agreement as a whole? What is the role played by Czechoslovakia and the GDR, countries which will be implementing the right of verification? We asked Georgiy Korniyenko, who replied:

The verification system has been worked out in great detail in the agreement, in a truly unprecedented way. In practice, it will no doubt acquire new details. For instance, even prior to the agreement's entering into force, our Soviet experts traveled to the United States and American experts traveled to the USSR in order to become acquainted with the subject. They all visited places from which such guests had previously been banned. Thus, the infrastructure for disarmament is being created (so to speak) on the material and the psychological levels. Another important thing is that a practical interlinkage between effective verification measures and expanded confidence-building measures is being planned for 13 years, from positions of a new political thinking.

The Washington document, and particularly the part dealing with mutual inspection rights, is expanded to cover the sovereign rights of the GDR and CSSR, as the Soviet operational-tactical missiles were formerly deployed on their territory. "Were formerly" is the correct term here: It is known that Moscow, Berlin, and Prague have adopted and carried out the decision to dismantle the missiles without waiting for the official ratification of the agreement. This is a goodwill gesture testifying to the sincere and honest intentions of the world of socialism, a gesture deservedly appreciated by social and political circles abroad.

I can also add that representatives of top GDR and CSSR legislative bodies attended the sessions of our commission and, on behalf of their peoples, expressed full support for the agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

All nations are looking forward to the ratification of the agreement, G. Korniyenko stressed in conclusion. In essence, no government in the world has opposed it. True, certain Western capitals appealed for a "break" in disarmament matters. But the USSR and its allies are convinced that one must progress on the road toward a nuclear-free world without intermissions and wavering.

Nazarkin 'Not Satisfied' With Disarmament Talks

PM0505141188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 May 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Report on interview in Geneva with Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament talks, by correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy: "Decisions Needed, Not Maneuvering"; date not given]

[Text] The work of the spring session of the Disarmament Conference has ended at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. IZVESTIYA's Geneva correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy asked Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation, to comment on its results.

During the session of the Disarmament Conference, Yu.K. Nazarkin stated, talks continued on chemical weapons. I should like to make that point first of all because the banning of chemical weapons is currently the only long-term area where an important document—the text of a convention—is being elaborated at the conference. Some progress has been made at this session. The draft convention has been augmented with some additional provisions agreed among the participants in the talks. A better mutual understanding has been reached among the participants on some other aspects which have yet to be put down on paper.

However, I have to say that the pace of the talks has slackened somewhat. Recognizing that fact, some Western delegations try to explain it by saying that new technical questions have cropped up during the talks which need additional work. They also attribute the slowdown to an awakening of interest in the talks on the part of those participating states which have been quite passive so far, but which have now begun to put forward proposals of their own.

It cannot be denied that a broader range of countries have become more active. It is also true that certain technical problems have arisen during the talks which

have needed extra work. But I absolutely disagree with the opinion that those are the factors which have caused the pace of the talks to slacken. That is not so.

On the contrary, they lead to an activation of the talks. If you are looking for the real cause, you must not limit yourself to an analysis merely of what is happening at the negotiating table inside the Palais des Nations.

First and foremost, it is clearly necessary to take into account, Yu.K. Nazarkin continued, that the talks have now reached the point, the limit where each participant must make a political decision on the conclusion of a convention. Whereas before, one could make do with some kind of maneuvering, the stage of the talks now demands a clear "yes" or "no." That is what a whole series of other participants in the talks have done. The Americans, however, are not yet saying "yes" or "no." They state, of course, that they support the conclusion of a convention. Unfortunately, however, we see no practical evidence of that. This leads me to conclude that Washington has still not made a political decision on the banning of chemical weapons. And it is obvious that making that decision is complicated by the fact that the United States has begun and is going on with the production of binary chemical weapons. It is clearly trying to gain time to create a stock of such weapons which would be retained for at least the 10 years which would be set aside for the destruction of all the chemical weapons arsenals after the convention goes into force.

When mentioning the reasons for the slowing down of the talks, it would be a mistake to ignore the position adopted by France, which is either preparing to acquire its own binary weapons or has already begun producing them. But in any event, at the negotiating table the French delegation is doing nothing to promote the successful progress of the talks.

It goes without saying that the Disarmament Conference's activity is not confined to the talks on banning chemical weapons. Its agenda includes a whole series of other important questions, such as the complete and general banning of nuclear tests, the prevention of the arms race in space, nuclear disarmament questions (including multilateral nuclear disarmament), and a whole series of other issues. Unfortunately, we cannot note any progress on these questions. Why is that? Washington does not want such progress and we have not yet managed to overcome that obstacle. That is why I admit that I am not satisfied by the results of the spring session.

It must be borne in mind that the UN General Assembly's third special session on disarmament is due in June this year. All the questions under discussion at the spring session will also be examined there on a broad political plane. This gives grounds for the hope that the third special session will give impetus to the summer session of the Disarmament Conference, which begins in July. And, of course, we must also bear in mind the upcoming summit in Moscow. Any accords in the disarmament sphere which may be achieved there would be of exceptional importance not only for bilateral talks, but also for the whole disarmament process.

Delegate Views 'Space Inspectorate' Proposal

LD0505111988 Moscow TASS in English 1101 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—"Even though there are no weapons in outer space now, their emergence in near-earth orbits would pose a grave threat to mankind," believes Vyacheslav Zharkov, deputy representative of the USSR at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

The Soviet Union shared concern with the majority of countries over the possibility of the spread of the arms race to outer space, he said in an interview to TASS correspondnet Gennadiy Talalayev.

"At the spring session of the Disarmament Conference, which closed on April 29, the Soviet delegation submitted for consideration a memorandum on establishing an international system of control over the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

"The principal idea of the draft, specifying the USSR's idea of setting up an international space inspectorate, is that inspection directly before launch is the simplest and most effective means of verifying whether objects launched into space are weapons or carry weapons."

"In our opinion, verification measures to be enforced with the help of international space inspectors, should include, specifically, timely transmission of information to representatives of the international space inspectorate about each planned launch and securing permanent presence of inspectors' groups at all space launch sites," Zharkov said.

Noting that the latest Soviet proposal evoked considerable interest among the participants in the Disarmament Conference, Zharkov drew attention to the fact that the U.S. delegation alone made a negative assessment. Its representative described the proposal as unacceptable due to alleged "technical, political and organisational problems."

"These remarks look at least strange, taking into account the fact that the issue of verification and control were traditionally raised by American diplomats as the most important subjects at all international talks.

"The refusal by the U.S. representative to back the Soviet proposal was in discord with the positive attitude on the part of most other delegations," Zharkov pointed out in conclusion.

Lobov Examines Arms Talks, Balance of Forces
AU0505155188 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 2 May 88 p 4

[NOVOSTI interview especially for ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI with Colonel-General Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Aleksandr Cherepanov: "Let's Not Waste The Chance"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Cherepanov] In one of his stories, the American writer O'Henry spoke through the lips of one of his heroes, saying: "It is not the road we choose that is important, it is something in between, something that makes us choose this road...." The point is that during the Washington summit, the extremely discordant speeches of the politicians were concordant about one matter: the "choice of a road" leading to a constructive settlement of world problems. Do you think other factors have contributed to this "similarity" between the speeches of both leaders?

[Lobov] Indeed, in the discordant speeches of the politicians we did hear a concordant statement about the "choice of a road" away from confrontation policy and toward a constructive solving of problems. I believe the main reason is the feeling of joint responsibility for our common survival, plus an awareness of the reality imposed by the nuclear-cosmic era and of the fact that relations between our peoples and countries cannot continue this way. Politics "from a position of strength" and the concept of a "nuclear deterrent" officially professed by the United States and other NATO countries have outlived their time. It is becoming understood that these concepts will not safeguard security and that sooner or later they will lead to a "war path," and that the road to peace is via dialogue and cooperation in all spheres of relations.

As far as other elements of this "concord" are concerned, they surely include the need to combine efforts in solving universal ecological and economic problems, and an aim by public opinion toward a rapprochement and democratization of interstate relations.

[Cherepanov] The American treaty to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles (INF) caused an initial storm among political circles in Western Europe, although—as General John Galvin, commander in chief of the NATO Joint Armed Forces, has said—the USSR is losing more warheads than NATO if it eliminates its SS-20 and other missiles. French Defense Minister Andre Giraud has compared this treaty with...the 1938 Munich Agreement, because it deprives Western Europe of that "which protected it against the dramas of a conventional war 40 years ago." Could it be that the very fact of easing tension between the two powers is upsetting the population of Western Europe?

[Lobov] The INF treaty that was signed by the USSR and United States is an international one. It concerns the interests of the USSR and Warsaw Pact as well as the interests of the United States and NATO bloc, and not just the countries where missiles were deployed or were to have been deployed. It concerns every European country; more even, every country of the world, whose security is increased because of the new treaty.

Nevertheless, in Western Europe and across the ocean there are influential circles closely connected with the industrial-military complex, whose interests this treaty really does threaten.

[Cherepanov] Fortunately, West European governments basically support the INF Treaty, as well as further Soviet-American steps toward a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons. The London DAILY TELEGRAPH, which it is difficult to suspect of partiality toward us, wrote recently: "Most of the treaty's opponents have withheld their attacks, feeling that it is better to wait for the results of the Reagan-Gorbachev talks on strategic missiles." Does that mean that the treaty's opponents have laid down their arms?

[Lobov] Unfortunately, the INF Treaty has opponents both in the United States and in NATO countries in Western Europe. For example, a group of American senators openly spoke out against its conclusion. The activity of specific NATO circles aimed at "compensating" for the elimination of the missiles by increasing the amount of European nuclear weapons not covered by the INF Treaty, is becoming increasingly ominous. As far as we know, NATO is working on plans to deploy in Europe more nuclear missile-carrying aircraft, new operational-tactical missiles with a range of up to 500 km, and sea-to-land guided missiles; as well as on plans to improve and install conventional weapons, including completely new types thereof. British Defense Secretary George Younger told the the London INDEPENDENT the following: "Perhaps certain adjustments will have to be made to the North Atlantic Pact's remaining forces, so as to preserve an effective deterrent. Right now we are working on this problem in NATO."

Why should such a "compensation" be necessary? After all, the decision to deploy American "Pershing-2's" in Europe was made under the pretext of an alleged "threat" by the Soviet SS-20's. That means that the American intermediate-range missiles also ought to be withdrawn from Europe without any kind of "compensation."

[Cherepanov] Even after the signing of the INF Treaty, right-wing forces in the United States still suspect and distrust the USSR. They will certainly try to prevent its ratification at all costs, saying that the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will "destabilize" the European situation, that the Soviet Union's "overwhelming conventional armaments" will gain even greater superiority, and so on. Is that really so?

[Lobov] It is not true. In Europe, a balance of forces has been created which will not be upset by the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles at all. The military potentials of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are approximately equal. There is no doubt that historical disproportion and assymetry does exist in some types of armed forces and armaments. For example, the Warsaw Pact has more tanks and NATO has more fighter aircraft. NATO representatives say that the Warsaw Pact possesses "superiority" in central Europe, but they forget that NATO has considerable superiority in the southern flank of Europe. All this confirms yet again that these problems ought to be resolved at a roundtable. We are prepared to sit down at this table immediately. It depends on the West.

[Cherepanov] According to information from the United States, the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, binary weapons, has started. THE WASHINGTON POST writes that over $20 billion is going to be spent on chemical "rearmament "in the next few years. What sort of countermeasures could the USSR make, and will there be any? If the new chemical weapons spiral does not torpedo the Geneva talks on a chemical weapons ban, it will at least complicate them very much.

[Lobov] The current round of talks on banning chemical weapons started at a time when the production of binary weapons in the United States was a fait accompli. Production began despite the considerable progress in Geneva. It is no exaggeration to say that commencing the production of these weapons is an attempt to complicate the talks and torpedo the process of chemical disarmament.

The Soviet Union believes that this is creating a new situation with chemical weapons, which may require us to make suitable steps not necessarily involving chemical weapons. But at the same time, the USSR will continue to do all it can to prevent the Geneva talks from being broken.

[Cherepanov] And one more question, about future prospects. Let us assume that the the Moscow summit this year will be successful. After a 50 percent reduction, the USSR and United States will have about 6,000 nuclear warheads each. But at the same time, in view of the rapid development of the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France, all these countries will have a total of 2,000 warheads by the year 2000. These nuclear forces are independent of the United States, of course. But they are also aimed at Soviet territory. What possibilities of Soviet-British-French talks do you see on this subject? Today there is no hurry, as M. Thatcher says. But what about tomorrow?

[Lobov] The Soviet Union's idea of a world free of nuclear weapons takes the security of all countries into account. Therefore, this idea envisages that Great Britain and France will join the process of nuclear reductions, but not until Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons have been reduced by 50 percent. No one is "hurrying" Great Britain and France right now, but we assume that these countries, with their major nuclear potentials, will certainly want to take part in the process of nuclear arms reductions.

But as far as the possibilities of Soviet-British-French talks are concerned, I would like to recall Mikhail Gorbachev's statement about our stance on the subject of the nuclear potential of Great Britain and France in the European balance of forces. During his French visit in October 1985, he said: "The French side has shown that France's nuclear potential cannot be discussed without French participation. That is correct. From this, it emerges that the time has come to start direct talks on this subject and try to find a compromise concerning a way out. The Soviet Union is ready for such direct talks with France, as well as with Great Britain, of course."

Congressional Office Report Dubious on SDI

PM0505111388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Sukhoy dispatch: "Many Questions Without Answers. Debate Over SDI"]

[Text] New York, 3 May—The debate over the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is continuing in the United States. First it dies down, then it flares up with new force. The Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress has thrown the latest "log" onto the fire of the debate. It prepared a report whose conclusion is unambiguous: SDI—in the form in which the present administration sees it—"will not be created [sozdat] in the foreseeable future." The report evaluates as "acts of faith" rather than scientifically substantiated suppositions the statements by certain supporters of the "Star Wars" program that its basic systems could be deployed in the mid-nineties.

Scientists spent 2 years preparing the report. They were able to familiarize themselves with many materials that are unavailable to the general public and to hear the opinion of defenders and opponents of SDI. The Pentagon insisted on classifying three chapters of the 900-page report. Reference was made here to the fact that they contained "important defense information from the viewpoint of national security."

Despite 5 years of intensive research costing approximately $12 billion, the report points out, "many questions still remain unanswered, including the chief one—is SDI capable of providing a reliable space shield which will protect the U.S. population against all nuclear missile misfortunes?" From the scientists' viewpoint, there is no electronic system (neither military nor civilian) in the United States today that could function autonomously in space, controlling all the latest elements of ABM defense.

At the same time, specialists of the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress believe that "impressive scientific discoveries" have already been made during the work on the SDI program "which could be used in the U.S. national interest." Of course, the report's authors believe that all these discoveries could help to create [sozdat] a highly efficient ABM defense in the distant future, but not within the time of which representatives of the organization for the implementation of SDI speak.

U.S. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci refused to comment on the report.

Carlucci Remarks on SDI Criticized Further

LD0305230388 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 May 88

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] I must note that the U.S. military-industrial complex is still not preparing to give up its plans for Star Wars. This was shown in particular at the latest news conference by Carlucci, the new Pentagon boss. He asserted, among other things, that the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative no longer plays an important role in the conclusion of a treaty on cutting strategic offensive weapons, and that the Soviet Union has allegedly changed its attitude.

Well, I don't know where the Pentagon got the idea of such a change. In any case, Moscow has stressed several times, even in the last few days, that the deployment of SDI, even the threat of deploying it, would lead to a sharp violation of stability in the international situation and would make a profound cut in strategic arms impossible. But one thing is true. Recently, more and more scientists and prominent politicians in the United States itself and in other NATO countries have been admitting the adventurism and danger in the Star Wars plan.

Commentary by Bogachev

LD0405195588 Moscow TASS in English 1832 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 4 TASS—Follows commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military news analyst:

SDI cannot ensure for the United States an "impenetrable space shield", while the implementation of even the first stage of that programme will be a breach of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty. This is the gist of the evaluation of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" made by U.S. Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci. This is quite a realistic evaluation.

Yet in his recent remarks in an interview with the German DER SPIEGEL magazine, the U.S. secretary of defence made quite different conclusions, which are totally in conflict with his own appraisal of the "Star Wars" programme. Carlucci describes, for example, as "sensible" the programme leading, as he admits, to a violation of the ABM Treaty. It must be noted, for that matter, that he speaks about the effectiveness of that treaty in the past tense: The treaty was.... The treaty did not bring about..., etc. Meanwhile, President Ronald Reagan committed himself during the latest Soviet-American summit meeting to observe the ABM Treaty the way it was signed in 1972.

Speaking in DER SPIEGEL interview, the U.S. secretary of defence quite freely interprets the Soviet Union's stand on militarisation of outer space. Thus, in particular, he claims that the Soviet side had convinced itself that the USA worked solely on a defense system without any offensive potential. It is apt to recall, for that matter, that Soviet experts, and not only Soviet ones, have permanently pointed out and continue pointing out the openly offensive character of the American "Star Wars" programme.

Setting forth his disarmament concept, Carlucci is expressing apprehension that "one can go too far" in the field of arms control. In that connection he promises that if a treaty on a cut in the strategic weapons is concluded, the USA will start modernizing its nuclear weapons, as a result of which they will become "even more powerful".

Apparently they in Washington do not view disarmament as an aim in itself. At any rate, Carlucci apparently considers it possible to use even arms control agreements as a pretext for a further buildup of the U.S. nuclear potential.

Pact Initiatives' Implications Outlined

PM0305091588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 May 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Candidate of Military Sciences Major General V. Tenin article: "Three Initiatives Whose Implementation Would Make It Possible To Strengthen European Security"—boldface and capitalization as published]

[Text] The latest session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee expressed full support for and stressed its readiness to help implement the enterprising proposals put forward by the GDR, the CSSR, and Poland on nuclear and conventional disarmament in Central Europe.

The European nuclear disarmament process is closely interwoven with disarmament in the sphere of nonnuclear warfare systems. There are two reasons for this. One of these is doctrinal: The NATO "flexible response" strategy provides for the phased escalation of East-West armed conflict with an inevitable transition to the nuclear phase. At the same time Warsaw Pact defensive planning allows for the option of using conventional systems to put out a probable enemy's nuclear armaments.

The other reason is strictly military-technical. It essentially boils down to the fact that as technology evolves, the combat characteristics of the two types of modern arms draw closer together. Naturally, this does not mean they are becoming completely identical. The main criterion here is the weapons' combat effectiveness and strike power. Although the physical effect of a strike by conventional and nuclear systems is different, there is a common factor drawing them closer together: However you may reduce the yield and dimensions of nuclear weapons, they do not lose their fundamental qualities as "weapons of mass destruction," while conventional weapons are acquiring such qualities.

NATO and Warsaw Pact troops' operational-tactical echelons (regiments, brigades, divisions, and above) contain a number of so-called "dual-purpose" arms. They can fulfill their combat functions in either a nuclear or a conventional configuration. They include tactical missiles, strike aviation, artillery, and certain antiaircraft missile systems. With the appearance and rapid development of air-, surface-, and sea-launched cruise missiles, the number of "dual-purpose" systems in weapons arsenals has increased immeasurably. The range of such systems is increasing substantially, which means that virtually the same type of cruise missile can be used both as a strategic and as an operational-tactical weapon. Hence stems the need for parallel nuclear and conventional disarmament processes regulating one another.

This comprehensive approach has been formulated in the well-known program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the world expounded in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986. It is expressed concretely in the Warsaw Pact states' Budapest initiative, which envisages considerable reductions in both European military-political alliances' armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In terms of quantity and quality "dual-purpose" systems would form the main instruments of war, if one were to occur in the European theater. By virtue of their "dual nature" they are also extremely dangerous from the viewpoint of the escalation of any military conflict which might arise here into a nuclear conflict. Thus the task of reducing them is so important.

Every military specialist is aware that the broader the area between the two military groupings not occupied by troops, the greater the chances of avoiding conflict situations between them. Stability also grows as military forces are separated because the assessment of the situation and the solutions employed are seemingly transferred to an increasingly higher and consequently more responsible—in the political context—level of military leadership.

The defusing of the military situation [voennaya razryazhennost] in an entire zone of definite width along the line of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and then, possibly, its complete demilitarization could be one reliable factor strengthening mutual trust. There are many well-known high-level initiatives on this subject.

Three of them attract attention. They are as follows:

The joint GDR-CSSR program to create a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free from chemical weapons in Central Europe;

Poland's initiatives, which have entered the international lexicon as the "Jaruzelski Plan" on arms limitation and confidence-building in Central Europe;

And the CSSR proposal to create along the line separating the two military blocs a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations.

What does each of these initiatives propose? How do they correlate with the objectives being pursued in the mainstream of the all-European process for security and cooperation?

A NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE. It could occupy a zone 300 km wide—150 km into each side's territory. All nuclear arms would be withdrawn from such a corridor—both munitions and delivery vehicles. Nuclear infrastructure facilities would be dismantled: nuclear munitions dumps and equipment points. Nor would military exercises be held involving units and subunits equipped with nuclear arms. In other words, a mutually verifiable nuclear-free regime would be guaranteed in the corridor.

The exclusion of chemical warfare systems and also the elimination of potential storage sites for military toxins in the corridor would substantially add to its nuclear-free status. A zone free from weapons of mass destruction would, as a result, take shape in the center of Europe, which is traditionally deemed to be the highest point of East-West confrontation. The threat of a sudden offensive would be substantially lessened and the likelihood of war being unleashed in Europe would be considerably reduced.

THE POLISH PLAN FOR ARMS LIMITATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

This is a kind of buffer initiative, linking a nuclear-free corridor with the implementation of a large-scale program for considerable reductions in the numerical strength of troops from the Atlantic to the Urals—to 500,000 on each side.

The proposal is for the phased transformation of a nuclear-free corridor into a demilitarized corridor and its subsequent broadening by the further withdrawal and reduction of nuclear systems, "dual-purpose" weapons, and also conventional arms with the greatest destructive force suitable for sudden offensive operations. With the sides' agreement, a possible list of the latter could include strike aircraft, long-range artillery, multiple rocket-launchers, helicopter gunships, and the very latest tanks.

Confidence-building measures in the military sphere of the Stockholm variety, but developed even further regarding restricting the scale and number of military exercises and extended to all mobile components of armed forces, including independent air force activity, should be added.

Geographically the main region for the implementation of the Polish plan includes the territories of five NATO countries (the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Denmark) and four Warsaw Pact states (the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary). These are the territories where a large proportion of the two military-political alliances' strike power [udarnaya nagruzka] is concentrated. Forward-based echelons of the Western military machine were moved here with the formation of NATO in 1949.

In its turn the creation of the European socialist countries' military-political alliance—the Warsaw Pact—ensured military equilibrium, which is extremely necessary under such conditions.

It is also quite understandable that since NATO military preparations were mainly carried out in Central Europe, Warsaw Pact retaliatory measures were also mainly concentrated in this geographical region. The result was the emergence here of the world's highest level of military confrontation and a source of unprecedented danger, at not only a European but also a global level. The Polish initiative proposes a rational plan for reducing this danger to a minimum.

THE CSSR'S COMPREHENSIVE INITIATIVE TO CREATE A ZONE OF TRUST, COOPERATION, AND GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS ALONG THE LINE OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES. This initiative is as if it were the spiritual filling of the plans for the nuclear and conventional demilitarization of Central Europe.

Removing the military burden [nagruzka] from the center of Europe is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for strengthening security. The disappearance of military strong-arm methods of ensuring security necessitates an alternative. This is the process proposed by the Czechoslovak option. This affirms the comprehensive approach—measures of military detente must be backed up with the achievement of progress in all spheres of cooperation: political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian. This is essentially a plan for peacefully reinforcing the bases of nonconfrontational security which, one way or another, must be created in Europe.

Three proposals from the European socialist countries. They are constructive, topical, and realistic. Each of them has a value of its own for building a secure Europe. They mutually develop and supplement one another. In terms of their objectives and the ways that they can be achieved, these initiatives are fully in line with the tasks put forward by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Finally, they give concrete expression to the main idea set out in the Warsaw Pact states' Sofia Appeal: A real chance of ensuring durable security through disarmament is opening up for Europe.

Gerasimov Holds Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

Reagan Admits Rights Problems

LD0505191288 Moscow TASS in English 1905 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—President Ronald Reagan's admission that the USA has its share of problems in the field of human rights is a fresh confirmation of the justice of the provision that the approach to these issues is a "two-way street", Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing today.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman described the speech made by the U.S. President in Chicago on the problems of human rights as a kind of a lecture on human rights, noting that it contains many arguable points. However, Gennadiy Gerasimov said, one cannot but agree with a provision in Ronald Reagan's speech that the main thing in international relations is the desire for a peaceful settlement of problems.

Humanitarian problems and questions of guarantees of human rights were at the centre of attention during today's briefing in the Press Centre of the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs. "It is necessary to move step-by-step along the road of rapprochement of the positions and of achieving agreements which in the final analysis are in the interests of all the participants in the Helsinki process," Fedor Burlatskiy, chairman of the newly-created Soviet Public Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, said in this connection.

As regards the very notion of human rights, in the West it is very frequently utilized for political, propagandistic and even speculative purposes against the socialist countries, including against the Soviet Union. In this sense, they try to reduce all human rights to one sole right—that to leave the USSR. "Our understanding of human rights is much broader," Gerasimov said. We consider, among other things, that every individual, as it is, incidentally, pointed out in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution, has the right to life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness. It is these major rights of the Arab people of Palestine that are constantly violated. Despite their flagrant violations, we do not hear any special protests on the part of the USA in connection with the flouting of the rights of the Palestinians.

The special attention which is now given to the problems of human rights can be seen from the fact, he said, that since quite recently this problematique [as received] is discussed at Soviet-American meetings, meetings of ministers and at the highest level, and it is discussed, moreover, in a constructive spirit.

Congress Limits Nuclear Tests

LD0505155188 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman today described as "quite reasonable and useful" an amendment passed by the U.S. House of Representatives to prohibit any nuclear tests exceeding the one-kiloton limit as long as the Soviet Union reciprocates.

The spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov, said the measure fitted in with efforts made at full-scale Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva for limiting nuclear testing and eventually discontinuing it altogether.

Gerasimov, who is the ministry's chief for information, said also in connection with those negotiations that an "airlift" was being organized to prepare a joint verification experiment at the Semipalatinsk and Nevada test sites in the two countries.

During the airlift operation six U.S. Air Force transport planes will fly U.S. drilling equipment needed for the experiment to Semipalatinsk over several days, according to the spokesman.

The experiment, he said, should form the basis for decisions on improved verification arrangements to monitor compliance with the 1974 treaty limiting underground nuclear weapon tests.

Gerasimov reported also that the Soviet Union and Britain had reached a specific understanding on exchanging expert visits to military chemical facilities at Shikhany, USSR, and Porton Down, Britain.

The visit to Porton Down will take place on May 23-27 and the one to Shikhany on June 30-July 4.

"The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that much significance to successfully concluding a convention on a complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons belongs to trust and openness in this field," Gerasimov said.

Commenting on the latest edition of the U.S. pamphlet "Soviet Military Power", he said it showed an obvious desire to exonerate Washington's military buildup programs, by renovating the rather dilapidated myth about a "Soviet military threat", and to bring pressure on U.S. NATO allies in Europe to increase their contribution to bolstering the bloc's non-nuclear potential.

U.S. CW Accusation Disputed

LD0505211988 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1546 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 5 May (TASS)—"The Soviet Union is not conducting research and development aimed at creating or further improving biological, bacteriological,

or toxic weapons," Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, stated here today. He was commenting on a Reuter report on a statement by Harrison, deputy assistant U.S. secretary of state, alleging that the Soviet Union is maintaining an offensive military biological program in contravention of the 1972 convention.

As has happened on more than one occasion in the past, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman commented, accusations that we have contravened agreements are put forward when there is a desire in the United States to get money to implement military programs, and far from indisputable ones, at that. This time, it is a matter of financing construction of a military biological facility in Utah. The construction and future activities of this facility are giving rise to legitimate concern among Americans, including some in Congress, in connection with the fact that it might be used in contravention of the 1972 convention.

"Instead of dispersing such fears, the deputy assistant secretary of state could find nothing better than to accuse the Soviet Union of failing to observe this convention. The U.S. spokesman's statement, G. Gerasimov underlined, does not fit with the unfolding process of strengthening trust between the states signatory to the convention, among whom there has begun an exchange of information about the activities of laboratories with a high level of protection, about unusual outbreaks of diseases and about peaceful use of biological achievements."

Gulf War, CW Exports Viewed

LD0505153588 Moscow TASS in English 1515 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—Washington's course towards giving greater scope to the activities of the U.S. naval force in the Persian Gulf increases the probability of various incidents and enhances the danger of an unpredictable development of events in the area, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a briefing today.

He emphasized that the Persian Gulf problem is of international character and it should be tackled on the basis of collective efforts. The Soviet Union suggests that the naval forces of non-littoral states be withdrawn from the Persian Gulf area and be replaced by appropriate naval contingents of the United Nations Organisation.

"The implementation of this proposal," the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out, "would promote efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and to restore stability in the Persian Gulf area in accordance with Resolution 598 of the U.N. Security Council. That would become a considerable practical step towards reducing naval activity in general."

The Foreign Ministry's spokesman refuted the slanderous assertions, published in the West German newspaper FRANKFURTHER RUNDSCHAU recently, about some involvement of the Soviet Union in Iraq's receiving chemical weapons.

"The Soviet Union did not transfer its chemical weapons or technology and equipment for their production to anyone," he stated. As far as Tabun gas mentioned by the newspaper is concerned, this country has never been armed with it altogether. In the Soviet Union, there are rigid rules concerning the export of chemicals which are of civilian purpose but can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons. We did not supply any of the chemicals either to Iran or Iraq."

"The Soviet Union condemns and will continue to condemn any use of chemical weapons in breach of the 1925 Geneva protocol irrespective of who and under what conditions violated the protocol," Gennadiy Gerasimov went on to say. "A breach of the protocol is inadmissible and it would run counter to the norms of civilisation and humaneness, and cannot be justified by any considerations."

The head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the Soviet Union regarded with satisfaction the report on Saudi Arabia's decision to join the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Saudi Arabia's participation in the treaty will be a positive example for other countries which by virtue of this or that consideration have not yet become parties to the treaty.

Pakistan 'Extremists' Condemned

LD0505151888 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate, addressing a briefing in the ministry's Press Centre today, made the following statement:

"The implementation of the Geneva agreements on settling the situation relating to Afghanistan has begun as U.N. groups have arrived to Islamabad and Kabul to observe compliance with the commitments stemming from these accords.

"In the first place, this is related to questions connected with the cessation of interference in Afghanistan's affairs.

"The world public, including in Western countries and NATO, welcomed the Geneva agreements, regarding them as a breakthrough in the solution of regional conflicts.

"The successful completion of the Geneva negotiations made it more real to achieve an internal Afghan settlement and establish an inter-Afghan dialogue.

"Pakistani-based extremist organisations, however, flatly rejected the Geneva accords, saying that they would fight till the end. In other words, they regard the overthrow of the legitimate government in Afghanistan as their sole objective.

"The news of a meeting between the extremist leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, and heads of the diplomatic missions of the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and Greece came from Peshawar.

"If the ambassadors of those countries had made an attempt to persuade the extremists to take a realistic look at developments and respond to the Afghan Government's calls to cease fire and settle outstanding issues by peaceful means, that meeting would have probably evoked a certain positive response.

"Judging from Pakistani press reports, however, the meeting was of a clearly provocative character. It grew into an expression of encouragement and support for the policy of the forces which are opposed to the Geneva agreements and cessation of bloodshed in Afghanistan and are guided by purely selfish and egoistic interests.

"The Geneva agreements open up prospects for resolving the Afghan problem. The task is to facilitate in all ways the implementation of the agreements rather than to add fuel to the fire of the fratricidal war."

Geneva Disarmament Session Ends

LD0505142088 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—The results of the spring session of the conference on disarmament, which ended in Geneva April 29 after making only limited progress in its work, have left many participants worried, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing here today.

Gerasimov, chief of the ministry's Information Directorate, said the session had shown low productivity despite certain improvement in the world situation and positive shifts in the Soviet-U.S. relationship.

"The only area where some headway has been made is the drafting of a multilateral agreement for banning chemical weapons," he continued.

"But talks on the problem have now reached a phase where every participant should make the appropriate political decision.

"The Soviet Union has said a decisive yes, as have a number of other nations.

"The United States so far has said neither yes nor no. Mention ought to be made also of the position of France, which has not been conducive to a successful completion of the talks," Gerasimov said.

It had not proved possible to open multilateral talks on the other issues on the conference's agenda, including a nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and nuclear disarmament, he added.

"The main stumbling block in the way of the multilateral negotiations is, as before, the posturing of the U.S. delegation which has been not only blocking their commencement, but also countering in every way efforts to start substantial work," Gerasimov said.

Burlatskiy Receives Amnesty International Group

LD0505141088 Moscow TASS in English 1353 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—"It is necessary to press for drawing positions closer to achieve the earliest completion of the Vienna follow-up meeting on security and cooperation in Europe," Fyodor Burlatskiy, chairman of the Soviet Public Commission for Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, has pointed out.

He described the participation of the commission's delegation in the work of the Vienna forum at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center today.

Documents of the Vienna meeting had been on the whole drafted, he said. Some items, related, specifically, to human rights had already been agreed upon.

Members of the Soviet commission sought to stimulate the search for mutually acceptable solutions to adopt a final document.

"It is necessary to move step after step towards drawing the positions closer and achieving agreements in which all parties to the Helsinki process are ultimately interested," Burlatskiy said.

In Vienna, the delegation met with representatives of the International Helsinki Human Rights Committee. This meeting continued the exchange of views held during the Moscow visit by the organisation's representatives.

"We came to the conclusion that the contacts in Vienna were fruitful and constructive. The dialogue in Moscow launched an effective process of cooperation."

Members of the Soviet delegation met in Vienna with representatives of Amnesty International, Burlatskiy said, adding that the leaders of Amnesty International proposed holding a new meeting in Paris.

'Simplistic' Approach to Western 'Enemy' Derided

PM0505103188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 May 88 Morning Edition p 5

["Letter to the Editorial Office" From O. Gusarevich of Nizhniy Odes village, Sosnogorskiy Rayon, Komi ASSR, followed by IZVESTIYA political observer S. Kondrashov commentary under the general heading: "Dogged Struggle Ahead"]

[Text] The USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was the greatest event of last year and may be the start of the greatest events of this century. It is being greeted enthusiastically by all peoples and governments on all continents. People have been thrilled by the possibility of peace and captivated by hopes of peace.

But it would be advisable to explain our enemy's motivation, an enemy who has now become our negotiating partner. Perhaps our desire for peace has broken capitalism's spirit? Or perhaps we have convinced Reagan, who has for a long time described us as the evil empire and in front of journalists has rehearsed commands for beginning bombings of this empire?

So, our side will destroy 1,752 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and the Americans, 859. Enough fine words have been said as to what we will gain from this, and I cannot add anything. But let's try to put ourselves in the position of those who have not abandoned their long-term aims of world domination. What kind of logic do they have?

First, in their eyes the partial reduction and destruction of these missiles does not rule out the "Strategic Defense Initiative" and is occurring at the same time as the development of research work in this sphere.

Second, such a quantity of nuclear firepower has been accumulated that even if one side were able to carry out a disarming strike, the catastrophe would still be worldwide and neither the side in question nor the whole world would escape "nuclear winter." Therefore, and people across the ocean evidently realize this also, given the number of nuclear weapons accumulated, it would be foolish to attack first. What is the solution for the side that wants to reserve the right to a first strike? The solution is essentially simple and peaceable in appearance: a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear armaments. That is, so many nuclear weapons have been accumulated that there must be sufficient reductions to give the side intending to create the "Strategic Defense Initiative" system a chance of surviving a first strike. Since the destruction of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is opening up scope for a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear armaments, we can agree to the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles without suffering any damage.

Third, the peoples of the entire world, including America, the FRG, and Britain, have grown tired of excessive nuclear tension and are demanding guarantees of peace. Peace supporters in all countries have acquired a force to be reckoned with. Therefore, the creators of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" are faced with the choice of either quelling peace-loving sentiments with a new "witch-hunt" and military psychosis or associating themselves with the peaceable demands by satisfying them, hurrying events along, gradually dulling people's interest in this question, and damping down fiery passions, thus causing peace-loving sentiments to die down and bringing the "Strategic Defense Initiative" to its conclusion.

Fourth, the arms race is draining our economy. We cannot compare our expenditure in monetary terms with that of the Americans, but you could say that the increase in our expenditure of labor resources on the production of equivalent armaments is equivalent to the decrease in our labor productivity. Moreover, America relieves its military burden at the expense of the Third World, which pays it tribute from its trillion-dollar debt. It knows how to shift a proportion of the expense onto its allies, while we offer selfless aid to many countries. By deploying SDI, our partners are not averse to involving us in further expense.

Fifth, we have pledged that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Our enemy partners know fine well that we will not attack first, but they still poison the minds of their peoples with propaganda about the "Soviet military threat." This lie often achieves its purpose because, however strange this may seem, it is made up of two truths: We are indeed well armed and can strike back, and our very existence poses a threat to capitalism. By cunningly merging these two truths and passing off the threat to capitalism as a threat to the peoples, our partners turn two great truths into one great lie, but we don't have time to answer this and are often fooled.

So why will Washington, London, and Bonn now disarm with us and destroy their missiles? Because nuclear weapons stocks must be reduced so that given SDI, a first strike is possible, because SDI enables them to drain our economy, because we will not be the first to attack since war and arms expenditure are not to our advantage, and because the correlation of forces in the world is such that a further round in the state-of-the-art space arms race is possible given the partial destruction of the old weapons.

As we can see, a surprising situation has arisen of benefit to both sides: Some need peace, and reductions have been achieved and missiles destroyed; others, contemplating a first strike, are promoting the "Strategic Defense Initiative" under cover of the disarmament.

Does this mean that we must not ratify the treaty on the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and must oppose the 50-percent reduction in strategic missiles?

Not at all! It means that we must simply correctly determine the significance of these accords without exaggerating their victory and without underestimating the might of our enemy partners.

We remember too well the grievous experience of 1941 when we overestimated our possibilities of postponing war. Almost half a century has elapsed since then, two generations have come and gone, but to this day the people have still not gotten over their grief.

Not a single unbiased observer could find people in our country who would like war or expenditure on arms production.

The new relations between our peoples have been described as new thinking. But this would be a meaningless slogan if it were not for the example of the elimination of the missiles which define it. For 70 years, our relations with capitalist countries have been determined by class irreconcilability, bitterness, and even animosity. In wartime, bitterness helped us muster our strength and stand our ground, and it later helped restore what had been destroyed. But at the same time, it was artificially kindled to blind hatred and senseless animosity in order to be able to establish arbitrary rule in an atmosphere clouding the consciousness. Now we are rejecting this and can see responsive movement. We do not want people to fear us, and missiles must be reduced so that there is no reason for people to fear us. But we must keep a clear head and firm spirit when casting off animosity and hatred.

The treaty that has been concluded and the one that is expected have caused a thaw in relations between our peoples. We are delighted by this and seemingly prepared to maintain it at any cost. We may do a great deal for this and are even ready to forget that the thaw is not only down to us and that it could end at any moment with a Boeing flying over Kamchatka, U.S. warships visiting the Crimea, our diplomats being kidnapped, and many other surefire ploys of which our enemy partner has a perfect knowledge—the experience of 1941 shows that we can pay a high price for a thaw but not any price.

All this must be said so that millions of ordinary people such as the women of Greenham Common realize that if SDI or any new spiral in the state-of-the-art arms race comes to fruition, then the destruction of army bases like Greenham Common is not a victory but a change of stance and that our enemy partner is getting rid of millions of its steadfast enemies along with the missiles. So when we describe this as a victory, we are misleading everyone with this twaddle.

Questions of war and peace are resolved not only at the negotiating table but mainly in fields, farms, plants, and factories. Strictly speaking, we will ensure peace if we master scientific and technical progress to the same degree as capitalism. Therefore, the destruction of the missiles and all peace treaties en bloc will not compensate for the detriment done to the cause of peace by our lag in labor productivity.

In my opinion, it is too early to say how near the treaty that has been concluded and the upcoming treaty have brought us to peace. It is clear that a dogged exhausting battle lies ahead and, as always, we will only be able to correctly assess our actions today in the future.

[Kondrashov] Some of O. Gusarevich's arguments for and against the Washington treaty are acceptable and some disputable. Like every reader he has the right to his own viewpoint, and, ultimately, only time can tell who is right and who is wrong.

Yet if I undertake to make some brief concluding remarks, it is only because the fact that this article that was published is unusual. In the era of glasnost, foreign senators have their work published in IZVESTIYA. Foreign political specialists, too. But hitherto there has been no space there for our readers' articles on international topics.

The review "Voices From the People" ["Golosa iz Naroda"] (IZVESTIYA No 37, 1988) reported that letters linked with international questions form a small percentage of the editorial mailbag. This was occasioned, in particular, by the prevailing opinion that diplomacy is for the sacred few. The reader does not not want to appear ignorant.

Not everyone concurred with this explanation. G. Alekseyeva, a reader from Leningrad and also an engineer, reacted in the following way: "I am not afraid of appearing ignorant. I am ignorant, but not always through my own fault." She went on to say: "People in our country have always believed and still do believe that the government expresses the view of its people, but no one has ever been interested in the people's opinion: It was assumed to be the same as that of political observers, who seemed to have set themselves the target of imparting uniformity to their views and ours.... We have a great deal to think about with incomplete information. A great deal is incomprehensible, and at present, nothing changes whether you write or not."

This opinion is, possibly, too categorical. But there is a healthy seed of criticism there. O. Gusarevich has chosen a different path, and we are publishing his article with certain abridgements occasioned only by the shortage of news space.

In my opinion, this is an article by a man who looks at a subject not from within like professional writers on international affairs but in a somewhat detached manner. In this way details, even substantial ones, are not always discerned. "That side" and "our enemy partner" are seen as a sort of monolith, which is not always borne out in practice.

The main flaw in the writer's logic is that it is based on lack of faith in the power of the new thinking and its influence on the opposing side. O. Gusarevich is proceeding on the basis of an outmoded premise that the West desires without fail military confrontation with us in one way or another. At the same time, more and more Western politicians, above all those in power, understand just as well as we do the catastrophic consequences of modern warfare.

The summary of O. Gusarevich's arguments, for instance, as to "why Washington, London, and Bonn will disarm and destroy missiles with us" somewhat simplifies matters. It seems that the writer is proceeding on the premise that our enemy partners are not only protecting their own interests but also want to hurt and deceive us. So some people are not averse to deception, but there are more sensible people and politicians in the West than the writer gives credit for. Certainly our side also has to defend its own interests.

Moreover, the writer unnecessarily absolutizes SDI, seeing it as some kind of fait accompli and losing sight of the fact that intense fighting is under way in the United States itself around this program and that it has as least as many convinced opponents as supporters. In terms of its technical implementation, SDI is still far from being a reality. On the other hand, the writer has apparently forgotten that the emergence of the danger of transferring the arms race into space is an element in our stance at the talks on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments.

Some of the blame for this simplistic approach lies with us professional writers on international affairs. For a long time, we have been assiduously cultivating suspicion about everything coming from the United States and the West in general, and now the consequences of this are rebounding on us even in the opinions of a sensible and intelligent man.

United States & Canada

'New' Tone of Reagan Speech in Chicago Praised

Human Rights, Summit Issues Cited

LD0605114988 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 5 May 88

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] President Reagan addressed the National Strategy Forum organization on 4 May in Chicago. He dealt in his speech with Soviet-American relations pertaining to the forthcoming top level meeting between the leaders of the two countries. This time the President addressed the organization that sponsors educational programs on national security. This presupposes that attention should be focused on the promotion of security of the United States and other countries, that is, on problems associated with a further reduction of nuclear and other weapons. And this is especially important since the Moscow summit is not far away.

The experience of the previous top level meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington shows that there is no way for the two countries to get away from these problems on which humanity's survival hinges. But this doesn't mean, of course, that the importance of the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union and the United States, on which the President laid emphasis in his speech, should be belittled. This issue is raised invariably during Soviet-American talks at all levels. The human rights issue was often the initial topic of discussion between the Soviet foreign minister and the American secretary of state.

Understanding on these matters have already begun taking shape. The President laid accent in his Chicago speech on what has already been stressed around the world, that is, the Soviet Union is living through the process of democratization and is correcting the errors of the past in the human rights area among others, and we applaud the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union, the President said. He also admitted that there exist alarming problems in the human rights area in the United States. They include unemployment, homelessness, and racial discrimination, and we'd like to regard this as the President's attempt to be objective.

Humanitarian issues, human rights among others, will of course be discussed at the forthcoming summit, like they were during all the previous top level meetings. And this is only natural, since the concept of an all-embracing security includes in itself respect for human rights, based on international covenants and on the respect for the sovereignty of the states. Yet Washington's attempt to get away from key issues of Soviet-American relations and international security, from problems connected with a further advance down the road of disarmament, cannot help but put the public on the lookout.

Incidentally, when the newspaper CHICAGO TRIBUNE reported in advance about the President's speech in Chicago, it pointed out, with reference to Washington's official, that no emphasis will be made in it on disarmament. The paper quoted one of the high ranking White House officials as saying that the President's speeches were used for spelling out his agenda and stressing the issues that the president attaches importance to in the absence of the agreement on arms control. And this is how the most crucial issues are pushed aside in advance.

But the preparation of a really productive summit requires the attainment of agreements covering key policy issues. It's hardly surprising, therefore, that when the President finished his speech, those present asked him first and foremost about the prospects of the preparation of an agreement of a 50-percent cut in strategic weapons. Like the Soviet people, for the Americans this is undoubtedly the number one issue associated with the forthcoming summit in Moscow.

President Notes Soviet 'Progress'

PM0605130988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 88 Second Edition p 7

[Article by political observer Gennadiy Vasilyev: "If They Are To Restructure Themselves.... About a Speech by the U.S. President"]

[Text] Who said that conservative politicians are incapable of learning? No, they learn and make adjustments to their words and actions. Only, in my view, they are restructuring themselves too slowly. Not wishing to rid themselves entirely of old hackneyed stereotypes.

I have in mind U.S. President R. Reagan's latest speech. Addressing a "National Strategy Forum" in Chicago on 4 May, the head of the administration once again spoke of Soviet-U.S. relations, and once again, as in all his previous speeches, focused attention on human rights. We already know that the existing political and social system in the Soviet Union "does not suit" the U.S. President. In this sense, there was nothing new in the speech. He again said that "the Soviets must recognize basic human rights...since they have assumed international obligations in this regard." (Strangely "forgetting" that the United States itself has not even ratified 16 of the 22 most important international documents on human rights). Once again there were homilies on freedom of speech and, this time, freedom of religion.

What was new—and the U.S. press at once pointed this out—was that this time, the tone of the speech was markedly different from Reagan's three previous speeches. The President deemed it necessary to acknowledge progress in the sphere of the democratization of Soviet society and to note certain shortcomings in the United States itself. This is how this was formulated. About us: "In recent months, the Soviet Union has shown readiness to respect at least some human rights....

I do not want to say that no progress has been made in the Soviet economy." About themselves: "There are social and economic shortcomings in the United States. One of them is unemployment.... The homeless are really a problem, an agonizing problem.... This problem (racial discrimination—G.V.) remains, and we are struggling hard against fanaticism and prejudice."

As we see, progress is in evidence, as it were, in the sphere of a more objective view of themselves and us. So why the need once again to splash gasoline onto the fire of confrontation which has been fanned for decades? Is it not better to take a cool, refreshing shower and wash off the scab of ideological fanaticism? The President himself believes that his importunate homilies to us and his intolerance of forms of social structure that differ from the U.S. system are a manifestation of "realism." But what kind of realism is it if Americans in their relations with the Soviet Union, just like we in our relations with America, are dealing with a historical reality which they, like ourselves, are incapable of changing or refashioning to their own taste. But it is possible to poison the atmosphere of Soviet-U.S. dialogue, and prevent what all sensible people in the world expect of the two countries—the finding of joint solutions which will reverse the crazy nuclear race and make our world a safer and more just place.

For the President himself said: "We now have weapons which can destroy the world, so why should we not realize this threat more clearly and unite with a single purpose—use safe, sensible methods and quickly rid the world of this threat hanging over our civilization and existence?" Indeed, why not realize it and unite?

Official Cites 'Changes' in U.S. Rights Stance

LD0605124088 Moscow TASS in English 1225 GMT 6 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—"It is the key moment in transition from confrontation to elements of cooperation in the Soviet-American dialogue on humanitarian problems that the American side has admitted that there are human rights problems at home and expressed readiness to discuss these problems with the Soviet Union," Alexey Glukhov, first deputy head of the Department for Humanitarian and Cultural Relations at the USSR Foreign Ministry, has pointed out.

He said in an interview to a TASS correspondent that tonality as well as the results of the discussion were important.

"So far, regrettably, there are no signs of the United States' movement towards the solution of humanitarian problems, while in the Soviet Union there is such movement.

"Nevertheless certain changes are being made by the American side. U.S. Congress, for example, started debating the question of ratifying international human rights covenants which are fundamental documents in that field.

"There are some new positive elements with regard to the punishment of Nazi criminals, too."

The Foreign Ministry official drew attention to the fact that the structure of humanitarian problems in the Soviet Union and the United States was different. "That is why the prevalent view in the United States is that the Soviet side is primarily concerned with social and economic problems," he added.

"We also raise the question of a great number of political prisoners—campaigners for the rights of the Indian population, all coloured people in the United States, for the independence of Puerto Rico."

One should admit that many laws in the United States simply did not meet international standards, Glukhov said. Soviet legislation, too, had some remnants of the past that did not correspond to present-day notions and standards.

Much work was being done in the Soviet Union to bridge that gap. "An exchange of views may help clarify in a tactful way without interference in internal affairs the weak spots in the position of the two sides and the possibilities for their rectification."

"Regrettably, the American side is still inclined to use humanitarian issues for purposes of confrontation," he said. "U.S. officials are also involved in this course. Questions are raised not with a view to improving the destinies of people, but in the interests of propaganda."

The Soviet official said that the approach to discussing humanitarian problems should be constructive. "The Soviet side believes that business-like honest cooperation is not only possible, but also necessary in that difficult area, cooperation that would correspond to the interests of the peoples in the two countries and the imperatives of the times in general."

Congress Holds Hearings on Biological Warfare

LD0405153888 Moscow TASS in English 1311 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Washington May 4 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin:

Several House subcommittees in U.S. Congress, which are concerned with armed services, opened joint hearings Tuesday on the U.S. biological warfare program to question ranking officials from various departments on the subject.

The sitting began with verbal exchanges which closely resembled wrangling among people who refuse to understand one another.

The tone was set by Thomas Welch, deputy assistant secretary of defense, who complained right away that the topic of the hearings was irrelevant since the United States allegedly had neither such a program nor germ weapons and was involved together with other NATO members in a defensive program against such weapons.

But the attending congressmen wouldn't be sidetracked. Ronald Dellums, for example, asked what the Pentagon's specialists were going to do at the Dugway base where a major center is planned to be built to test bacteriological weapons.

The congressman did not get any coherent answer.

The influential U.S. magazine BUSINESS WEEK, however, disclosed recently that appropriations for the Pentagon to conduct research into germ weapons had grown to 90 million dollars in 1986 from 15 million dollars in 1981.

The figure does not include the five million dollars requested by the Defense Department to construct the supersecret facility at Dugway.

The Pentagon is using newest scientific methods, including genetic engineering, which make it possible, the magazine said, to produce cheaply large quantities of antibodies, toxins and other substances capable of making bacteriological weapons more effective.

Principal research into new kinds of such weaponry is under way at an infectious disease research center at the Fort Detrick Army Base in Maryland and the Walter Reed Army Research Institute in Washington.

A total of 23 million dollars were set aside for the purpose last fiscal year. Noting claims that those research efforts were directed at finding protection for servicemen and civilians, the BUSINESS WEEK suggested it would be more appropriate for them to be handled by civilian agencies.

U.S. Increases Naval Operations in Persian Gulf

LD0405211588 Moscow TASS in English 2008 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Washington May 4 TASS—The United States has decided to increase the scope of its military operations in the Persian Gulf. A spokesman for the Pentagon said that the U.S. naval force deployed in the area is faced with the task of taking vigorous actions if any vessel flying the flag of a friendly country is attacked in international waters. Prior to that the activity of U.S. ships was limited to escorting Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. flag, and a new, 28th escort this year set out on Tuesday.

Commenting on the Pentagon's decision, the U.S. press notes that the further intensification of activities of the U.S. naval force in the Persian Gulf leads to the growth of tension in the region and inevitably makes the United States deeper involved in the Iran-Iraq armed conflict.

A report of the ASSOCIATED PRESS says that the U.S. Department of State urged all diplomatic missions, the command of U.S. bases abroad and foreign missions of U.S. companies to take additional measures of caution against terrorist attacks. The letter of the Department of State says that the possibility of such actions increased after the recent raid of the U.S. naval force in the Persian Gulf on Iran's oil platforms and ships.

VOA Commentary on Pacific Forces Criticized

OW0505140788 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0300 GMT 21 Apr 88

[Commentary by station commentator Fedorov: "Uninvited Protector"]

[Text] In a radio broadcast to China a few days ago, the VOA talked about the military and political situation in the Pacific region. Judging from the contents of the commentary, one cannot be sure whether it was intended for the Chinese audience alone or for others as well.

My attention was brought to several viewpoints which were openly expounded in the commentary by author Hopkins, a VOA commentator. He was full of nostalgia about bygone times and still cherishes memories of the days when the U.S. Armed Forces were the domineering masters of the vast Pacific Ocean. In those days, the United States called the Pacific its own inland lake.

Hopkins, the author, thinks the present situation is very abnormal because in the Pacific today, one finds not only the U.S. fleet but also fleets of other littoral nations, including the Soviet Union and China. Mr Hopkins says: The appearance of the Soviet and Chinese fleets creates a state of military confrontation in the Pacific. This statement summarizes the main points of his commentary.

Hopkins obviously believes that the U.S. fleet alone is enough for the Pacific. His logic is this: The Pacific is an inland lake of the United States. Knowing Mr Hopkins' logic, one is not surprised by his viewpoint. He believes that the following state of affairs is normal: The Soviet naval headquarters should be in Vladivostok, in the Soviet Union's own territory. But the U.S. naval headquarters should be in the Philippines, a Pacific coastal nation. To support his view, he says: Since the continuous expansion of both the Soviet and Chinese Navy spells a lot of trouble for the United States, how can the United States afford not to expand its own navy? VOA reporter Hopkins [words indistinct] accuses China of not recognizing the role of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific in dealing with the Soviet Union's daily-increasing armed forces in the Far East. According to his

point of view, China is a nation devoid of gratitude. The United States is protecting her. U.S. naval vessels are patrolling near the Chinese coast and frequently visit China's Taiwan. Yet China has not shown the slightest bit of gratitude.

House Committee Approves South African Sanctions

LD0405194588 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Washington April 28 TASS—The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee approved by 27 votes against 14 on Tuesday the bill providing for the imposition of a partial embargo on trade with the racist RSA.

In accordance with that document a ban is to be clamped down on the export of American products to the RSA, with the exception of granting economic aid, as well as aid from private sources for assistance to health protection and religious activities. The bill simultaneously provides for a ban on import from the RSA, with the exception of some types of strategic raw materials. The U.S. citizens are prohibited to make capital investments in the South African Republic.

In the course of the debate on the bill, an amendment was made, making an exception for the export of foodstuffs to the RSA. The sanctions will come into force six months after the bill becomes law.

Evaluating the chances for the approval of the bill by the full complement of the House of Representatives, the UPI agency notes that this is a realistic opportunity, since representatives of the Democratic Party, who have a majority in the lower chamber of the U.S. Congress, evaluate that step as a politically beneficial one in the year of presidential elections. As far as the Senate is concerned, the bill may meet with serious opposition among the Republicans.

In 1986 the U.S. Congress, acting contrary to President Reagan's veto, already adopted a bill on the imposition of limited economic sanctions vis-a-vis RSA. Yet these sanctions were applied only to some industries which, as the UPI agency notes, had little effect on the apartheid system in the RSA.

U.S. Perpetuates 'Domination' of Virgin Islands

LD0405211488 Moscow TASS in English 2004 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] New York May 4 TASS—TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov reports:

The concentration of U.S. forces and U.S. military exercises in the territory of the Virgin Islands which have been a possession of the United States since 1917 obstruct the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, says a document circulated by the U.N. Secretariat on Tuesday.

A U.S. naval base, Coast Guard units and the staff of the National Guards—this is a far from complete list of U.S. military units and facilities situated on the Virgin Islands in the West Indies, east of Puerto Rico.

The document issued by the U.N. Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation says that the United States is under an obligation to promote a political, economic and social progress of the population of the Virgin Islands. Despite the demands of the overwhelming majority of the United Nations member-countries to end the colonial status of small territories, the United States is striving to perpetuate its domination of the islands.

U.S. Resolution on Religion in Ukraine Noted

LD0405143288 Moscow TASS in English 1353 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 4 TASS—TASS political news analyst Natoliy Krasikov writes:

Reports from Washington say that U.S. President Ronald Reagan has signed a U.S. Congress resolution "deploring the Soviet Government's active persecution of religious believers in Ukraine".

The resolution, which is timed for the celebration of the millennium of the baptism of Russia, discourages official participation by the Government of the United States in ceremonies of the millenium in the USSR "so long as individuals remain harassed and imprisoned for their religious beliefs, are denied access to religious literature and the opportunity to receive religious instruction, and the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches remain outlawed".

In March this year when a draft resolution to this effect was only under consideration, a statement by a group of deputies of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet, the top state power body of one of the 15 Soviet union republics, was delivered to the Congress. The statement expressed a protest against interference from across the ocean in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian people. If the United States listened to the voice of the Ukrainian parliamentarians, today we would not have to comment on the document which cannot be qualified otherwise than as a monument of dense incompetence of its sponsors.

At present we have to remind the members of Congress and the President as follows: normally functioning in the Ukraine are more than four thousand orthodox parishes, more than a thousand prayer houses of Christian Baptists, more than a hundred Catholic churches, Pentecostalists' prayer houses, synagogues, and other places of worship. The errors made as regards the church and believers in the 1930s and in subsequent years are being rectified.

In view of the approaching celebrations on the occasion of the millennium of the Baptism of Russia, a jubilee edition of the bible is being published in the Soviet Union in a mass impression. A large batch of religious literature, including the Bible, comes as a gift to Soviet Christians from co-religionists abroad. The previously existing customs restrictions upon bringing such literature into the USSR have been lifted. And finally—and this is of particular importance—a new law on the freedom of conscience is being elaborated. It will also reflect the interest of religious organisations.

Of course, not all matters connected with the exercise of the constitutional right of citizens in the USSR to profess any religion or not to profess any have been settled now. But they are being tackled in the interests of all citizens of the USSR both believers and non-believers in the conditions of economic restructuring and democratisation of Soviet society.

It is naive and ridiculous to believe that this is being done for the sake of showing off or pleasing some people abroad. The members of the U.S. Congress and President of the United States may sleep well: their calls which hopelessly lag behind actuality will evoke only an ironic smile in the USSR. It would be better if they tackle the problems of the freedom of conscience back at home: as far as we know there are not so few people in the United States (including those in upper echelons) who, while publicising their religiosity, show through their entire lifestyle that to them faith is not more than a cover for not quite evangelical acts.

And finally: about "discouragement" of U.S. representatives' official participation in the festivities marking the millennium of the baptism of Russia. Well, this is their own concern. No one is going to insist upon anyone's participation in celebrations in the USSR. It would be better, though, if people across the ocean listened to what Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galich, the exarch of the Ukraine, said in February when meeting British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Geoffrey Howe.

"We hope", the religious leader said, "that our jubilee will contribute not only to broadening ties between churches but also to building trust between East and West, the trust which we are lacking today".

Northeast Asia

Further on DPRK's Kim Yong-nam Moscow Visit

Holds News Conference

LD0505130388 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1148 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 5 May (TASS)—Kim Yong-nam, member of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Politburo, vice premier of the DPRK Administration Council of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, and DPRK foreign minister, held a news conference in Moscow today for Soviet and foreign journalists.

He gave a high appraisal of the conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which took place the day before.

Speaking about the talks with Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, the guest noted their useful and friendly nature. The unity of views and opinions which was shown, the Korean minister stressed, is testimony to the fraternal nature of relations between the DPRK and the USSR. The results of the talks will help the successful development of these relations, he stated.

During the news conference Kim Yong-nam focused attention on the question of the situation on the Korean peninsula, reaffirming the DPRK's determination to continue the efforts aimed at the withdrawal of U.S. troops from there, at turning the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, and the reunification of Korea on a peaceful, democratic basis.

The visit to the USSR, Kim Yong-nam said, has given one a better understanding of the process of the renewal of all aspects of the life of Soviet society. We support the policy of restructuring and wish the Soviet people success in carrying it out.

Gorbachev Supports DPRK

SK0505133688 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1200 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, yesterday met with Comrade Kim Yong-nam, member of the WPK [Workers Party of Korea] Central Committee Politburo, vice premier of the State Administration Council, and foreign minister of the DPRK who is on an official goodwill visit to the USSR, at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At the meeting, Comrade Kim Yong-nam conveyed warm greetings from the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il to Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev. He also conveyed a personal letter of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song to Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev. Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev expressed deep thanks for this, and asked Comrade Kim Yong-nam to convey his sincere, warm greetings [chungsimuiro toenun ttugoun insa] to Comrades Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il.

Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that today the situation on the Korean peninsula has become a focal point of Asian and Pacific areas. He said: We are always on your side because proposals made by the DPRK are all constructive and farsighted. Your proposals are not

only in the national interest, but also in the interest of other countries. In other words, they correspond to the affirmative trend [kungjongchok chuse].

He stressed that the Soviet Union will firmly maintain a principled position in resolving the Korean issue and will support the DPRK's line for easing tension on the Korean peninsula and for realizing preconditions for political dialogue between the North and the South. He wished the fraternal Korean people new success in socialist construction and expressed the firm belief that the friendship and cooperative relations between the Soviet Union and Korea will be expanded and developed.

The talks proceeded in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Present at the talks were Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Soviet foreign minister, and Gennadiy Bartoshevich, Soviet ambassador to our country. Kwon Hui-kyong, ambassador of our country to the Soviet Union, was also at the meeting.

Leaves For Warsaw

LD0505174888 Moscow TASS in English 1720 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—Kim Yong-nam, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, vice-premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK, left here for Warsaw today.

He stayed in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Gorbachev Meets With JCP's Fuwa in Moscow

OW0505170688 Tokyo KYODO in English 1636 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 5 KYODO—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was quoted here Thursday as saying the Soviet stance in the upcoming Moscow summit will be that reaching an agreement for a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear forces must be combined with controls on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Gorbachev made the comment regarding prospects of the U.S.-Soviet summit, scheduled to begin May 29, during a two-hour meeting with the Japan Communist Party's [JCP] Central Committee vice chairman, Tetsuzo Fuwa.

In a meeting with reporters in Moscow Thursday, Fuwa said he presented Gorbachev with his party's proposal for a two-stage solution to the long-standing Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute over a group of islands east of Hokkaido, referred to by Japan as "the Northern Territories," a major problem pending between Japan and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II.

Fuwa said he proposed that in the first stage, the Soviets would return Shikotan Island and the Habomai Island group to Japanese control. The proposal said the return of the remaining Kurile Islands would follow after the signing of a formal bilateral peace treaty. Fuwa told the Soviet leader that the proposal represents the JCP's official position, and requested that the Soviets to [as received] join in discussions over the idea in future Soviet-Japanese inter-party meetings.

Gorbachev agreed to the inter-party consultations in general but did not directly comment on the territorial issue, Fuwa said.

Fuwa also said he told Gorbachev that the praise of the top opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP) by the Soviet Communist Party in its official gazette and elsewhere is "a mistake," and that JSP is anticommunist and dissolutionist in the Japanese antinuclear movement. Gorbachev was quoted as saying he would look into Fuwa's explanations and documents on the matter, but avoided showing his view on the problem.

The Japanese delegation arrived in Moscow Monday.

Dobrynin 'Uncommitted' on Gorbachev Visit

OW0605031288 Tokyo KYODO in English 0102 GMT 6 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 5 KYODO—A high-ranking Soviet official Thursday remained uncommitted to a Japanese request for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to visit Tokyo this year. The request was made by Takako Doi, leader of the Japan Socialist Party, in a meeting with Anotoliy Dobrynin, head of the international division of the Soviet Communist Party, JSP officials said. Dobrynin said, however, that he cannot rule out the possibility of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo this year for regular foreign ministerial consultations with Japan, they said.

Doi arrived in Moscow at the head of a delegation from Japan's largest opposition party on a weeklong visit to the Soviet Union. She is scheduled to hold talks with Gorbachev Friday.

Dobrynin responded negatively to a question on whether Moscow and Washington can reach agreement on a 50 percent cut in strategic nuclear arms by May 29 when the two countries start a summit meeting. He said the two superpowers are still unable to clear obstacles, including the inspection of the sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM).

Visiting JSP Leader Gives Moscow Lecture

OW0505172788 Tokyo KYODO in English 1549 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 5 KYODO—Takako Doi, visiting chairwoman of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), pledged in her lecture at Moscow University Thursday her continued efforts to defend Japan's war-renouncing state

Constitution. The Japanese Constitution based on popular sovereignty, basic human rights and pacifism is increasingly important under present world circumstances where tension, especially between the Soviet Union and the United States is easing, Doi said.

The leader of the No 1 Japanese opposition party delivered the one-hour lecture before some 300 teachers and students at the university. Doi began her talk on the Japanese Constitution by saying how honored she was to speak at Moscow University, party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's alma mater. Doi, who arrived here Wednesday, is scheduled to meet Gorbachev on Friday.

In her lecture, Doi pointedly asked why Japanese soldiers taken prisoner by Soviet troops during and after World War II were harshly treated and subjected to long periods of forced labor in Siberia.

In a question-and-answer session after the lecture, a Soviet student expressed hope that problems pending between the Soviet Union and Japan would soon be resolved. The student also hoped that the JSP would increase its influence in Japan and achieve great things. Doi thanked the student for his encouraging words and departed to warm applause.

She is scheduled to leave Moscow for Leningrad on Saturday and return here on Tuesday to continue her stay. The JSP leader will leave here next Wednesday night and return to Tokyo Thursday.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Gilashvili Delegation Continues Asian Tour

Philippine News Conference

HK0305121588 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 1 May 88 p 4

[Text] Congressional leaders have reached an understanding with three visiting Soviet parliamentarians that no country should be burdened with foreign military presence.

Pavel Gilashvili, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the USSR's parliament, told a press conference yesterday that Soviet and Filipino legislators also agreed to establish "more systematic and regular" contacts to strengthen relations between the two countries.

The world should emerge into the 21st century "free of nuclear weapons...and military bases," Gilashvili said.

Speaking through an interpreter, he said the Soviet Union had an interest in regional peace because it was part of the Asia-Pacific region.

He stressed that global problems needed "internationalized efforts," with nations acting in "full solidarity" regardless of their distance from one another.

Gilashvili and two other parliamentarians are on a "friendship visit" around Asia. With him are Vladislovas Mikuchyauskas of the transportation and communications commission and Vera Lebedeva of the women's commission of the Soviet parliament.

While expressing objection to all kinds of foreign military bases in any country, the Soviets declined to comment on the ongoing review of the Philippine-U.S. military bases agreement.

"This question is of great concern for the Philippines, and they should resolve this problem themselves," Gilashvili said. "Our position is clear."

The three Soviet officials were at the Senate when the nuclear-weapons-free bill of Sen. Wigberto Tanada was being deliberated on, but Gilashvili said they did not stay long enough to appreciate the full discussion.

The Supreme Soviet is composed of 1,500 deputies, 492 of whom are women. They are elected popularly through secret balloting.

Gilashvili said his country was awaiting the visit of a Philippine congressional delegation in either June or July.

"We will be happy and grateful to receive anybody who will come," he said.

Indonesian Talks Summarized

BK0605104288 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1500 GMT 5 May 88

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The visit to Indonesia by the Soviet parliamentary delegation, led by Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Gilashvili, has ended. During the visit, the Soviet delegation met with Indonesian Vice President Sudharmono, during which Sudharmono stressed the need to increase mutual understanding and cooperation among all nations, as well as the need to remove mutual suspicion.

Sudharmono said that the Soviet-U.S. accord on the elimination of intermediate- and short-range missiles has a positive meaning, but a follow-up to the accord is necessary. Funds to finance the arms race should have been used for [words indistinct] and development. Sudharmono also stressed the importance of a new world order without arms and violence.

Indonesia's active and independent foreign policy is aimed at promoting friendly relations with all countries based on the principle of mutual respect regardless of the social and political system, noninterference in each others' internal affairs, and mutually beneficial cooperation. On the basis of these principles, Indonesia wishes to develop and forge closer relations with the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the Soviet parliamentary delegation explained the process of perestroyka taking place in various aspects of life in the Soviet Union. Stressing the urgent need to further promote interparliamentary contacts between the two countries, the Soviet parliamentarians again presented to their Indonesian counterparts an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. The Indonesian side also expressed its willingness to enhance interparliamentary contacts.

The two sides called for greater economic cooperation between the two countries. The Soviet side discussed the possibility of exporting heavy machinery to Indonesia and importing agricultural products from Indonesia.

During the meeting, the two sides also discussed an end to the nuclear arms race and the utilization of funds from disarmament for peaceful purposes. The Indonesian side expressed its satisfaction over the Soviet-U.S. disarmament accord and its hope for a follow-up to such accord. The Soviet side expressed confidence that Indonesia would play an active role in international forums to improve international relations.

Arrives in Singapore

LD0405214888 Moscow TASS in English 2108 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Kuala Lumpur May 4 TASS—The group of deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Pavel Gilashvili, vice president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who are now on a tour of a number of South East Asian countries (the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore), visited Singapore on their way back home. The delegation is to meet with members of the Singapore parliament and exchange views on issues of mutual interest.

Envoy Cites Inability To Pressure Vietnam

BK0405141088 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES in English 3 May 88 p 12

[Text] The Soviet Union cannot compel Vietnam to settle the Cambodian issue but it is willing to provide any assistance necessary to help resolve the Cambodian problem.

Reiterating Moscow's stand, the Soviet ambassador to Singapore, Mr Anatoliy M. Dryukov, told the Singapore Press Club yesterday Vietnam was a sovereign, independent state and that "history proves it is useless to try and pressure Vietnam".

Mr Dryukov was confident that the Vietnamese would stick to their plan to withdraw militarily from Cambodia by 1990.

The issue, however, he added, will have to be settled by the Khmer people themselves.

The Soviet stance, similar to Vietnam's, differs from the position held by ASEAN and by the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, both of which believe no real settlement is possible without the participation of Vietnam.

On Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroyka, or retructuring programme, Mr Dryukov said it aims to solve internal problems within the Soviet Union and "to drastically change the structure of our economy".

The ambassador said Mr Gorbachev's perestroyka policies was backed by the majority of the people in the Soviet Union although the process of change "is very difficult and very painful".

During a question and answer session after his speech, Mr Dryukov tried to downplay the significance of the Soviet military bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang in Vietnam.

While acknowledging the active role of the Soviet Navy, he said: "We don't threaten anyone in this region. We are such a big country, we do not need anything from others."

Near East & South Asia

Afghanistan's Najibullah Holds Talks in India

Received by Gandhi

LD0405212688 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] New Delhi May 4 TASS—Afghan President Najibullah arrived in New Delhi on a three-day official visit today at the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The welcoming ceremony was held at the Presidential Palace.

Najibullah and Gandhi started talks on ways to implement the Geneva accords and on matters pertaining to bilateral relations.

In the evening, Indian President R. Venkataraman, speaking at a banquet in honour of Najibullah, said that the Geneva accords "open up the possibility for the restoration of peace and normalcy in the region".

"We have welcomed these accords which we regard as truly historic. If sincerely implemented, we have no doubt that they will help attain their end objective," he said.

"We hope that the Geneva accords would remove any excuse for the induction of sophisticated weapons into the region, particularly the supply of lethal weapons to Pakistan which can only be used against us."

"We attach the greatest importance to your visit not only because it will enable us to have a mutually beneficial exchange of views on the emerging situation in Afghanistan and in the region but also because of the abiding and multi-faceted ties of friendship which have been shared for centuries by our two countries and peoples," Venkataraman said.

"We have followed with great interest the efforts now being made by you, Mr President, to evolve a national consensus for peace and stability in Afghanistan," he went on.

"We look forward to these efforts ushering in an era of peace and progress for the friendly people of Afghanistan. We also hope that in the coming weeks and months, as the Geneva accords are under implementation, all concerned parties will respect the principle of non-interference enshrined in the accords.

"We, in India, would like to see friendly Afghanistan as a strong, stable and non-aligned state, whose independence is never in jeopardy," the Indian president said.

"I would like to assure, your excellency, that we, in India, are prepared to stand shoulder to shoulder with our brothers in Afghanistan, to help them in every manner possible within our modest means, in the arduous task of rehabilitation and reconstruction," Venkataraman said.

In his reply speech Najibullah noted that Afghanistan attaches enormous significance to consolidating the friendly ties with India, which are rooted in distant past.

The successful conclusion of the Geneva accords, which are aimed at resolving the external aspects of the situation around Afghanistan and the national reconciliation policy as a model of social and political pacification and forming a coalition government on a broad basis in a multistructure society with a pluralistic parliamentary system, are evidence of the prevailing common sense, the president of Afghanistan said.

Najibullah also touched upon the fresh initiative of the Republic of Afghanistan addressed to all the opposition forces and providing for their participation in a national peace Jirgah that would settle the internal aspects of the Afghan problem. "I am confident that the people of Afghanistan, who have suffered much from war, will certainly support that constructive initiative", he said.

We, Najibullah emphasized, intend to follow our commitments fully as regards the implementation of the agreements, which is due to start within the next ten days, and we sincerely urge all the other sides to act likewise.

Today all the true friends of Afghanistan, among them India and the USSR, pin their hopes on the revival of strong, peaceful, nonaligned and neutral Afghanistan friendly to all the neighbour states.

We are profoundly grateful for the disinterested and permanent support rendered by our northern neighbour the Soviet Union in realising our great national aspirations and also for the aid in the defence of national sovereignty and independence of the Afghan people in the critical period of their history. The president voiced hope for a further broadening of relations.

New Afghanistan will be created. Yet the effective support and unselfishness of India, our devoted friend, which came to our assistance in a grim period of our history, gave political support to Afghanistan in the international arena, assistance in the economic, technological and cultural field, will never be forgotten. We use every opportunity for further strengthening the ties and cooperation with India for resolving serious regional and international problems, Najibullah said.

On the same day talks opened in Delhi between Afghanistan's Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil and India's Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh. In the course of the talks, which proceeded in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, a frank exchange of views was held on international issues, the situation around Afghanistan and bilateral relations.

PRAVDA Reports Banquet Speeches

PM0605115288 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 88 Second Edition pp 1, 7

[Own correspondent O. Kitsenko report: "Najibullah's Visit to India"]

[Text] Delhi, 5 May—The Indian-Afghan talks at the summit level, which have begun in Delhi, are taking place, according to an official government spokesman, in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. Immediately upon his arrival in Delhi, President Najibullah of the Republic of Afghanistan met with Indian President R. Venkataraman and had a 2-hour talk with Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi. The two leaders, who are to have another meeting, comprehensively discussed questions of the implementation of the Geneva agreements and the creation of a government of national unity, as well as the development of events in the region.

The community of the sides' views on the questions discussed was expressed in the speeches delivered by R. Venkataraman and Najibullah at a banquet in honor of the Afghan president given by the Indian Government. A strong, stable, nonaligned, and friendly Afghanistan, President R. Venkataraman stated, is only possible when the Geneva agreements are strictly implemented and the process of consolidation of national unity has taken place. President Najibullah, reaffirming Afghanistan's support for the agreements, called on all interested

parties to act in the same spirit. We expect all countries, he said, to support this process and to promote our efforts aimed at ensuring peace and security in Afghanistan and the region and at implementing a policy of national reconciliation and the formation of a broad coalition based on a pluralist parliamentary system. The president of Afghanistan invited his government's opponents, wherever they may be—in Pakistan, Italy, Britain, the FRG, or the United States—to take part in the forthcoming nationwide jirgah which is being convened to resolve internal aspects of the Afghan problem. Afghanistan, President Najibullah stressed, seeks peace, cooperation, and good-neighborliness with all countries of the region, including Pakistan, Iran, and China.

The two sides expressed concern over Pakistan's position and called on it sincerely and honestly to fulfill the Geneva agreements. We hope, President R. Venkataraman said, that the Geneva agreements will exclude any justification for deliveries of modern armaments to the region. Supporting the Afghan people's right to self-determination, President R. Venkataraman expressed India's readiness to "stand shoulder to shoulder with our brothers in Afghanistan" and help them to resolve the difficult task of restoration and reconstruction.

Simultaneously with the summit-level meetings, talks betweeen official delegations of the two countries are taking place in the Indian capital.

Maslyukov Receives Afghanistan's Koshani

LD0505043988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2130 GMT 4 May 88

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Maslyukov has received Koshani, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Afghanistan and chairman of the State Planning Committee, who is now in Moscow.

Kamentsev, Indian Talks 'Sharp Exchange of Views'

LD0405153688 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 4 May 88

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Another working meeting of the Soviet-Indian Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation has ended in India.

[B. Levchenko, identified by caption] Summing up the results of the working meeting, Comrade Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Shiv Shankar, India's minister of planning, noted with satisfaction the results attained thanks to the business-like and frank discussion of all problems. Specific measures were planned for increasing the goods turnover between the two countries, raising the volume of mutual trade in machines and equipment, and the development of such new forms of collaboration as production cooperation and the establishment of joint enterprises. A new principle in this final element is the wide involvement of private Indian companies and firms.

The meeting showed that neither of the sides has yet fully realized the wide opportunities now opening up before business people from both countries. In the course of the frank and at times very sharp exchange of views it transpired, for example, that Indian enterpreneurs do not fully realize what profound and radical transformations are taking place in the Soviet economy. On the other hand, it was also justly noted that the leaders of Soviet enterprises and associations who have been given the right to approach foreign partners directly have not been sufficiently briefed on the realistic and, most importantly, rapidly growing potential of Indian industry. It is thus completely logical that here, at this meeting, it was proposed to set up a joint enterprise for advertising goods and services.

Use of Force Could Jeopardize Israel's Future

PM0505154588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[Commentary by Pavel Demchenko under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Fist Law and Common Sense"]

[Text] The Israeli army has carried out another incursion into southern Lebanon. Judging by Near East press reports, it is the biggest incursion in recent years. For 3 days, soldiers "combed through" villages and the wooded slopes of Mount Hermon, set up road blocks, and searched inhabitants. At the first hint of insubordination, they opened fire. Tel Aviv has given the standard explanation: The military contingent was sent in to seek out and destroy PLO guerrillas.

It must be mentioned that under this "pretext" Israel has carried out several military actions of late. They included six air raids on Palestinian refugee camps in the area of the Lebanese ports of Sidon and Tyre and the terrorist outrage in Tunis where Khalil al-Wazir, one of the PLO's key leaders, was assassinated in his apartment.

In citing this by no means complete list of facts, it is not difficult to notice that Israel is ignoring all standards of morality and international law, organizing incursions into other states, and arbitrarily sowing death.

Quite understandably, another circumstance is also attracting attention. All these actions are connected with the Palestinian problem, with the uprising that has engulfed the occupied territories since December last year. Attempts to put an end to it at the latest by the 40th anniversary of the existence of the State of Israel, scheduled this year for the end of April, were futile. The fact that the Palestinian issue cannot be resolved by means of military force was confirmed once again.

To follow this path would not just mean making matters worse, tightening the Palestinian knot even further; it could call the future of the Israeli state itself into question. In fact, according to demographers' estimates, the number of Jews and Palestinian Arabs on the territory currently controlled by the Israeli Government will become equal by the year 2010, or even a little earlier. In addition, there are the Palestinians who live dispersed throughout the world, and there are even more of them. If right now the Israeli army has to use its weapons virtually every day and public opinion is torn apart by differences, what will the situation be like in 10-20 years?

The truth is that after many years of defeats and failures, the Palestinians regard their uprising as the beginning of a qualitatively new round of the struggle. Its participants are primarily people who were born during the occupation, who do not want to live like this any more, who want, cost what it may, to "breathe the air of freedom," as one Palestinian put it.

The fact that this is a new situation began to be felt, albeit not very swiftly, in all the Arab capitals. This has been reflected in many different ways. Thus, for instance, contributions from increasing numbers of countries began to reach the uprising fund. The governments of a number of countries, including Libya, Syria, and Jordan, toned down or put aside former differences with the PLO and improved their relations with the organization. For the first time in the past 5 years, 'Arafat was able to visit Damascus. And finally, a meeting of leaders of Arab states is scheduled to take place at the beginning of June in Algiers for the sole purpose of discussing the Palestinian problem. It is to be hoped that a unified Arab stance will be elaborated at this meeting which will facilitate the convocation of an international conference on the Near East and thus pave the way to a peaceful and just settlement of the Palestinian problem.

Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that common sense is gaining the upper hand in Israel, that the real development of the situation is being taken into account, although a section of public opinion believes that for the sake of future peace, it is necessary to give up the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. "Both Israelis and Palestinians must refrain from making extreme demands and move on to a compromise agreement on coexistence," the writer A. 'Oz has said, for instance.

However, Prime Minister Shamir repeats a categorical "no" to concessions of any kind. This intransigence, based on U.S. support, is fraught with the threat of new Israeli adventures and continues to hamper the restoration of peace in the Near East.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Commentary on Southern Africa Talks in London

LD0405194488 Moscow TASS in English 1743 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 4 TASS—TASS commentator Vladimir Korochantsev writes: Settlement in southern Africa is the subject of negotiations in London held by representatives of Angola, Cuba, the Republic of Southern Africa and the United States. The key questions at the talks are the military situation in Angola and independence of Namibia occupied by South African troops.

The very fact of holding such a meeting is viewed as a success of those who are interested in a durable peace in the region, in the creation of normal conditions for economic development. But it should be noted that prior to the opening of the negotiations, the Pretoria regime, which is chiefly to blame for the bloodshed in southern Africa, declared against undue optimism about their outcome.

The sides have different approach to the problems discussed. The Government of the People's Republic of Angola proclaimed more than once the readiness to contribute to the establishment of peace. It presses for an end to any interference of the United States and the Republic of South Africa in Angola's internal affairs, for the implementation of the U.N. Security Council's Resolution 435 which envisages the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, the granting of independence to Namibia and the guarantees of the security of its frontiers. Angola, specifically, demands that Washington and Pretoria stop any aid to UNITA bands which are actually part of the regular army of the apartheid regime. For the sake of a compromise, the Angolan-Cuban side proposed a plan for a quadripartite treaty among Angola, Cuba, the Republic of South Africa and Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which is aimed at ensuring the security of the People's Republic of Angola, the granting of independence to Namibia, the establishment of peace between Angola and the Republic of South Africa. This document includes the schedule of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the southern districts of Angola and their stage-by-stage withdrawal from the Angolan territory.

But it is apparent that Pretoria has not plans for a peaceful solution to the problems of southern Africa. Its positions, certainly, changed somewhat under the effect of the growing casualties and material losses in Angola. Nevertheless, the racists remain recalcitrant on fundamental matters. The idea of an artificial linkage of Namibia's decolonisation and withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was advanced by Washington and Pretoria in order to delay indefinitely the granting of independence to Namibia.

It would be wrong to expect that South Africa will automatically agree to fulfil Resolution 435 if Cuba withdraws its troops, Professor Michael Hough, who supervises strategic research at the University of Pretoria said the other day. South Africa uses the Cuban problem as a pretext to justify the presence of its bases in Namibia, said Robert Schrire, head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Capetown. He said Pretoria is less inclined to the settlement than any other participant in the London talks. It is apparent that these

are just statements. Hegemonistic considerations determine the stance of the state of apartheid. Its leaders actually make an ultimatum to independent African countries, demand that the South African diktat be recognized. Deplorably, the United States sees no need of using the levers of pressure against the Republic of Southern Africa, "it's friend and ally", for the sake of peaceful settlement.

The Angolan Government showed goodwill by establishing a direct contact with the Republic of South Africa. It is now for Washington and Pretoria to reciprocate that step. They should give up the aggressive course against the People's Republic of Angola and other "Frontline" States and grant independence to Namibia.

East Europe

Reportage on Polish Strikes at Combine, Shipyard

Militia Intervenes

LD0505175288 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Warsaw May 5 TASS—Since a strike involving workers at part of the plants of the Nowa Huta metal-making combine in Krakow has put many users of its products in a fix and thus jeopardized the interests of the entire national economy and the Polish people, measures were taken today to restore the normal operations of all the combine's plants, PAP news agency reported.

A spokesman for the Polish Interior Ministry said that law-enforcement personnel entered the premises of the Nowa Huta combine last night and turned out the organizers of the illegal strike, including several persons who are not combine employees.

The militia personnel did not use force and nobody received any wounds or injuries. As a result of the operation, which took less than an hour, 38 people were arrested.

Polish Government spokesman Jerzy Urban noted that the operation was undertaken to restore order and give the majority of the combine staff a possibility to resume work. It was a minority of the employees and the illegal strike committee that had been urging a continued strike.

The combine has been operating normally since the morning today. The militia left its territory immediately after the operation.

The essential measures taken to restore order were not an example of how problems and conflicts are resolved by force, the Polish Government spokesman continued. The method for their resolution remains the same: It is reform and national accord.

The authorities, Urban stressed, are fully determined to ensure calm and a possibility to continue debates on the future development of the nation and further reform.

He said also that the management of the Gdansk shipyards last night decided to suspend their operations and the decision was announced to first-shift workers who then remained at home rather than reporting to work.

Some 1,000 people stayed put on the shipyards' premises, including the "strike committee" and persons conducting an "occupation strike."

After reporting unsuccessful attempts to organize strikes at a number of other enterprises, the government spokesman emphasized that on the whole, the Polish economy is functioning normally.

"The latest events in Poland have demonstrated clearly that those have organized and keep frantically trying to engineer further strikes of all kinds, demonstrations and unrest have chosen their line," Urban said.

"It is one of provoking a political crisis, subverting the economy and disregarding popular needs. Our position with regard to such people remains firm.

"But, like before, we want dialogue with all those seeking agreement and cooperation on a realistic and lawful basis in the name of developing the country," the spokesman said.

He condemned attempts by the Western mass media to influence public opinion in Poland by making instigatory calls for strikes and other actions of this kind and creating the false impression that Poland is on strike and that everybody here identifies with the strikers.

Such activities, Urban said, should be seen not as journalistic, but as political, contradicting reporters' code of ethics and based on mean methods, exaggeration and fact twisting.

TU Body Adopts Resolution

LD0505201788 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Warsaw May 5 TASS—The Executive Committee of the Polish National Trade Union Accord (NTUA) at today's session adopted a resolution setting out its stand on topical socio-political problems of the country.

The resolution emphasizes that the trade unions make efforts to meet the economic demands put forward by the working people and at the same time firmly oppose unlawful stoppages and the use of workers' protest for manipulations in the interests of various kind of politickers. A stoppage is an exceptional and extreme means, which should be borne in mind in the current economic situation in Poland.

The NTUA Executive Committee emphasized that a well-founded defense of the interests of the working people should be practised under the provisions of the law on trade unions, and called on trade union organisations consistently to uphold the workers' interests within the framework of the existing law and order.

Strike Effects Assessed

LD0605102288 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0530 GMT 6 May 88

[From the "Panorama" program; feature entitled "News from the Socialist Countries"]

[Text] [Presenter] In the past few days, the attention of the Polish public has been riveted to events taking place at a number of industrial enterprises in that country. At the metallurgical combine in Krakow, as our correspondent reports, work was halted in a number of sections. At the shipyard in Gdansk, several hundred people, organizing disorder on the territory of the enterprise, made an attempt to force the collective to go on strike. We asked our Warsaw correspondent Vasiliy Lesovik to tell us in greater detail about these events:

[Lesovik] The strike in a few sections of the metallurgical combine affected the production of finished output, which made the financial-economic situation at the enterprise much worse and led to a disruption in the supply of metal deliveries to the cooperating plants. Alarming signals are coming from many works in the country about a shortage of metal. The combine's administration virtually completed the talks with representatives of the strikers a few days ago. Differences in the interpretation of one point have been passed on for resolution by the social arbitration organization attached to the voivodship court in Krakow. But, as the course of events has shown, the leaders of the strike committees both in Krakow and in Gdansk were pressing not so much for economic claims to be satisfied as to put forward unrealizable demands of a political nature with, in a number of cases, their methods of action assuming the nature of hooliganism, physical threats, blackmail and psychological pressure against workers in sections refusing to halt work.

In the collectives of both enterprises, demands by the workers on the administration were increased, as they requested protection against these terrorist elements. These demands were voiced in particular at a meeting of representatives of working sections of the metallurgical combine. It was said there that if Polish legislation permits strikes as a form of workers' protest, then it must also defend the collective's right to work. The combine's administration has taken measures with a view to arranging a normal pattern of work. The instigators of the disturbances were thrown out of the combine. On 5 May, the combine started work.

The Polish working people realize that attempts to organize chaos and to disorganize the economy strike, first of all, at the vital interests of the entire people, undermine confidence in Poland as a partner on the foreign market, and lead to a retardation of economic and democratic reforms.

[Presenter] Concluding this topic, I will say that at the latest meeting of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo, it was noted that to solve problems that have arisen, citizens must be realistic and have a sense of responsibility for Poland's future.

Yazov To Visit East Germany in Early May

LD0605082488 Moscow TASS in English 0702 GMT 6 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—It was officially announced here today that General of the Army Dmitriy Yazov, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of defense of the USSR, will pay an official friendly visit to the German Democratic Republic in the first half of May this year.

'Whole Truth' About Accusations Against SFRY

LD021942 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1853 GMT 2 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 2 (TANJUG)—The Soviet public has for the first time learned from an article published in the latest issue of the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA that all accusations raised against Yugoslavia at the time of Cominform in 1948 were fabrications and that they only reflected Stalin's sick desire for absolute domination of all communist parties.

The Soviet side had many times up to now conceded that its policy towards Yugoslavia after the Cominform resolution was utterly wrong but had never before told the whole truth about the causes and consequences of that policy.

The author of the NOVOYE VREMYA article, Doctor of History Vladimir Zelenin, sets out now that the Yugoslav party alone had enough strength to resist Stalin's pressures and that time has shown that the Yugoslav party's policy of resistance was correct.

Since Yugoslavia had made with its national liberation struggle an outstanding contribution to the victory over fascism and its fighters were tried friends of the Soviet Union, the Cominform resolution "was incredible for all of us", Zelenin writes. He qualifies the Cominform resolution as a "gross repudiation of the principles of the autonomy and equality of parties and of the Marxist-Leninist concept of respect for diversity in socialist development".

Zelenin condemns also the 1949 Cominform resolution in which the false accusations against Yugoslavia were repeated.

The (?Soviet historian) sets out that the Cominform resolutions went as far as to call on the Yugoslav Communists to forcibly replace their leadership should it fail to bow to the demands of the "omnipotent" centre in Moscow.

Soviet citizens had all the time been deprived of objective information about Yugoslavia where exceptionally interesting processes of seeking solutions to socialist development were taking place. Among the processes, stresses the Soviet historian, self-management is most significant.

It was only at the 27th congress of the Soviet party in 1985, and during the recent visit of Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev to Yugoslavia, that everything was clarified in the right way, assesses Zelenin. He underscores that the Yugoslav-Soviet declaration (?signed during) Gorbachev's visit, confirmed that only an absolute equality amongst the parties and the mutual respect, can secure good relations between the states and the parties.

Yugoslavia has always adhered to these principles, says Zelenin in conclusion, citing an excerpt from Gorbachev's speech (?in) Belgrade: "The experience of those years has become a lesson from which proper conclusions should be drawn."

Nikonov Receives SFRY Ambassador in Moscow

LD0405115188 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1012 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 4 May (TANJUG)—Viktor Nikonov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today received Milan Veres, Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union. On this occasion, talks were conducted about Yugoslav-Soviet economic relations and, in particular, about the ways of promoting agricultural cooperation.

The participation by Yugoslav economic organizations in the construction of agricultural combines in the Soviet Union was positively assessed. At the same time, attention was drawn to favorable prospects for developing higher forms of cooperation and for expanding cooperation in the agro-industrial complex.

Interview With Mchedlov on Rewriting History

AU290953 Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian No 17 22 Apr 88 p 7

[Interview with Miran Mchedlov, deputy director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute of the CPSU Central Committee, by Ferenc Varnai in Moscow: "History—Feelings Is One Thing, Ideology Is Another"; date not given—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Miran Mchedlov, doctor of philosophical sciences, received our correspondent in his Moscow study and answered his questions.

They Were No Prophets [subhead]

[Varnai] To what extent do the debates currently under way on judging the historical past contribute to the rewriting of the CPSU's history?

[Mchedlov] It is true that ideological activity has become more lively in the area of historical sciences. In the "broad sense of the word," there is certain opposition to a factual approach to our history coming from scientists. By this I mean that one need not consciously oppose the ideas of restructuring: It's only that quite a few people have not yet reached the stage of evaluating the facts and thinking freely about history, economy, morality, philosophy, and society. Scientific problems, however, can never be solved by approaching them in a simplified way. Lenin was already ill when he received Kropotkin, the revolutionary geographer, who asked him: What do you consider the most difficult task in the new society's construction? Lenin answered that they would overcome hunger, intervention, and civil war. But the most difficult task is winning the people's minds, and educating the new generations will be an everlasting task.

We started to rethink and rewrite the history of the party a few years ago. We were still working on this when we started all over again because we found that important facts were missing from our body of knowledge. Some historians themselves were not yet prepared to consider the facts honestly, and they were unable to advance on the basis of the old concepts. A new approach was needed.

The essence of such a new approach is, first of all, serious consideration of the facts, discovery of material in archives, and the study of original publications. Second, a realistic and objective approach to the conditions of the times, an approach free of extremists ideas, is needed. Third, one must take into consideration the fact that history was not shaped only by leaders and their followers.

Several types of dogmas are still disturbing us. We cannot study the history of Marxism-Leninism on the assumption that they were prophets who were always right about everything. This would simply not correspond to the facts. Lenin often spoke openly about the several mistakes committed by the Bolsheviks, for example, in their relations with the third Duma. Following the October Revolution, Lenin himself counted very much on a proletarian revolution in the West, primarily in Germany. When this failed to occur, he honestly admitted that his previous considerations proved to be wrong, and he worked out new concepts for the victory of socialism in one country only. If a concept proves to be wrong, wisdom lies in discarding it rather than sticking to it. The classic thinkers were indeed geniuses, but their genius manifested itself in the fact that they analyzed the concrete situation on the basis of a large amount of information, generalized correctly, and learned from their mistakes.

[Varnai] How do you evaluate the way in which the writers deal with history?

[Mchedlov] We have an understanding of the creative freedom of artists. At the same time, we consider an important requirement the need to be aware of historical facts. A group of historians is currently publishing documentation in PRAVDA. A meeting between historians and literary men will take place in the framework of the Academy of Sciences, in order to jointly analyze relations between historical truth and artistic formulations. If artistic generalization goes beyond certain limits, it can lead to a distortion of the truth.

[Varnai] Precisely, how does the rewriting of the party history advance?

[Mchedlov] In fact, we are presently preparing a comprehensive and synthesized six-volume history of Marxism-Leninism . The first volume, which has already been published, covers the period between the appearance of Marxism up to the Paris Commune. The second and third volumes are almost ready and will be published next year. Publication of the entire series is planned for 1995.

Two Kinds of Rehabilitation [subhead]

[Mchedlov] In our work, we are taking into consideration the concept formulated in the speech delivered by Mikhail Gorbachev on the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. According to this concept, we are living in one world, and, at the same time, even if we have set different concrete goals for ourselves, none of us has a monopoly on the truth. The stress is on understanding the way different concepts contribute to different strata of society rather than discarding such concepts that differ from our own. For example, we were not the first who dealt with the issue of technical and scientific development and various issues of environmental protection. However, we were the first to deal with the tasks of the new relations with "the Third World."

This broad and civilized approach enables us to search for the strict historical truth. For example, we should not only examine Kautskiy critically but also take into consideration the positive elements of his views. Or, to use another example, we should evaluate historical personalities the same way Lenin did in the case of Proshyan, one of the leaders of the leftist Socialist Revolutionaries and former postal affairs minister who opposed the Soviet Government in 1918 and died in 1919. Lenin spoke at his funeral and stressed that Proshyan's activities did more for the revolution than the damage he caused after the revolution.

Conversely, we cannot remain silent about anyone's negative aspects just because we remained silent—over a long period and incorrectly—about his positive aspects. The so-called "two leaders" concept, for example, is well known here for decades; the impression was given that the 1917 Revolution had two leaders: Lenin and Stalin. This is simply not true. Stalin's role was exaggerated later. Trotskiy also shared this two-leaders concept, of course, in that he was supposed to be the first leader of the revolution and Lenin the other leader. Trotskiy did, indeed, do a lot for the revolution and to defend it, and he proved to be an outstanding military organizer. But, following the revolution, he made many mistakes, including military ones. For example, he envisaged the Soviet regime as a military regime.

[Varnai] How is rehabilitation progressing?

[Mchedlov] The Rehabilitation Committee of the party is led by Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev, and our people also participate in the committee's activity. The committee analyzes the facts on the basis of original documents. The state rehabilitation of Bukharin and of his ten followers was a result of this committee's activity. At the same time, we wanted to reach a decision on Bukharin and his followers from a party point of view, but we have not yet succeeded in concluding this work. However, it has been proven that Bukharin and his followers had no contacts with imperialist intelligence services, and we could no longer wait to publish this finding. But, as a result, a merely emotional approach toward these people has also gained ground in our press. Sentimental interpretations, however, have no place in ideology. At the first congress of the Writers' Association, for example, Bukharin used vulgar terms in evaluating Yesenin, the poet, because of his kulak origin, an evaluation that was totally unacceptable to Marxist esthetics, and which was even more vulgar than the one given by Stalin. In his book "The Theory of Historical Materialism," Bukharin said that, in order to make a stool, a carpenter must consider its purpose. According to Bukharin, the builders of a socialist society must similarly follow the requirements of political expediency. But Bukharin himself fell victim to this "political expediency." In other words, we must provide an objective evaluation of all the people who contributed to the victory of the revolution and construction of socialism, and who also had quite a few mistaken views. We use original sources, and we study and evaluate the views emerging from speeches and writings. In our work, we will also not be influenced if someone has previously been declared an "enemy of the people," nor will we be swayed if we are dealing with a martyr's views.

Joint Committee [subhead]

[Varnai] A joint committee in charge of studying the blank spots in Polish-Soviet relations has recently been established. What is this committee's work program?

[Mchedlov] We are dealing with many issues, but primarily with the period of the Comintern. There are two basic views concerning the Comintern. Our Romanian comrades emphasize the negative aspects more. There is much truth in their views on the period following Lenin's death because the Comintern often failed to make a

thorough enough evaluation of the concrete conditions of individual parties and countries and exaggerated the role played by centralism. Also, the comintern replaced the leading bodies of several parties on the basis of unfounded reasons. However, many other parties, including the CPSU, think that the Comintern also left us an important political heritage. It made a great contribution in training cadres for the workers and communist movements, and it formulated several important theoretical issues like, for example, the people's front policy, the tasks facing the antiwar movement, the principles of proletarian internationalism, and so on.

We try to publish the Comintern documents, and we transfer everything possible to the competent party archives. What is the sensitive issue in this area? The sensitive issue here is that, on the basis of the joint mandate of the parties that participated in the dissolution of the Comintern, the CPSU is in charge of preserving these documents. The CPSU is not authorized to transfer documents dealing with sensitive issues referring to the internal affairs of some parties. The representatives of the parties that signed the decision on dissolving the Comintern should get together and make a decision themselves.

On the Archives [subhead]

[Mchedlov] Concerning other issues, like, for example, the rumors connected with the resettlement of part of the Polish population or with the Katyn tragedy, all these are more speculations born in the head of some people, rather than evaluations based on "newly discovered proof."

[Varnai] When will the CPSU archives be open to the public?

[Mchedlov] Do you know of any party archive in the world that is totally open? We ask the social democratic parties in vain, for example, but we hardly receive any old documents. Which bourgeois party in power puts its classified documents at our disposal? They should, therefore, not expect perfection from us, either. However, the Central Committee decided to lift the secrecy of many documents. In various libraries, we will establish departments where an entire series of materials are openly on display, and permits will be issued for scientific research covering other materials.

Hungarian Economic Restructuring Viewed

PM0505094188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 88 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov article under the rubric "Economic Search": "Compressing the Spring. Paths and Problems of Hungarian Restructuring"]

[Text] Budapest, Apr [dateline as published]—"Twenty-Four Hours in the World Economy"—every day an information bulletin of this name discussing current events in the international markets lands on the desks of hundreds of Hungarian economic managers and economists. Various other bulletins are also published to pass on information on the movement of prices, commodities, and capital deposited in banks, and on the export and import status of individual countries and firms. This work involves electronics.

Janos Deak, general director of the Institute of Research and Information on Market Conditions and the Market (KOPINT in Hungarian), spreads out in front of me a motley "palette" of front covers. There is a publication on the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and Japan. Short-term forecasts about the development of the world economy, long-term forecasts, reference materials, and reports with graphs for the sectors of industry....

"We are also constantly studying the situation in Hungarian industry and agriculture, as well as export opportunities for them," Janos Deak said, drawing my attention to one of the new publications. "For example, we have started to feed into a computer incoming reports from enterprises on unutilized capacities and proposals on buying and selling. We get the same information in turn from Western firms. We put all this together. Thus, we are assisting in import and export harmonization. We would like to obtain such information from Soviet enterprises."

When you meet the KOPINT specialists, you are convinced of how much the desire has grown among Hungarian industrial and agricultural enterprises to further penetrate the international market. This trend is supported by the entire course of economic reform and restructuring in the Soviet Union.

Hungary is a country of average development. But the fact that 40-50 percent of the produced national product is exported is creating, on the one hand, a high reputation and recognition (machines, equipment, chemical products, aluminum, textiles, and footwear make up 75-78 percent of all exports, and agricultural output makes up 22-25 percent.) On the other hand, this is the reason for the unusually high dependence on international market conditions, on enterprises' competitiveness and their ability to stand on their own feet when they are "hit" by shrapnel from the arena of the "financial war," the "petroleum war," the "wheat war," the "chicken war," or else, as now, the "meat war."

If not for new management methods, the country would have sustained considerably more "holes." One factor cannot be doubted: Hungary can be proud of the fact that it began restructuring its national economic mechanism 20 years ago, installing regulators, levers, and instrument panels with the indicators "profit," "prices," "credits," and "economic accountability" [khozraschet]. The reform has filled the stores with goods, has boosted prosperity, has increased foreign economic activity, and has brought agriculture up to world standards. It has

proved the advantage of economic methods over administrative edict. Study of the Hungarian experience, a respectful attitude toward it, and its skillful application have benefited and will benefit the fraternal countries, but the overhaul of the "machinery" now taking place in Hungary was inevitable: The path to the world market is a thorny one. Speed needs to be increased, paths chosen more precisely, and the load increased and qualitatively improved.

In its time Hungary took out a number of large loans from international banks to enable it to switch to the intensive path, to technical development, which takes into account the scientific and technical revolution. Hungary also took out these loans to protect itself from the explosion of prices for raw materials and to restore economic equilibrium. It cannot be said that the loans were poorly utilized. By the end of 1985, the level of indebtedness had even been reduced. Many loans were switched to long-term ones, and financial reserves had increased. The country prevented its solvency from being undermined. But it took a great effort to achieve this. Capital investments and development sources were curtailed. In 1986 external market conditions once again deteriorated (the prices of a number of Hungarian commodities fell by 30-50 percent, and discriminatory barriers were extended), and production did not compensate for this loss by producing competitive output—"the motor had stalled." The process of improving the foreign balance broke down. The state budget deficit soared. The state allocated 160 billion forints annually just to assist and subsidize unprofitable production processes and bankrupt enterprises. The net foreign debt was now approaching 12 billion dollars, which is more than twice the value of Hungary's annual export in convertible currency. The country has been forced to take unpopular measures: This year consumer prices will rise by 15-17 percent.

In the summer of 1987, the MSZMP Central Committee and, in the fall, the Hungarian National Assembly examined the question of ways out of the difficulties and subsequent deployment of all economic capacities. What is planned to be done first?

The most urgent task is to restructure industry: eliminate unprofitability, expand the manufacture of goods which are competitive in all markets, reduce the relative expenditure of materials and power, and encourage the involvement of socialist partners.

I visited the Hungarian Machine Tool Manufacturing Combine. The general director, Matyas Jakab, recalling the recent past, cited the following example of restructuring: There had been nine plants at the combine; five remained, and output had increased by a factor of 2.4. Abandoning traditional components which did not sell, the combine is now manufacturing the most modern ones. It has its own developments and those based on Western licenses. It was like "compressing a spring." Those plants that had incurred losses were discarded. They were sold to diverse industrial cooperatives. The combine quickly settled accounts with the state for its loans and switched to self-financing. It is working well with its Soviet clients. Thanks to the structural transformations, the country's machine tool manufacturing industry has doubled its export over the last 4 years on both the socialist and the capitalist markets.

Why, despite the reforms, are structural transformations slow to take place in other sectors? Economic accountability is everywhere, but why does the administrative leveling of income continue? Why is the mechanism of price formation still separate from the basic trends of price movements on the world market? All these questions which earlier prevented the full revelation of reform potential are now being answered. But these answers are not being provided without a clash of opinions.

There were fierce debates, for example, on the new tax system which, all the same, has been introduced and is aimed at better exposing weak enterprises and limiting interference from above in the redistribution of profit. Profit, incidentally, is increasingly becoming the main criterion of the end results of management. New commercial banks, large and small, are establishing themselves. Any enterprise which has a certain level of income can become a banker now. Promissory notes have appeared: Economic units can lend money to each other. A securities market has emerged. A genuine bond "boom" has begun. At the Hungarian Council of Ministers Commission for Planned Management, I was cited the figure "200." This many different kinds of certificates and bonds have already been issued for a total sum of about 27 billion forints. Two-thirds of these securities have been bought by the population.

"We had to build a new school," I was told at Kecskemet City Council. "We have 50 million forints for this over a period of 5 years: 10 million per annum. If we were to base ourselves only on this sum, then construction would drag on for the entire 5 years, and by the end, it would cost significantly more: about 70 million. We issued certificates—we distributed them among the population and quickly collected the sum needed at a high interest rate, and the school opened its doors within 6 months. We will pay for the certificates due for redemption within 5 years out of the 10 million allocated to us per annum for school construction."

The state budget organs are also issuing "treasury notes" at a high interest rate.

"By selling certificates due for redemption within 2 to 12 months to enterprises and the population, the state will thus withdraw 'real' money from circulation," Laszlo Antal, a leading financier on the Hungarian Council of Ministers Commission for Planned Management, explained on the mechanism of this system. "And if the state bank buys up the 'treasury notes,' it thus increases

the amount of money in circulation. For the socialist state, new levers of influence on capital investments, consumption, and inflation have emerged."

One more novelty: Enterprises are also issuing shares for members of their collectives. At the "Taurusz" rubber industry combine last year, working people bought "property notes" (as shares are called here) to the tune of 32 million forints. Each person could buy these notes for a price of 5 up to 100,000 forints. The level of payments for each note reached 17.2 percent! If the plan is fulfilled this year, then "Taurusz" guarantees its working people an even greater share of the dividends—20 percent for each note! "I am very keen for my enterprise to make a high profit! So, I must work better and to a higher standard"—this is what they say at "Taurusz" now.

The government is taking steps to develop the reform in constant conjunction with the renewal of the economic mechanism and economic policy and, what is particularly important, more consistently than before.

"The government will do everything," Karoly Grosz, member of the MSZMP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, stated, "so that enterprises, establishments, and individual workers can boost the results of their labor, so that production grows selectively and the proportion of goods made to a high technical standard increases, and so that incentive and market mechanisms are deployed and government leadership becomes more effective."

Now the Council of Ministers chairman and other members of the government often visit enterprises and public organizations and hold meetings and consultations. They are entirely characterized by open dialogue. Parliamentary monitoring of the government's work is being stepped up.

Further great scope is being given to financial calculations. The instructions to enterprises to create certain previously mandatory funds have been abolished. The most efficient enterprises are getting rid of the central regulation of wage growth. Competition and competitiveness are on the increase.

"Although I believe that eliminating certain enterprises' 'omnipotence' is still a slow process," Janos Deak tells me, "trade turnover per capita is to be increased further and international cooperation expanded. Economists believe that enterprises must be allowed to acquire loans in foreign currency from Hungarian banks. The CEMA countries expect from us new commodities produced to the most modern standards."

Hungary is the most advanced among the other CEMA countries in creating joint enterprises and associations with the Soviet Union. There are 10 of them. About 50 proposals are still being discussed. Seventeen joint scientific collectives have also been organized. Almost 120 pairs of enterprises have concluded treaties on direct ties. When you talk today with Hungarian economic managers, you invariably hear: Strengthening economic interaction with "Soviet restructuring" is an important link in the technical and economic strategy. "We must establish order in our affairs" can be heard in enterprises today. Through criticism of shortcomings, understanding of the inevitability of difficulties, and realization that this is the turning point, comprehensive restructuring must be implemented so that Hungary is not pushed to the periphery of the international economy.

West Europe

Soviet, British 'Experts' To Visit CW Sites

LD0505200288 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] London May 5 TASS—Speaking at a press conference in the British Ministry of Defence today, Ian Stewart, minister of state for the Armed Forces, said that experts of the two countries would visit military chemical facilities at Porton Down (Britain) and Shikhany (USSR) in May-June 1988 as part of a bilateral agreement on the inspection of chemical warfare sites.

The purpose of the visits, Ian Stewart pointed out, is to build trust and mutual understanding between the two countries in the light of the ongoing talks in Geneva on concluding a convention on complete and general ban on and elimination of chemical weapons. The minister of state said the bilateral exchange of visits would give an opportunity to hold wide-range consultations and would serve better mutual understanding and the building of trust between the Soviet Union and Britain.

Mr. Stewart highly appreciated the latest Soviet steps towards reaching agreement on banning and eliminating chemical weapons and on effective verification measures, which was shown, in particular, in autumn last year when the delegations of 45 countries visited the Soviet facility at Shikhany.

Archbishop of Canterbury To Visit in June

LD0405194888 Moscow TASS in English 1826 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] London May 4 TASS—Archbishop of Canterbury, primate of all England and Metropolitan Robert Runcie will pay a visit to the Soviet Union in June this year, an official spokesman for the head of the Church of England announced today.

The church dignitary will attend at the invitation of the Russian Orthodox Church festivities marking the 1,000th anniversary of Christianity in Russia.

Smirnov Delegation Returns From West Germany

PM0505111788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] The CPSU delegation headed by G.L. Smirnov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, returned to Moscow from the FRG on 3 May after participating in the German Communist Party's May Day events.

Latin America & Caribbean

Ortega Condemns Contras' 'Obstructionist' Stand

PM0505140188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "Against Interference"]

[Text] Managua, 2 May—Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega has resolutely condemned the obstructionist stance of the ringleaders of the armed counterrevolution during the talks with the government.

Addressing a thousands-strong rally in the capital, the Nicaraguan leader warned that in the event of the failure of the process for ensuring a peaceful settlement in the country, the Somozist hirelings would be wiped out. If a concrete agreement on a cease-fire in Nicaragua and the contras' transition to peaceful activity is not reached before 30 May, when the temporary truce with the contras expires, he pointed out, the Sandinist People's Army will launch a broad offensive against contra gangs in the country.

At talks in Managua, the government proposed that the temporary truce be extended for 1 month in order to resolve technical questions of the cease-fire, but the contras rejected these initiatives by the Nicaraguan leadership. We cannot try forever to persuade the counterrevolution to put an end to the war, and at the end of the temporary truce period, we will start a new offensive in order to finally rout the mercenary formations, the president stressed.

At the same time, D. Ortega reaffirmed the government's intention to strive to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict and to discuss ways of overcoming differences and ending the war at the new round of talks with the contras in mid-May. The Nicaraguan president condemned the counterrevolution's attempts to impose on the Managua meeting futile discussions about democracy and the development of the revolutionary process. The Nicaraguan people, he said, have gained independence and democracy by overthrowing the Somozist dictatorship; they are entitled to independently choose the path of development for their political system, and we do not intend to discuss this with anyone. Our independence, national sovereignty, and self-determination cannot depend on Washington or the wishes of counterrevolutionaries, D. Ortega stressed.

Political & Social

Politburo Meeting Examines Several Issues 5 May

LD0505193188 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 5 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At its session on 5 May the CPSU Central Committee Politburo approved the government proposals on the procedure and the stages for forming and considering a concept for the economic and social development of the USSR up to 2005, the basic guidelines for this period, and the state 5-year plan for 1991-95. It was emphasized in the discussion that the problems of the long-term development of the economy have fundamentally important political significance. The basic documents on these issues should be based on the principles of radical economic reform in strict compliance with the provisions of the Law on the State Enterprise. They should be drawn up on a broad democratic footing, making use of the vast creative potential of society, which will make it possible to more fully reveal reserves for economic growth and determine scientific-technological and social tasks.

The session considered a proposal of the USSR Council of Ministers on coordinating the state plans of the USSR and other socialist countries for the coming 5-year period, and on particular problems for the period up to 2000.

It was noted that in accordance with the restructuring of foreign economic activity that is being implemented throughout the country and the Law on the State Enterprise, enterprises and organizations—above all in machine building, chemicals, and other processing sectors of the country's industry—are to be involved most actively in the work of coordinating plans. They emphasized the enormous importance of implementing cardinal improvements in deepening the international socialist division of labor and perfecting the structure for mutual trade turnover on the basis of intersector coproduction and specialization, broad utilization of new forms of integrational interaction, and realization of the comprehensive program for scientific and technological progress by CEMA member-countries.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo considered the matter of improving the provision of food for the population. It was noted that as a result of increased work to intensify production and the use of new forms of organizing and stimulating labor, an improvement in supplying foodstuffs to the population has been achieved in a number of oblasts, krays, and republics. This work, however, is still not being carried out satisfactorily in many parts of the country. Soviet and economic bodies are displaying a casual approach, adopting a position of dependency in solving the problems of richly supplying the market with food products, and striving for the food problem to be tackled centrally instead of adopting the necessary steps locally. Work in solving these matters is being restructured extremely slowly by the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee; the USSR Ministry of Grain Products, the Ministry of the Fish Industry, and the Ministry Trade; the Central Union of Consumers' Cooperatives; and the Councils of Ministers of union republics.

Considering the existing state of affairs in the provision of food to the population in particular regions of the country to be inadmissible, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo has deemed it essential that party, soviet, and economic bodies examine from all aspects the potential of each rayon, town, oblast, kray, and republic and outline and implement measures to improve the supply to the population of all kinds of food products.

It is essential to comprehensively develop and support the initiative of work collectives and each worker as they, with understanding and great responsibility, get down to solving the tasks designated by the party for increasing the production of foodstuffs as quickly as possible; to give them effective support, to provide in practice a broad avenue for lease forms of economic management and the collective and family contract, and to everywhere remove all obstacles and hindrances to their application.

The session examined the issues of raising the economic interest of labor collectives, branches of industry, republics, krays, and oblasts in increasing the output of nonedible consumer goods. The ministries and departments and the councils of ministers of the union republics have been invited to draw up steps to more effectively utilize the economic levers for increasing the manufacture of these goods, develop the required material and technical base, and improve the management system.

It was decided to immortalize in the Soviet Union the memory of Polish figures who have made a great contribution to the revolutionary movement, developing science and culture, and strengthening Soviet-Polish friendship. Together with the commemoration in Poland of the foremost people of Russia and the Soviet Union, these measures are a new step demonstrating the breadth of the interaction of the two countries on the basis of the declaration adopted a year ago on Soviet-Polish cooperation in the field of ideology, science, and culture.

The Politburo approved the outcome of the talks Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had with [Rodney] Arismendi, general secretary of the Uruguayan Communist Party Central Committee. The unity of views of the CPSU and the Urugyuan Communist Party on the present-day situation in Latin America and the world, and on the state of the international communist and workers' movement was noted with satisfaction. There was confirmation of both parties' readiness to promote the theoretical interpretation and the implementation of the tasks confronting communists in light of profound

changes that have taken place in the world. The mutual desire of the CPSU and the Uruguyan Communist Party to continue to develop their traditional fraternal relations was emphasized.

The session approved the outcome of Comrade Gorbachev's meeting and Comrade Shevardnadze's talks with Kim Yong-nam, Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Politburo member, vice premier of the Administrative Council, and minister of foreign relations of the DPRK, who has been on an official visit to the Soviet Union. Kim Yong-nam handed Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev a personal message from Kim Il-song, Korean Workers' Party Central committee general secretary and DPRK president. The unity that exists between the CPSU and the Korean Workers' Party, the USSR and the DPRK on the main directions of bilateral relations and the international situation was noted with satisfaction, as was their mutual deisre to develop all-around cooperation and to widen their foreign political interaction in the interests of strengthening peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the entire Asian and Pacific region.

The results of Comrade Vorotnikov's visit to Yugoslavia at the invitation of the Governments of the Socialist Republics of Serbia and Montenegro were approved. It was noted that practical cooperation between the republics, krays, and towns of the USSR and Yugoslavia are an important link in the whole package of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, whose further development received a powerful boost from the recent visit to Yugoslavia by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

Information was examined on the visit by the CPSU Delegation led by Comrade Razumovskiy to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and on the meetings and talks with Nguyen Van Linh, Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committe general secretary and other Vietnamese leaders. The importance of the further development of the multifaceted cooperation between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Vietnam was emphasized.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo session examined a number of other issues of the foreign policy activity of our party and state.

Reader Urges Ridding Key Posts of Braking Forces

PM0605132188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 May 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Letter from reader V. Karlov under the rubric "Letters...'Not for Publication'": "Fearing Internal Opposition"]

[Text] I, like others of my generation, remember very well the late fifties and early sixties. That was when N.S. Khrushchev adopted the course of combating high-ranking embezzlers and bribetakers. The response was that stores throughout the country stopped selling prime necessities and other goods. This was partially due to the poor harvest and other objective factors. But I believe this was also helped by economic sabotage designed to make the people dissatisfied with the leader of the day. Those dark forces got their way. Within 1 week of N.S. Khrushchev's removal everything appeared in the stores again—as if by magic! For a time, at least.

Let us not look for direct comparisons with the present or see every crook or bungler as a clandestine enemy of restructuring. There are also objective difficulties. But nor should one underestimate the danger presented by the braking forces. They are hoping that by increasing problems with supply and craftily kindling national dissension, they will again be able to turn the people against the reforms.

How much longer are we going to go on merely debating with these powerful enemies? Let us be honest: The fate of restructuring is in the balance. Thus it is necessary to determinedly oust the braking forces from key posts. Otherwise our passivity and patience may prove catastrophic.

V. Karlov, Kuybyshev.

Yerofeyev Weighs Glasnost's Function, Results

PM0605110988 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 May 88 First Edition p 2

[Nikolay Yerofeyev "Publicist's Thoughts": "Test of Glasnost"]

[Text] Moscow—There is no shortage of readers' letters about democracy. This is understandable: We are greeting our professional festival—Press Day—on the threshold of the 19th all-union party conference, which will define measures for the further democratization of the life of the party and society. What will these measures be? I would very much like them to be really revolutionary; to be a really radical political reform aimed at replacing the old administrative edict system of management with genuine people's power. It is not just that our economy insistently demands this and that the new economic mechanism simply cannot survive without democratism, without the working people's full participation in production management. No, the need for democratization is certainly not a narrow pragmatic need or just a production need. "More democracy" is the demand of socialism's very essence, of its original humanist ideals. The person must at last really feel that he is both the master of his homeland and the master of his own destiny.

Do you remember the poet's bitter words about the atmosphere in the thirties? "We live with feeling the country beneath our feet. Our speeches are inaudible 10 paces away..." I did not know those times but, on the other hand, I very well feel the labored breathing of those recent times now called the stagnation years. I have worked on the newspaper for several years, and I know myself how agonizing it was to read the letters arriving in

the editorial office and what impotent despair gripped you when you did not know what to reply to these literally bleeding questions conveying alarm: Where are we going, why is all this happening, do the people up there really not see how long this could last? And again: Why do you not publish our letters, why do you not tell the whole truth?

Incidentally, not only journalists but also many readers knew perfectly well both about the zones closed to criticism and about the topics closed for discussion. They knew that they must not write, for example, about negative phenomena in the Army, and very cautiously (only "at the level" of precinct militiamen) about shortcomings in the work of law-enforcement organs. They must not touch on problems of interethnic relations, as it was considered that there were [no problems] and could be no problems here. They must not raise their critical pen against Moscow—the "model communist city." Red tape was a forbidden topic: Not even references to Lenin's words about red tape as one of our chief "internal enemies" saved those who tried to set down their thoughts on this topic in writing—Lenin's lines were struck out together with the author's thoughts. They must not write about drug addiction, prostitution, corruption, formalism in party work, the devaluation of pledges in socialist competition, price hikes, the privileges of leading workers, the heavy work of female construction workers, the low disability allowances, the elite approach to training diplomatic cadres, the ration cards for meat and butter, air disasters, and so forth—I could go on and on extending the list of "not our topics," as we used to say then.

Fairness requires me to point out that, "despite all the impediments and obstacles" (which, incidentally, we were not allowed to mention either), even during those times many editors and journalists raised sharp topics at their own peril and shaped and prepared public opinion for the need for changes. Of course, they did not do this in isolation but with the help of their authors—courageous, honest, and principled people who included scientists, writers, party workers, and so-called "ordinary readers"—workers, students, and pensioner veterans. But at what a price such veils of silence were rent!

Much has changed since then. Under the impact of the revolutionary April changes the old Russian word "glasnost" not only crossed state borders without being translated but also acquired a new, "second" life in our own home. Glasnost became a new, in many ways still not very customary, but undoubtedly tremendous political and social phenomenon. For a while we all suddenly felt like [Hans Christian] Andersen's straightforward little boy who saw and "blabbed" the truth about the emperor's actual state of undress. We saw for ourselves with relief how quickly the list of previously forbidden topics had begun to dwindle. And the relief was occasioned not at all by a philistine desire to relish saucy details from the life of prostitutes in the capital or the horrors of drug addiction. Although we indeed did not get by without such curiosity—the kind shown by readers of detective stories—the chief point lay elsewhere: Since we write and speak openly of our social ills, this means that society has finally declared war on them and that we really want to make our life purer and better. This is probably the first meaning of glasnost: It is needed in order to get an unblinkered view of the real problems which must finally be resolved. In this instance **the Word** must truly come at the beginning of **the Deed** [boldface as published] for, before doing something, it is necessary to speak about it for all to hear. For, as is known, silence most frequently denotes consent, that is, virtual acceptance of the existing order of things.

But you also encounter the following judgments: Of course, glasnost is necessary, but... is there not too much glasnost? Must we expose our past and present sores and focus attention on shortcomings as frankly as has been done recently? Some high-ranking bribetaker has been convicted, a high-handed appanage princeling has been expelled from the party, a plant which was poisoning a lake has been closed down, a river diversion project has been scrapped, an unjust sentence passed by a court some 50 years ago has been revoked... Yes, please do revoke, judge, and expel, but why inform absolutely everyone of this? Do we not thereby undermine the authority of leaders generally, obliterate past achievements with black paint, and do a disservice to the cause of educating young people? It would probably be wrong to reject these doubts "out of hand," as the saying goes. The question of the limit and degree of glasnost is not so simple, but it seems to me that it is worth giving it some thought.

When I think about it, I recall Lenin's conversation with—if I am not mistaken—Lunacharskiy about which movies could be shown to the people. The conversation took place in connection with the fact that after October the new Soviet movie industry had not yet had time to create its own output and had to hire out movies made before the revolution. And so this question was put to Lenin: Which old movies can be shown? Show everything there is, Vladimir Ilich replied, so long as there is nothing counterrevolutionary or pornographic. I admit that that reply had in the past staggered me (perhaps that "staggering" impression arose "by contrast" with the bans on showing movies which were generously imposed by our cinematographic department in the seventies). It also staggered me, above all, by its democratism ("show everything"), that is, with its complete trust in the proletarian and peasant viewer, who will himself understand what is what. But this, please note, was not "unbounded" democratism, for Lenin's advice contained clear ideological criteria: "nothing counterrevolutionary or pornographic."

Yes, socialism does have political and moral values which no one is permitted to erode, and there are ideas incompatible with our way of life. There are spiritual drugs, before whose aggressiveness and extremism the

doors of glasnost must be tightly shut: such as propaganda of chauvinism and nationalism, religious mysticism, anticommunist appeals, and provocative rumors. Glasnost, like democracy, is not abstract but lives and develops under specific social conditions and cannot be used against society, against the interests of the majority. The demand professed in medicine—"do not harm"—is fully applicable to glasnost.

I agree it is not always easy to discern the dividing line between a truly wise, party-minded word and false progressiveness and party-mindedness. The temptation to flaunt imaginary revolutionariness and home truths is just as dangerous as the temptation to ban. I, for example, am convinced that V. Kozhinov's article "Truth and Verity" [Pravda i Istina], published in NASH SOVREMENNIK No 4, contains something like a vindication of violence in the name of historical progress. But that is my belief, while the journal's editors are evidently of a different opinion and, probably, a section of its readers as well. What a delicate thing it is—the criterion of truth and glasnost! A little to one side—and everything is permitted...

It is here that a question formulated back at the beginning of the last century arises: "Who are the judges?" As a matter of fact, it is clear who the judges are. Since we are speaking of editorial matters, we journalists are the judges here. Therefore it will be more correct to ask: "What kind of judges are they?" What is the level of our qualifications, what is the extent of our political flair, civic responsibility, aesthetic taste, boldness, and courage, finally? How many times I have met editors of oblast, city, and rayon newspapers who would run off to the party committee to "agree" on any more or less pointed article! The saddest thing is that many party secretaries are fond of this "agreeing." Voluntarily fulfilling a censor's duties, they are ready to condone the editor's professional helplessness and unscrupulousness and his cowardly desire to shed responsibility and transfer it to the secretary's shoulders. On the other hand, one can rest easy: The newspaper will not say "too much," and glasnost will be strictly "rationed." Is this not why many of our local newspapers are so ineffectual?

But is it only local newspapers? Take those events in Nagorno-Karabakh. What prevented the mass media from speaking fully and promptly about the events in that autonomous oblast? In the end, everything was said and shown. (In my view, the last edition of the television program "Pozitsiya" was well done). But why was it necessary to do this "in the end"?

"It is an amazing thing," an acquaintance of mine said to me while watching the "Vremya" program (just then shots of yet another political demonstration in the West were being shown on the screen). "How is that their television people manage to get to the scene of an event in time! Why is it that ours cannot do it?"

Indeed, why?

I do not think it is necessary to explain how difficult it is then to "catch up" with glasnost, say all that was not said right away, plainly, frankly, and fully. Let us reflect on the 3-year period of restructuring and remember the events in which glasnost was a kind of "litmus paper" of the present state of our democracy and ability to act in accordance with this state. Here they are, the events: Chernobyl, the "Nakhimov," the Alma-Ata events, the Rust flight, the Crimean Tatars' demands, the Ovechkin brothers. These events, quite different in their character, scale, and consequences, have one common feature: As soon as they occurred they set public opinion alight and the public wanted to know "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" about them.

I do not know what you think, but it seems to me that glasnost worked best in the cases of the "Nakhimov," the Rust flight, and the "Ovechkin family." Between the events themselves and the reports on them there was virtually no delay at all: As soon as the rumors appeared they were extinguished and foreign radio stations were forced to recount what our papers had said.

Chernobyl stands alone. It stands alone in terms of the tragedy of it, its public impact, and, finally, in terms of the fact that it was the first real test of glasnost for the new party and state leadership. In fact, it was then that I first heard the words—"glasnost test." I don't know who I heard them from, but the sense was as follows: We say "glasnost, glasnost"—now let's look at how extensive this glasnost is, how fully the truth is going to be told. On looking back, one can sum up: We have passed the test. The glasnost proclaimed by the party acquired in these tragic events the status of a most important principle of our life today. The people have been told the harshest truth—frankly and without embellishment.

I can hear the objections that here too, at first, the original information was withheld. Yes, unfortunately, that is so. But something else is also true: It took time to investigate the causes, to obtain a clear picture of the degree of danger and elaborate the requisite measures to eliminate it. Premature, inaccurate information might have led to unforeseen results.

I am convinced that there are situations that demand of glasnost not so much answers to the questions "what, where, and when?"—as a full and honest analysis, because glasnost (and this is another very important meaning of it) should serve as a guarantee that a mistake will not be repeated, as a lesson for the future. Indicentally, it is this aspect of glasnost that those who object to the resurrection of the historical truth about the grim chapters of our past do not recognize or do not want to recognize. No, we are not leafing through these chapters to reopen wounds or vilify the history of socialism. It is to learn lessons for the future: This is what happens if you roll back democracy, this is the consequence of opting for administrative-edict methods of leadership and for rigid centralism in management, even if they are

resorted to for the finest motives. Glasnost is also a warning: Do not repeat, do not permit in the future, rule out the very possibility of a new cult, new stagnation, new Chernobyls.

It seems to me that glasnost also means trust. Trust in people's common sense, their collective reason, wisdom, and conscience. Sometimes we forget this, which is entirely understandable: The bureaucratic system, which was the dominant feature for a long time, accustomed people to relying in all things not on the people's reason, but on the guiding opinion of the apparatus, believing that "one can see more clearly from on top of the hill."

You may say that it is not my business to assess the extent of glasnost. But why not mine? In fact, one way or another, we all discuss not only items in the press, but Politburo decisions and speeches by our leaders. We discuss them at work and at home, on the street and in the subway, in cafes and on aircraft. Indeed, how can it be otherwise when these actions, decisions, and speeches relate to me personally, to you, to him—to all of us, participants in restructuring?

So let us exchange opinions more often, not in the kitchen and smoking room, but in newspapers and on the television screen. Only then will glasnost be an effective means of participation in the running of society, an effective form of social control, a reliable instrument of socialist democracy.

The difficult job of renewing society is accompanied by debate, argument, and conflicting opinions. This is natural. It would be considerably worse if views of restructuring were presented in only one form—in a truncated official form, even if it is absolutely accurate. A monopoly on truth always brings with it the danger of conservatism and dogmatic infallibility.

In this connection, I would like to share my anxiety on the following count. The difficult revolutionary processes taking place in our life, frankly speaking, have been perceived in different ways by different people. It is natural that everyone should interpret and analyze in his own way the innovative transformations in the economy, in the social and spiritual sphere. Restructuring has taken away former privileges from some people, some people have had to step up their work. We all find it hard to eradicate stereotyped thinking. In these conditions the imposition of a "taboo" on all wavering views and opinions must not be allowed. One could easily become like those who only recently were expelling any element of dissent from literature, from the screen, from the stage, from the newspapers. After all, it is very simple—give the go-ahead to all those who agree with us and finally lower the barrier on those who think differently, who are mistaken, who doubt, and even oppose us. Perhaps it is better after all to adopt a different principle: Allow full pluralism of opinions, "without counterrevolution and pornography," of course? In fact, socialist pluralism is by no means conflict-free. It is important that its espousers should be patriots of their country, that concern for the destiny of the country should be not only the possible, but the essential basis on which to conduct the debate. And it goes without saying that we must all ensure a high standard of debate, which—as we can see very well!—is in short supply at the moment.

Glasnost is becoming the norm of our life. It is not just in the pages of the newspapers. We are not just talking about it because it is Press Day. It is struggling for social justice in trade union committees, it is grappling with formalism in the Komsomol, it is voting at competitive elections for enterprise directors, it is discussing urgent problems at party meetings. In short, to paraphrase our great poet, one can say: The people are not silent. This is vital to success.

PRAVDA's Afanasyev on Perestroyka's Status

LD0505154688 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0940 GMT 5 May 88

[Excerpts] Today is Press Day. We now present a conversation between our correspondent Yakov Smirnov and Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev, chief editor of PRAVDA and chairman of the USSR Union of Journalists Board. [passage omitted]

[Afanasyev] You have probably acquainted yourself with our editorial article. The purpose of that article was to promote perestroyka, to reveal opponents of perestroyka and their arguments. For the sake of maintaining principles, they would like to restore the Stalinist command and administrative methods of leadership. Above all, they stand for old, outdated methods without offering any positive program.

Our task, the task of PRAVDA and of the entire Soviet press, is to find positive experience with perestroyka, to find the people of perestroyka, to find collectives which do a great deal while working in new conditions. [passage omitted]

We cannot, of course, limit ourselves to criticism to advance the cause. What is needed is practical implementation, a strategy of perestroyka which has been developed by our party. This is exactly our work at the moment. With differing degrees of success, we have our coups and failures. Nevertheless, the policy of PRAVDA is very clearly defined, as is the policy of the central press. I believe the situation is worse among the oblast, kray, and rayon newspapers. As yet they do not have the edge, the eagerness which is typical of the central press. [passage omitted]

[Smirnov] We are all now learning democracy, learning glasnost, including journalists. We openly told our listeners that we had not mastered glasnost and democracy to the necessary extent either.

[Afanasyev] We journalists are also children of our times. We are not 10 or 15 years old. We lived in the period of stagnation, and some even in earlier periods. Naturally, the press of this past, the press of stagnation, the press that could not make full use of democratic forms, also characterizes journalists. We ourselves learn democracy, learn glasnost. Look what happens, for example. Some time ago, right on the eve of the 27th congress, we published a review of letters which was headed "Purification." That was a critical article, based on letters from readers. What a dressing-down I got for that "purification"! At the 27th congress PRAVDA was criticized and very high-level bosses really raked me over the coals on that occasion. However, that was an article of principle; in fact it was the beginning of glasnost. We gave a push, a cue to our press: Here is what you should do, comrades, here is what you must aim for. The things that are published in the press nowadays, the problems that are touched on—in comparison with what is there today—"Purification," you could say, was child's play and no more.

Recently we published another interesting, curious article—it was literally on 2 May—on the strength of party authority by one of our readers. That was also a very interesting, sharply focused letter. We believe that this letter by one of our readers...[Afanasyev changes thought] He posed very interesting problems there, but its value lay perhaps not so much in criticism but in its specific proposals concerning democratization of the life and the work of our party itself. You can agree with him or not; you can argue with him, but there are also serious proposals in it. We believe that that was a new push for glasnost; we believe it was an article of principal importance.

[Smirnov] I would also like to share an observation with you and to ask you to give your opinion on that subject. I have noticed, Viktor Grigoryevich, that recently it has become very difficult for journalists to fight with the bureaucrats. They have rallied together; you see, there is some sort of consensus in places, in party bodies, in legal bodies, among trade union and economic leaders. They stand up with all their might. No so long ago, We subjected one organization to criticism, and you know, we have already received replies from four organizations which were exact replicas of each other. We posed the issue of the inadmissibility of the command and administrative methods in management, but the reply to us was: Look, we were right to dismiss such and such person. As to what we meant, all organizations reject it as if they were in complicity about it. It is very difficult; this bureaucratic machine stands in the way like a barrier.

[Afanasyev] I agree with you, it has become very difficult to work. There are many instances of newspaper, radio, and television correspondents being refused admission to an enterprise, installation, or a trade enterprise under various pretexts. First they demand some sort of papers from us, then some sort of permit; then we have to wait for hours to be received when our correspondent phones us for help. Sometimes we have not even managed to leave the office for the critical evaluation of this or that situation when preemptory telephone calls start coming in and from high above as well.

True, the bureaucracy, of course, resists with all its might. Why is there so much resistance? Because officials—I do not want to refer to them all as bureaucrats—officials on the managerial staff, in the soviets, or in the Council of Ministers here in the center are connected with each other and do each other's work. [passage omitted]

[Smirnov] We do talk about it, but they still command. Are we going to gain the upper hand over them, after all? The reason I am asking you this question is because people are already asking it. So, who is winning now, perestroyka or those who are against it? After all, we must finally break this bureaucratic machine, this brake on perestroyka.

[Afanasyev] We really must do it, and we will break it. I believe it is people who support perestroyka, who work to promote it, who are gaining the upper hand. I cannot tell you the percentage of who is for and who is against, but let us say that we do have a certain indication of that. We have received about a thousand replies to our article of 5 April over this short period of time. About 70-75 percent support it. So you can see the correlation for yourself. We are wrong in thinking the anti-perestroyka forces are only some isolated persons, individuals. This is quite a powerful administrative system that has been in existence ever since Stalin. Perhaps it was shaken a bit, but not broken. It is very hard to break it. Let us take the reforms we had in the past, Khrushchev's reform, for instance. Brezhnev also took to reforming in 1979 when an economic reform was announced. The provisions were good and the decisions were good, but the command bureaucratic system survived and everything got stuck and stumbled against that system. The party is now breaking that system, reducing the administrative apparatus, simplifying it, passing a new management scheme for industries.

But all that work is still at the very outset, at the conceptual level only. Look at what is being done: Let us say, a section of a ministry is scrapped, a major section with many staff members. Then the same ministry sets up some sort of a scientific research institute nearby, and all these bureaucrats are resettled into different chairs. I am not aware of any instances when a high-level bureaucrat is re-employed as a chief engineer, a chief of a production shop, or a director of a certain plant. That is because some argue in the following way—I know such people—they say: What the hell do I need to slave away for R500 for, when I can do nothing here for R200?

[Smirnov] With various benefits on top of that.

[Afanasyev] Right, benefits as well. Then he resides in the capital, after all, and he would have to leave the capital [if he wished to take an alternative job]. He also has a car, a black Volga with various extra lights. [installation of an extra pair of strong headlights or tail lights on a vehicle is only tolerated by militia when the car belongs to a high-ranking official] You cannot even blame the bureaucrat that he is a bureaucrat; it is the system which has turned them into bureaucrats. The command and administrative system needed people just like them. It is not at all easy to cope with that trouble. A democratic apparatus has to be created, and we—if you ask me—do not know how to go about creating it for the time being.

[Smirnov] We are learning.

[Afanasyev] Yes, we are learning, that is the word.

[Smirnov] We are in the process of understanding this democracy, glasnost, at the moment, and we receive letters. How remarkably more open and sincere people have become! After all, in the past they could not even think of being able to say it.

[Afanasyev] In all likelihood, we will receive about 800,000 letters this year. In April, we received 68,000 letters, whereas a couple of years ago we would not receive more than 20-25,000. We are simply inundated with those letters.

[Smirnov] And so are we.

[Afanasyev] I think this is the main gain of these 3 years which we have traversed since the Central Committee April Plenum. People have been set in motion; people have started displaying interest in the destiny of the country, in the fate of their own enterprise. People are taken up with the cause; people worry when perestroyka skids; people warn us, the party: Please, for God's sake, do not stall, carry out perestroyka to the end at all costs. Our people regard the turn of events optimistically. Perestroyka will triumph, even if it is only for the reason that we have no alternative to perestroyka. People are well aware of that. [passage omitted]

Party Conference To Review Reform Progress

LD0405165188 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 4 May 88

[Commentary by Aleksandr Putko]

[Excerpts] We begin with an item about the forthcoming 19th Communist Party Conference opening in Moscow on the 28th of next month. Radio Moscow's commentator looks into what has been done to prepare the meeting.

The party conference will review progress in implementing renewal. Meanwhile heated debates continue in the Soviet press on fundamental aspects of this policy. The discussion was sparked off by controversial articles in the daily SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, the magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIA and some other periodicals. Renewal has affected everybody's interests. Some strongly dislike it, for instance the breed of administrators and bureaucrats who appeared in the stagnant seventies. Their domination is now coming to an end. The competition of knowledge and initiative and the policy of openness has highlighted the incompetent and reactionary nature of the outdated administrative apparatus.

But it has been resisting change, using its favorite method: rhetoric. The opponents of renewal have been claiming that Soviet society has been departing from socialism and from principles they cannot neglect. This is the main idea of articles published not so very long ago by the daily SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIA and reprinted by a number of local dailies. The timing of the publication and the similarity of arguments used by the opponents of revolutionary change are not accidental and they help piece the picture together. Renewal has entered into a new phase. The drafting of strategy and tactics has been completed and the time has come for action. Incompetent officials now have to step down. Administrative and command methods have been giving way to economic ways of management. Openness has increased.

The 19th Communist Party Conference is drawing near. The process is becoming irreversible. All of this prompts the opponents of reconstruction to greater activity. The attempt of those opposed to renewal to consolidate their forces has ended in failure. The national daily PRAVDA has carried an editorial with a profound analysis and criticism of their position. The policy of revolutionary renewal and of protecting socialism must be translated into life with greater decision and consistency. This is what the article in PRAVDA, which is of fundamental importance, has called for. An overwhelming majority of the Soviet people share this opinion. Newspapers, magazines, and radio and television stations are being showered with letters.

The opponents of renewal obviously didn't expect that they would be given such a rebuff. Wednesday's edition of PRAVDA has published a review of some of the letters it has received. The readers are unanimous in their support for renewal which, they are confident, means more socialism and for the restoration of Vladimir Lenin's concept of socialism. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, I might say that I cannot recall more emotional and active massive actions in support of the Communist Party's policy over several decades.

Readers Discuss Party Conference, Delegates

WA18000292 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 19 Apr 88 p 2

[Readers' letters by V. Semenov, O. Mamedov, and L. Mikhaylova—boldface and italics as published]

[Text] My Candidate [subhead]

Voronezh—My old comrade Oleg Shevchenko, head of the letters department of KOMMUNA—the Voronezh

Oblast newspaper, read the 6 April 1986 PRAVDA editorial, went to the party organization secretary, and demanded that a party meeting be held immediately. He said that he wanted to deliver the report, that in the report he wanted to openly say everything on his mind about those who wave the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article "I Cannot Waive My Principles" like a flag and once again, and as he did 20 years ago, raise his voice and drive away the threats.

He told me about this excitedly and went to write his report while I went to our division of the Union of Writers to inform our colleagues about the meeting.

Oleg is in general a fighter and a citizen by nature. If I could will it, I thought to myself, I would send him to the 19th all-union party conference.

If I could will it?...And why should not my will and the will of other rank and file Communists determine, for example, who attends the party conference in Moscow from Voronezh Oblast? Only 2 months remain and nothing is heard in the party newspaper, from the obkom, from the raykom—there are no news or indications whatsoever about how, when, and the way in which our oblast party organization plans to elect delegates to the 19th party conference.

Perhaps there will be no elections at all. Perhaps the delegates will once again be named by the obkom.

Where can a rank and file Communist turn to nominate his candidate? After all, the obkom plenum will nominate candidates from its ranks and will strictly observe certain percentages: a certain percent of workers, a certain percent of women, a certain percent of young people. But how many of them will be real champions of perestroyka? Not those who merely fulfilled two norms but those who achieved perestroyka through suffering, those who laid the ideological and political foundation and who are now carrying it out.

This is why I decided to address all Communists in the nation through SOVETSKAYA KULTURA and tell them that we in Voronezh, like other cities, have honest, diligent, sensible people, who are not vested with mandates, but who sincerely and passionately believe in the ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress and will fight for them like staunch and courageous communists.

The people at the conference must not be weathercocks who vote for anything at all. They must be people of honor and duty who know what to do and who do it. Such people will be urgently needed at the conference. Our Politburo must rely upon them if it wants perestroyka to be irreversible .

Valentin Semenov, writer, CPSU member since 1963

More Socialism Means More Politics [subhead]

Rostov-na-Donu—You watch an informative telecast and ask yourself: can it be that in a great socialist power that occupies one-sixth of the earth's land, there has not been a single political event the entire day? This is difficult to believe, especially today. And we see with our own eyes the usual lamentable disproportion: internal economic against foreign political information.

When will we realize: no matter how important a new blast furnace or a newly built plant may be, the activation of the human factor requires giving priority attention to sociopolitical facts. After all, acceleration entails the reforming of social relations whereas previous calculations were intended to make sophisticated technology fit obsolete social forms. The 27th CPSU Congress was revolutionary in that it fundamentally repudiated this hopeless attempt.

The local press and television above all visibly demonstrate the negative consequences of the predominantly "technological" approach. They have almost imperceptibly become manuals on the procurement of haylage and on the introduction of the *contract* [podryad] system. But everything cannot be reduced to production. We cannot write just about production if we really want to become a society of well-rounded individuals rather than "professional cretins." What our glasnost lacks today is politics—on a large or small scale, at the all-union or regional level.

Journalism has a stereotypical penchant for reporting events after the fact. This means that the role of the mobilizing impulse today belongs primarily to the adopted decision.

And we are indeed accustomed to being informed about events that have already taken place. We are so accustomed that we have forgotten that current internal political life is frequently formed from the torturous, stage-by-stage, compromise coordination of the positions of different organizations that represent the concrete interests of concrete groups of people. But it is specifically this vast preparatory work that is the essence of the nation's political life that is today in the majority of instances a "sealed book" to us. We do not see the centers of our political life in their everyday work and know nothing about it. This not only impoverishes our ideas about the complexity of internal political processes but also distorts the perception of their work as political activity.

Especially alarming is an inexplicable paradox that has already been noted in the press: People are better informed about the concerns and decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers than they are about their own party raykom or rayispolkom. The lack of such information is today becoming a frank challenge to perestroyka. Therefore the special examination of the question "Concerning Glasnost in the Work of Party and Trade Union Organizations and Soviet Organs in Vladimir Oblast" at the

CPSU Central Committee is entirely in accordance with the needs of perestroyka. It is only important that it not become just one more report.

Finally, the time has also come to overcome the prejudice against primitively understood "sensationalism" in reporting materials on internal political topics. To the contrary, the purposeful shaping and arousing of interest in impending political events and decisions would be a major step forward in the work of the mass media. What is more, [the publication of] information on differing positions (after all, they do exist!) of various organs and officials on specific issues is desirable rather than reprehensible. The democratization of the political thinking of the masses cannot be achieved in any other way and any difference of opinion will produce a shocking impression as was recently the case. And this is what is surprising—there is no one who does not know that real life moves through the resolution of real contradictions. Thus is it possible and conceivable that internal political life in such a gigantic nation would be excluded from general social dialectics?

The main principle in the political organization of socialist society—democratic centralism—shows that unity here does not come automatically, is not guaranteed, but is continuously sought and developed.

This is why total unanimity on everything, including internal political questions, which has occasionally been demonstrated to too great a degree by our mass media, not only distorts reality but also tends to undermine interest in internal political issues and in the mass media as well. People do not want to be kept informed about the beginning and course of negotations in the international arena alone: no less important is "internal" information on the positions and arguments of interested persons on questions that directly influence the working people's everyday life. Such information would be addressed to people as citizens, thereby making them active co-participants in the current internal political life of the nation, oblast, or rayon. And perhaps then talks on internal political topics will no longer yield in popularity to lectures on international topics (a fact that should have long ago been assessed as alarming).

O. Mamedov, doctor of economic sciences

Don't Make a Show of It [subhead]

Moscow—I would name the need for more reason, openness, and honesty as one of the principal needs in our entire daily life. We are renouncing many absurd rituals, stereotypes, and conditionalities. For example, I am entirely unable to understand why the party bureau secretary does not simply open the meeting and say: the bureau proposes a presidium made up of the following comrades, let us discuss these candidacies. Why put on the show that people are nominated for the presidium from the floor? The editorial commission, that frequently does not edit anything, and the counting commission are nominated in the same way. We can tell me that all these things are trifles not worthy of discussion. I do not agree with you. All staged actions undermine the authority of the meeting, generate skeptical smiles in the hall, and thus detract from the businesslike atmosphere of the forum.

L. Mikhaylova [not further identified]

Listeners Concerned Over Restructuring's 'Fate'

LD0405164988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 4 May 88

["Restructuring Radio Questionnaire" program, presented by Lidiya Kozenko]

[Text] For today's review I have selected several letters whose authors express concern for the fate of restructuring.

The grounds they give for this concern is that among a large number of local party and soviet bodies they do not see an interest in fundamental transformations of old and stagnant practices. Many listeners often express themselves in more than pointed terms, at times wrongly generalizing negative phenomena locally and considering them typical for the country as a whole.

It is not always possible to agree with such views, although in some cases one can also acknowledge the correctness of the letters' authors.

Frolov, a member of the party since 1966, from the Vostok settlement of Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon in Maritime Kray writes: I think that the basic mass of working people are wholeheartedly in favor of restructuring in spirit, that is, they are in favor, but in fact, a majority is playing the waiting game, playing careful, because just as the little Bonapartes held everything in their hands, together with an obliging milieu—that is how everything has remained. Each of us knows many speechifiers, demagogues, blatant careerists, and high-handedly impudent leaders, indifferent toward another's misfortune and public opinion.

I think, writes Frolov, that it is necessary to conduct union-wide extraordinary elections of leaders; the channels of government should everywhere be in the hands of reason, honor, and conscience. To achieve this a legislative act is needed, or a decision of the Central Committee, and the widest democracy in the discussion of and putting forward of candidacies.

But, after all, legislative acts already exist, and a decision on the extension of democracy and the right to elect leaders. It is necessary only to make more widespread use of these rights.

Close to me are the thoughts of Atsentyan, a participant in the war, a labor veteran from Rostov-na-Donu, who writes that is necessary to more boldly and resolutely purge from the party bureaucrats, careerists, and rogues who got into the CPSU solely for the purpose of getting as comfortable a position as possible and to get rich at the expense of the people.

Chuprin, a war invalid from the city of Cherkassy, citing specific examples of the misuse of power, also reaches the conclusion of the need to purge mercenary people from party bodies, to ensure they do not disgrace the Communist Party, the socialist system, and Soviet power as a whole.

Yes, it is impossible not to agree with the authors of these and other letters received by Restructuring Radio Questionnaire that there is no room in the party for dishonorable people who use their official positions for mercenary purposes and shield themselves from people with the walls of their offices and the doors of their private cars.

All these people are known and prominent locally. But some listeners do not name them. Once again, apparently, that notorious guardedness. Unfortunately many people protest, in a purely declaratory way, not citing examples of their own struggle or of their own collectives with blatant—as they write—rogues at the helm of power.

It is not the first time that I want to say to you that you have to be bolder comrades. Don't put your faith in people arriving from Moscow, searching out and punishing those guilty of malpractices. In my view, in the majority of cases it is possible, on the spot and using one's own efforts, to do much to set things to rights. The basis for success in this are the decisions of the party's Central Committee and the new climate in public life born out of restructuring and whose irreversible progress depends on us all.

I shall remind you of our address: 127427 Moscow, Radio Restructuring Questionnaire.

Democracy Can Protect Restructuring

PM281147 Moscow NEDELYA in Russian
No 15, 11-17 Apr 88 (Signed to Press 13 Apr 88) p 2-3

[V. Vodolazhskiy and V. Gatov account of "Roundtable Discussion" on the agenda for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: "Perceiving the Future by Knowing the Past. Party Conferences: Historical Steps"; date and place not given—first three paragraphs are NEDELYA introduction]

[Text] As the opening date of the 19th all-union party conference draws nearer, NEDELYA's mailbag produces a growing number of letters about this event. They contain reflections on restructuring, on the process of democratization now under way in the country, on glasnost, and on the CPSU's role in the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society.

We must not forget our history while solving contemporary questions—this idea runs right through most letters. A vision of the past and an analysis of its achievements and miscalculations, of its ups and downs—this is the best guarantee for avoiding future mistakes. It is certainly no accident that restructuring, which, in M.S. Gorbachev's expression, is "fateful" for socialism, has generated such a universal interest in history.

The history of all-union party conferences, the role which the forthcoming party forum in June has to play in the country's life, and the hopes which Soviet people are investing in it—these were the topics of a "History Club" "roundtable discussion" between: Doctor of Historical Sciences Valeriy Vasilyevich Zhuravlev, deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute; Yuriy Aleksandrovich Polyakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Doctor of Historical Sciences Kirill Vladimirovich Gusev, professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; Doctor of Historical Sciences Vitaliy Semenovich Lelchuk, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences History of the USSR Institute; Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor Vladimir Aleksandrovich Tumanov, sector chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute; and Candidate of Historical Sciences Yuriy Vasilyevich Tyurin, editor of the History and Theory of Party Building Department of the journal VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS.

[Journalist] It is well known that the CPSU Statutes (except those adopted by the 19th and 22d CPSU Congresses) have all contained provisions for two forms of supreme party organ—the congress and the party conference. Conferences convened fairly regularly in between congresses until 1941. The 19th All-Union Party Conference will take place 47 years after the 18th. Why is it, in your opinion, that this form of the party's supreme organ has not been used for such a long time? At which most important historical moments in time did the party resort to convening its conferences in the past?

V.S. Lelchuk: Perfectly legitimate questions. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the majority of all conferences held after 1917 were convened in the first few years of Soviet power. Both congresses and party conferences were being convened annually virtually until the mid-twenties. Now we know well that this was a manifestation of one of the most important aspects of Lenin's style of work and of his leadership of the country, of the life of the party and the working class, and of the process of society's transformation as a whole. Check decisions made by the party "brass" against the opinion of a broad party audience—that was Lenin's principle.

We see, alas, a different picture when we look at the period which was typified by administrative edict methods of management and the conditions of Stalin's personality cult. The 15th All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress was held in 1927, the next took place 3 years later, the 17th (the congress of "victors") followed 4 years after the 16th, and the 18th was held 5 years after that. The same fate befell the party conferences: They were convened only three times between 1926 and the beginning of the war (in 1929, 1932, and 1941). That was no accident: The personality cult which was taking shape and the administrative system of the country's management did not need an open [glasnoye] and impartial party discussion at forums. Could there really be anything accidental about the fact that the 19th congress was separated by 13 years from the one before it?

The party lost a lot when party conferences became sporadic occurrences and lost their former importance.

Yu.V. Tyurin: A retrospective look over the postwar (and even the prewar) decades makes it possible to perceive with sufficient clarity that mistakes and failures in the determination and implementation of domestic and foreign policy in our country occurred, as a rule, whenever collective leadership was weakened and there was, in one form or another, a manifestation of the personality cult, voluntarism, and subjectivism. Deviations from the principle of collectiveness in party leadership inevitably inflicted the gravest of damage on the party, the people, and the cause of socialism. Stalin's personality cult had the most pernicious effect on Soviet society's advance along the socialist path. This phenomenon, alien to the essence of socialism, was the most serious brake along the path of implementing the new system's enormous advantages, diminished the creative potential of socialism, and deformed the essential principles laid down by V.I. Lenin.

Tangible damage was inflicted on the party's activity, and consequently on our society's development, by the deformation of the functions of the CPSU's supreme organs, its congresses and conferences. For example, the last prewar congress, the 18th, was already nothing more than just a mouthpiece for Stalin's authoritarianism and his personality cult. Just leaf through the stenographic record, and you will see for yourselves.

The 19th CPSU Congress was held in 1952 and—even though the Central Committee report was delivered by Malenkov rather than Stalin—it was in fact also used as a rostrum to proclaim the personal ideas and affirm the personal policy of "the great leader."

Unfortunately, even after the cult was debunked, attempts were made over quite a lengthy period to apply voluntarist methods to the solution of qualitatively new domestic and foreign policy tasks both under N.S. Khrushchev (during the so-called "glorious decade") and under L.I. Brezhnev. What is more, this seriously complicated socialism's progress to a new stage and compromised the progressive initiatives that were being embarked on.

While restoring the spirit of democracy we cannot fail to look back on the past and check our decisions against Engels' warning: "It is also necessary for people to finally cease treating party functionaries—their own servants—with constant and excessive delicacy and, instead of criticizing them, obeying them with utmost submissiveness as infallible bureaucrats."

V.V. Zhuravlev: It would be incorrect to examine the problem of party conferences in isolation from the complex and ambiguous processes of the development of intraparty democracy as a whole, with its indisputable successes and its difficulties and retreats.

Lenin's traditions of democratic discussion by the whole party of the package of complex questions arising at crucial stages of our history retain their importance to this day. Suffice it to recall the developments which occurred in 1921, after the end of the civil war. The country switched from the tracks of "war communism" to the New Economic Policy. This transition was truly revolutionary and demanded a restructuring of the nature and content of the activity of the party and state institutions, a breakthrough in the awareness and practical activity of Communists. A congress and two party conferences were convened within just 1 year!

For example, the Central Committee elected by the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress took only 2 months to prepare and submit for discussion by the 10th All-Russian Party Conference a plan for the implementation of the congress decisions. It is hardly necessary to explain how important this plan was. It made provisions for the promotion of new forces, both from among Communists and from nonparty member workers and peasants, to responsible sections of party, soviet, and trade union work.

The affirmation of the regime of personal power by Stalin and the corresponding administrative edict system of leadership led, in particular, to the gradual erosion of the direct purpose of the party's supreme forums—the congresses and conferences—as the party's main democratic councils. The atmosphere of pomposity and glorification of Stalin came to typify them. The hitherto last party conference in the party's history, the 18th, was held in February 1941. This form of supreme party organ then disappeared altogether from the CPSU Statutes, but the 23d party congress (March-April 1966) wrote in its resolution "On Partial Amendments to the CPSU Statutes": "To make provisions... that, in the period between party congresses, the Central Committee may, to the extent that it may be necessary, convene an all-union party conference to discuss pressing questions of party policy, while the central committees of union republic Communist Parties may convene republic party

conferences." I think that it was no accident that this question became so topical actually in the mid-sixties. The desire not to repeat mistakes with voluntarist overtones drew the party's attention with renewed strength to the democratic traditions of party conferences. The economic reform which was unfolding in the country brought the party and society face to face with what was described at the time as the inevitability of discussing its most complex socioeconomic aspects in the very near future. But these intentions simply failed to materialize. There was insufficient depth of perception of the situation, insufficient political determination and persistence in the work to implement the adopted decisions. A historic chance was missed.

The CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum noted that, in elaborating the concept of the future conference, the Central Committee Politburo was guided by the belief that the democratization of social life and radical economic reform demand a clear-cut program of action from the party. In these conditions, the conference must define much of the party's strategic work.

The concept of the future conference not only restores the status of the conference in line with Lenin's views of party democracy, but also clearly defines the role of all-union party conference as a powerful instrument of democratization and an important lever of restructuring.

Yu.A. Polyakov: In the course of revolutionary development, the density of events is greater and movement is more headlong. This is why the party now feels the need to make more frequent use of the mechanism for collective elaboration of decisions. This need is clear now. I do not rule out the possibility that the question may be raised of convening CPSU congresses more frequently—once every 3 years, for example. In any event, the changes which have been effected in the 2 years since the 27th congress are so significant, the need for further deepening and expansion of revolutionary transformations is so obvious, that the convening of a broad party forum in the form of an all-union conference is pressing, it is now on the agenda.

[Journalist] In your opinion, what questions ought to be discussed in greater detail in the course of preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference?

V.A. Tumanov: I think the question of the means, forms, and methods of party leadership of state and public organizations has been brought to the forefront. This is of course no accident, since only high standards of such leadership can ensure the success of restructuring and can overcome the retarding processes originating with bureaucratic management mechanisms and established stereotypes of activity by state organs and public organizations.

At the same time, the basic demand made by restructuring—to abandon administrative-edict methods of work—applies to the party organs and apparatus themselves. The tenacity shown by edict methods is largely linked with the view, sufficiently widespread among party workers and especially at local level, that the law is not absolutely mandatory for them and that, in the "interests of the cause" (or rather the falsely and parochially interpreted "interests of the cause"), they can—if not "push it aside," as the saying goes—at least overlook its existence.

But wait a minute: Article 6 of the 1977 USSR Constitution reads: "All party organizations shall function with the framework of the Constitution." The appearance of this article at the time represented a great step forward. Unfortunately, however, the norm is neither concretized nor developed in the current CPSU Statutes; nor has the literature on party building given it the necessary attention. But practice shows that there is need for such concretization. Why?

Simply because, for example, to "function within the framework of the Constitution" means to respect the competence of the soviets of people's deputies, other state organs, enterprises, and labor collectives enshrined in the Constitution (and in the laws published in performance of the Constitution). Any breach of this principle represents a most typical feature of the administrative-edict methods of party leadership. I believe that the topic of "respect for the law" must take its place in conference discussions on the question of forms and methods of party leadership.

Yu.V. Tyurin: Let us ask ourselves why has there still been no proper breakthrough along the entire front of restructuring. Why is it progressing in such a complex, diverse, and ambiguous fashion? Simply because many party committee leaders still adhere to obsolete but conventional views of the CPSU's role ("we decide everything for everybody"), are slow to relinquish economic executive functions, and have a technocratic style of leadership detrimental to the political style.

Lenin said in his speech at the close of the 11th party congress: "The whole point now is to ensure that the vanguard (the party, in other words—Yu.T.) is not afraid to work a little on itself, to refashion itself...." What is this if not Lenin's political testament concerning the party's tasks in emerging, qualitatively new conditions (NEP at that time, radical economic reform nowadays)? Lenin, finely attuned to every link and every cog in the party mechanism, also warned against the danger of deformities in the top echelons of power in the event that "an **incapable** individual vested with enormous power will **'accidentally'** [boldface as published] appear at the center." "No remedy for this," he wrote, "will be provided by any statute; it can be provided only by "comradely influence' measures." In other words by collective and political methods of leadership.

I think there is another problem which merits serious attention: party committees' perception of the meaning of democratic centralism. After all, a formal interpretation of this fundamental principle of the party's life and work makes it possible to demand of party members "unanimity through discipline." My many years of experience as secretary of party organizations, including large ones, enable me to say that, generally speaking, any party meeting or conference which proceeded without arguments, without criticism, or without discussions has always caused legitimate dissatisfaction. To learn democracy does not mean to silently agree with everything that is suggested. Rather the contrary: It means being able to dispute and to uphold a viewpoint, provided it is substantiated. Collective wisdom is born not out of mechanical appeasement but out of intellectual diversity.

The time has probably come to also revise the outdated view held toward a "minority." One recalls a time when those in a minority were held out to be people almost alien to the party and the country. A respectful and tactful attitude toward minority opinion is one of the expressions of political culture and democracy.

[Journalist] Our country has a one-party system. Moreover, the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress resolution "On Party Unity," prohibiting any factional activity, still exists and still remains in force. In your opinion, does this mean that there can and must be no differences of opinion on various issues within the party?

V.A. Tumanov: Fortunately, the time when differences of opinion and discussions within the party ended with the label "factionist" or even, later on, "enemy of the people" being attached to those who disagreed with Stalin is now past history. It seems to me incorrect in principle to treat the terms "party discussion" and "factional activity" as synonyms, as phenomena of the same magnitude. The latter runs contrary to the party's organizational principles, primarily to democratic centralism. The former, on the other hand, is a necessary element of party life envisaged by the CPSU Statutes, and its absence leads to stagnation.

In my view now, in the conditions of restructuring, we are fairly successfully learning to conduct discussions expressing socialist pluralism of opinions and are abandoning the "plebiscite discussions" in which everybody gave more or less identical answers under threat of being excommunicated from Marxism-Leninism.

V.V. Zhuravlev: Unfortunately, right to this day one comes across instances of incorrect or distorted interpretation of the essence of the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress resolution "On Party Unity." This is an echo of the difficult times in the history of our intraparty democracy when, in the conditions of the personality cult, any expression of personal opinion by a Communist on various questions of life in the party and the country which did not coincide with the official viewpoint could be arbitrarily interpreted as a manifestation of factional activity. The pernicious consequences of this clearly perverted understanding of the principle of democratic centralism, which lasted for decades after 1953, are universally known. It is obvious that they also produced the crisis phenomena in the sphere of party duty and party responsibility which, by the early eighties, most obviously reflected the extent of the party's unpreparedness to promptly, actively, and effectively oppose the growing phenomena of stagnation in society.

Meanwhile, discussions reflecting differences ofopinion within the party while it was in the process of considering current questions of its theory and policy were always assessed by V.I. Lenin as an immutable attribute of living activity by a living party, as an absolute condition for the development of intraparty democracy.

The history of ideological and theoretical struggle within the party in Lenin's time indicates that factional activity began only in cases when, after the party as a whole had adopted some decision or other, those who had been in the minority disregarded party discipline and united organizationally to wage open struggle against the implementation of the party line. It is not personal opinion that can turn a Communist into a factionist, it is his deliberate breach of party discipline, his disregard of an adopted decision, and his opposition to the cause of its implementation. Thus the borderline separating factional activity from conventional discussions and differences of opinion within the party is quite clearly defined. Given healthy intraparty relations and reliable guarantees that a Communist's rights will be respected, it can in no way prevent the unfolding of most pointed discussions on the most fundamental questions.

K.V. Gusev: On the 4th day following the establishment of Soviet power, V.I. Lenin said: We wanted a coalition Soviet Government, we did not expel anyone from the soviet, we are not to blame that the Mensheviks and right-wing Socialist Revolutionaries withdrew from the Second Congress of Soviets, and we are prepared to readmit those who withdrew and to recognize a coalition within the boundaries of the soviets.

This was, as a matter of fact, a real possibility, because the point at issue concerned the handing of power to the soviets, which were multiparty organs. But the parties which styled themselves socialist and democratic preferred to participate in the organs of Soviet power in a bloc with the bourgeoisie and were unwilling to take on even the role of a parliamentary opposition. Instead of this, they unleashed civil war in Russia in alliance with the interventionists and the White Guards.

The government bloc formed by the Bolsheviks with left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries did not last long, either. It is well known that it was disbanded not by the

Communists but at the initiative of the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries who were against the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty. They attempted to blow up the peace treaty with the bomb thrown at German Ambassador Mirbach, and afterward launched an all-out antigovernment insurgency. This was no longer a struggle of opinions; this was counterrevolutionary action.

In principle, recognizing the possibility of creating multiparty organs of power means recognizing the struggle of opinions and disputes between parties. Why then, if we recognize the likelihood of different viewpoints being held by different parties, should we not recognize the likelihood of this occurring within one party? Regardless of whether a state has one party or several parties, different viewpoints could exist within that one party; it is, however, obvious that in such an event the responsibility for decisionmaking and the importance of discussions within the party increase. Consequently, we are talking not about discussions or a struggle of opinions, but primarily about the attitude toward them. (Let us look no further than the Brest Peace Treaty itself. A whole series of eminent party figures, the so-called group of "Left Communists," was against signing it. They were defeated in discussions, the peace treaty with Germany was signed, but all the "Left Communists" still retained their high positions within the party....)

Opponents should not be assessed from the position of "Whoever is not with us is against us." The struggle of opinions should not be perceived as struggle against enemies—this much is obvious.

This art must be learned from Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Let us recall that on 2 June 1921 IZVESTIYA published a letter from him saying that the Menshevik I.M. Mayskiy, whom he had classed as an opponent of Soviet power, was now a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and should no longer be ranked together with Chernov and Martov.

I therefore think that a rejection of the prevailing viewpoint that any form of polemics is essentially political struggle waged from positions that are hostile to the party and Soviet society, and a return to Lenin's norms in the conduct of polemics with and behavior toward opponents, constitute the path which leads to the development and improvement of intraparty democracy.

[Journalist] The CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum emphasized that democratization and strictest application of laws are ideas which are inseparably interlinked. The 1936 USSR Constitution granted the country's citizens virtually the full range of democratic rights and freedoms and guaranteed their protection against illegal search and arrest. But one of the most tragic periods in Soviet history began less than 1 year later. In your view, what state and social mechanisms (laws, political decisions, system of guarantees, amendments to the USSR Constitution) are necessary to enable us to avoid a tragic "recurrence of the past"?

V.S. Lelchuk: When thinking of a mechanism which would prevent a repetition of tragic mistakes from the past, it would be naive to imagine that it all boils down to individual measures (and in particular fixed terms for renewing the leadership of party and of economic organs and suchlike). It would be appropriate to recall V.I. Lenin's proposal for organizing the work of party-state control at all levels. His last articles speak of the creation of structures which would give authorized agents (the workers and peasants themselves) an opportunity to inspect any documents and materials concerning the activity of all echelons of the party and state apparatus. Lenin perceived such control as an opportunity to diminish "the effect of purely individual and incidental circumstances."

Is it not time to take another look at these Lenin proposals? I think that a broad discussion of them in today's conditions would be a useful contribution to preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The question of the radical renewal of practical trade union work (again, at all levels) also merits the utmost attention. Tremendous reserves for the consolidation of democracy are contained here.

V.A. Tumanov: Could the legal system and the law guarantee the irreversibility of restructuring processes and offer a cure against a "recurrence of the past"? Only a high level of development of democracy and all its components can guarantee the irreversibility of restructuring.

This formulation of the question really assigns an important role to the legal system. This is why the question of the all-around development and improvement of the legal basis of state and social life has arisen in the context of restructuring. The thesis of a socialist state functioning on the basis of law merits utmost support but, at the same time, it is necessary to avoid the danger of presenting what is desirable as real. Very much still remains to be done to elevate the state's practices within the law, and above all Soviet society's legal awareness, to the level of a state functioning on the basis of law, and also to give specific content to this hitherto figurative expression.

Let me indicate a few of what I consider the most substantial elements: A sufficiently effective system has still not been created to monitor departmental norm-setting, which is quite extensive and frequently "amends" and even distorts the law with impunity; there is insufficient legal protection of the legitimate interests of enterprises, cooperatives, and citizens; the judicial system needs serious and all-embracing reform; and finally, legal standards are inadequate, even in state management.

I would like to dwell in some detail on this last thesis. Disrespect for the law is a problem, not to say a calamity.... After all, reverence for the supreme acts of state

(which the laws are) is one of the foundations of statehood in general, which even Plato wrote about! Yet look at what has happened in our country: The Law on the State Enterprise came into force on 1 January 1988, yet a prominent Gosplan official, competing with the USSR Supreme Soviet, sets different time schedules for this law's effect and we read about it in one of the country's major newspapers.... It appears that this law is still operating only "partially" (obviously on Gosplan instructions) and will come fully into force only in a few years' time (the Gosplan will obviously issue a special directive to this purpose). According to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, a railroad chief declared at a locomotive depot party meeting that the first 15 articles of the USSR Law "On the State Enterprise" are ineffective regarding the depot's collective. Advance toward a state functioning on the basis of the law can be retarded by such attitudes in the management apparatus.

In my view, the psychological barrier in the minds of many functionaries is, figuratively speaking, one of the brake pads of the stagnation mechanism and, unless it is overcome, our advance will be extremely slow.

[Journalist] It is well known that the 19th CPSU Congress adopted a decision to abolish party conferences. At the same time, a decision was also adopted to abolish purges within the party. But the experience gained by the party during the years of stagnation indicated that, nevertheless, the ranks of the Soviet society's vanguard had been joined by people unworthy of the lofty title of Communist, "degenerates with a party ticket," as was said at the 27th CPSU Congress. Do you not think that the party needs a mechanism making it possible to cleanse its ranks every so often of such elements?

Yu.A. Polyakov. There are numerous instances of the party being penetrated by people unworthy of the lofty title of Communist. This was already noted during the early years of Soviet power, as soon as the party became a ruling party. Those were the leeches whom Kursk peasant Gribasov had in mind when he spoke in 1922 about the Communist Party: "I recognize that the party is right: The only problem is that there are too many wrong people among those who are right."

The method of mass purges, just like any method based on the unsystematic campaign approach, failed to prove its worth and there is hardly any point in reverting to it. What primary and rayon party organizations need is not an unsystematic campaign approach but daily work to keep their attention focused on the personal behavior and moral character of Communists. If a major or minor chief loses his modesty and tolerates rudeness and boorishness, if an official turns into a self-seeker (and I don't mean crimes committed while in office: They must be punished without fail), if...—there are too many "ifs," and they all must be examined in an unbiased fashion by Communist comrades, they must be strictly and objectively assessed and, mainly, they must be subject to glasnost. A Communist's authority should not stem from his office but must be proved in practice by devotion to the common cause.

Let me cite an example from the experience of party conferences. Among other issues, the Eighth Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Conference in December 1919 examined (on the basis of N.I. Bukharin's report) the question of making use of new party members. Somewhat earlier, in the fall, a party week had been held in the country. It coincided with the most tense weeks of the civil war. Denikin was approaching Moscow, Yudenich was approaching Petrograd. People realized that joining the party produced no benefits but imposed most serious obligations and posed the threat of death in the event of an enemy victory. It was in these conditions that 200,000 became Communists.

The times are different now, of course. However, it might not be inappropriate to recall even now the explicitly, passionately revolutionary slogan which appeared in the press 8 October 1919, when the party week began in Moscow: "...Down with leeches who have attached themselves to the party! Kick out of the party the saboteurs, the lazy and the idle, those who put on airs! Welcome to the workers, honest toilers, fighters, and comrades!"

Uncensored TV Discussion 'Lesson in Democracy'

PM0405152188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 88 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by M. Berger under the rubric "Echo": "It Would Be a Pity If We Remained a Minority"—boldface as published]

[Text] **On 28 April, Leningrad Television showed a complete recording of a meeting between the SOVETSKAYA KULTURA editorial office and Leningrad's creative intelligentsia.**

It is not often that, sitting in front of the television screen, you become eyewitness to an event. In terms of form, it was entirely in keeping with traditions established over many years. A meeting with an audience of readers is, generally speaking, a routine happening which pursues, as we are used to thinking, a purely professional goal: To find out the subscribers' moods and hear their opinion of the newspaper. But what took place in the House of Theater Artists, and was screened later on, turned our ideas upside down. Yes, words were indeed spoken about print runs, about retail sales and subscriptions, about newsprint problems. But none of these was the main point at issue.

The conversation, in which "the newspaper's side" was represented by, in addition to its staff members, M. Shatrov, G. Tovstonogov, A. German, K. Lavrov, V. Konetskiy, Yu. Andreyev, and G. Gorbovskiy, lasted

more than 3 hours and totally riveted the attention of all who happened to be watching television on that day. There was a sharp, frank, and at times difficult conversation about restructuring and the disposition of forces in it, about the well-known article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, about whose views it was expressing, about how polemics are being conducted concerning the paths of restructuring, and about how correctly this polemical activity is being carried out. About what happened to our society at different stages of its development, about what is happening to each one of us now. About our spiritual world, about the methods and results of the "management" of culture, about economic accountability without the proprietorial right to keep accounts. About the fear which was hammered in over the years, which infected the genes, and which still has many people in its grip....

It is difficult to sum up in general terms the range of positions which each participant took at the microphone, let alone the range of problems. That was not a conversation about pluralism of opinions and positions, it was in fact pluralism of opinions in action.

But what was most impressive was not the boldness of statements, but the fact that we saw this all one-on-one [v masshtabe odin k odnomu]. There can be no question that this demanded a certain amount of professional and civic courage on the part of the television workers, to whom a certain SOVETSKAYA KULTURA staff member suggested that an edited version of the discussion be broadcast. Yet at the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting they suddenly decided not to go along with the author's censorship! And this despite the fact that exceptionally sharp criticism had been leveled against Leningrad Television. This, let us state plainly, also demanded resoluteness from the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, whose representatives were at the meeting and did not feel comfortable all the time. In brief, we are learning democracy and that was a wonderful open lesson.

There is just one thing that caused and still causes bitterness. The program was seen by the overwhelming minority of television viewers—just those who can receive broadcasts from Leningrad. Yet this is a lesson in democracy that everybody needs.

Character, 'Scare Tactics' of Nationalism Seen

PM0505120588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 May 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Akbar Tursunov under the "Questions of Theory" rubric: "Phenomenon of Nationalism"]

[Text] Dushanbe—October opened a new page in the world history of national building. But it has still not been filled to the end: The multinational state of the Soviet type, for all its obvious achievements, has not yet exhausted the nationalities question in its full political proportions and all its social dimensions. Not to mention the consideration of all the parameters of its historical dynamics and future.

"We are now profoundly aware," M.S. Gorbachev said at the CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum, "of how much we lost in the past without completely assimilating—either in theory or, especially, in practice—all the fruitfulness of Lenin's ideas, designs, and practical recommendations concerning Soviet socialist democracy." This applies also to Lenin's approach to the nationalities question. In formulating the fundamental principles of the organization and consolidation of the multinational state of the new type, V.I. Lenin paid special attention to nationalism as a world-outlook position opposing the humanist ideals of socialist society.

In the early twenties, when the foundation of the union of Soviet republics was being formed, V.I. Lenin's special attention was attracted by the nationalism of the big nation and the nationalism of the small nation. He did not simply draw a distinction between these two types of nationalism but also, by correlating them with real social reality, directly indicated that they are far from equivalent in terms of their origin and political orientation. The nationalism of the small nation is as a rule a defensive reaction to the chauvinism of a big nation, particularly if it was previously an oppressing nation.

Justifying the need to create an equal alliance of nations within the framework of a single state entity, V.I. Lenin noted that it should be based "on the fullest trust, on a clear awareness of fraternal unity, and on entirely voluntary consent." At the same time Lenin warned that "such an alliance cannot be effected immediately; we must work our way toward it with the greatest patience and caution so as not to spoil things, so as not to generate distrust, and so as to eliminate distrust..." (Vol 40, p 43).

However, the "haste and excessive enthusiasm for administration" on the part of the party and soviet bureaucracy which was taking shape subsequently made themselves felt.

Their negative role is particularly notable in the history of national and territorial delimitation. Touching on the deadlines for the practical solution of this task of some importance for the historical destiny of nations and peoples, Lenin wrote: "... The question of how to define state borders right now, for the time being—because we are seeking the complete destruction of state borders—is not a fundamental question... We can and should wait with regard to this question," because national distrust "frequently clings extremely firmly" while "it can be intensified by haste," thus "causing harm to full and definitive unity" (ibid pp 43-44).

Lenin's instruction on the need for a slower, more cautious, more systematic approach to socialism (see Vol 43, p 199) in the national outlying districts was later consigned to oblivion. The mindless copying of everything which was being done in the center, tyranny in the centralized selection and placement of local cadres, the emasculation of the moral content of internationalism and its transformation into an empty political slogan, not to mention our common misfortune and the political persecutions of the so-called social nationalists, cosmopolitans, and so forth which gripped the entire country—that is a far from full list of the distortions permitted in post-Lenin times in the sphere of national and internation [mezhnatsionalnyye] relations. All this taken together could not fail to animate old national grievances in an ugly form and to thus prepare the appropriate ground for later manifestations of defensive (and in places offensive) nationalism.

In the seventies, as in previous decades, it was declared in theory that the dialectical unity of the nations' flowering and rapprochement was characteristic of developing socialism. In real political practice, special emphasis was placed on the rapprochement tendency, or simply assimilation. Inasmuch as what was desired did not coincide with reality, under the conditions of the universal complacency and silence implanted in the theory and practice of inter-nation relations, instances of overt ideological overreporting became frequent. Thus Soviet ethnographers have drawn attention to the fact that in the period between the two censuses of the population (1926 and 1939) the number of officially registered peoples of the USSR fell by a factor of three (from 190 to 62) while between the two subsequent censuses (1939 and 1959) it unexpectedly increased to 109. It turns out that the USSR Central Statistical Administration had completely overhauled its statistics to comply with arbitrary political instructions for the steady rapprochement and "premature" merging of "nations and ethnic groups!"

Nationalism is a phenomenon with many facets and many faces. But for all the diversity of its specific manifestations it has a determining logical sign. It is the recognition of national exclusiveness and the ensuing counterposing of a given nation to other nations. That is how V.I. Lenin understood this phenomenon. In speaking of nationalist prejudices he reduced their content to a recognition of "one's own" nation as "the model nation" (Marx) or "the nation with a prerogative to state building" (Vol 25 p 302).

Yet the broad interpretation of the phenomenon of nationalism inherited from the thirties and forties has still not been eliminated in modern scientific literature and political journalism. Thus far from similar phenomena like parochialism and the praising of archaic daily and ancestral customs and rituals, national arrogance and the rejection of the principle of party-mindedness in covering cultural issues, the idealization of the prerevolutionary historical past, and the identification of the national and the religious are often taken for specific types and forms of the manifestation of nationalism. For instance, national narrow-mindedness is still not nationalism. Ethnic prejudice is just as far removed from nationalism. The latter is no more than an involuntary sociopsychological tendency.

Unfortunately, to this day some people are continuing to use the bogey of nationalism for scare tactics whenever they encounter phenomena of this kind. For instance, there are frequent instances where attempts to defend the national dignity of the individual or even the terminological self-assertion of a national language, not to mention the defense of national interests and the demand for national justice, are confused with nationalism.

The further democratization of society also creates a favorable moral and ideological atmosphere for the elaboration of a more realistic theory of socialist social relations, including national and inter-nation relations—a theory which critically generalizes the historical experience of building a new society (not only in the USSR but also in other countries) and which is directly turned toward present social practice. Its conclusions and generalizations should be not only of an explanatory nature but, and that is the main thing, of a forecasting nature, and should promote the solution of practical tasks of our development and be based on the extensive and in-depth study of the realities of inter-nation relations. It is essential primarily to draw attention to the practical problems of national and inter-nation relations which either have not been resolved or have been resolved unsatisfactorily because, together with other political and other factors of a negative nature, they form part of the delaying mechanism.

There is no doubt that the roots of nationalism should be sought primarily in existence and not consciousness. We must know how to struggle against nationalism, and for that it is essential to explain in a consistently materialistic manner the sources of nationalist prejudices. The struggle against them must be linked directly with the specific practice of national building and we must reveal the real social conditions which generate or promote the conservation and consolidation of nationalism as a phenomenon.

One of the great gains of socialism in the USSR has been not only to ensure equal rights in law for nations and peoples but also to create real conditions for equalizing the overall level of socioeconomic and cultural development of all republics and regions. An unusually large amount has in fact been done in this direction. But life is setting new and complex problems.

The question of the need to link the actual economic equality of the USSR peoples more closely with the principle of social justice is now being correctly raised. The level of the republics' national income and their contribution to the development of the unified national

economic complex cannot be judged without considering the prices system which took shape long ago and which is operating to this day. Economists noted long ago that this system in agriculture artificially lowers the national income and artificially raises it in industry.

Writing off the socioeconomic problems of a particular region which have accumulated over decades by ascribing them to some specific historical conditions and features of the traditional way of life of its population would be above all the most flagrant violation of the principle of social justice, which in this case has inevitably acquired a national coloring. The same should be said of the costs of the extensive economy and sectorial planning and of violations in the principles of forming local budgets and management apparatuses (particularly in cases of excesses in the inter-nation exchange of cadres) and also of everything which can cause a deformation of national feelings.

National equality in its truly Leninist understanding, in addition to the socioeconomic aspect has other no less important aspects—the political, legal, cultural, and ethical—which are closely interlinked. The events in Nagorno-Karabakh in particular show the consequences to which lack of attention toward these aspects can lead.

Lenin was profoundly aware that there is an enormous distance between formally proclaimed equality and actual equality. Hence his call for the enshrinement in legislation of political rights, especially the rights of national minorities. He raised the question of the need "to issue a general state law whereby any measure... which leads to any privilege whatsoever for any nation or which violates the equality of nations or the right of a national minority is declared illegal and invalid—and any citizen of the state has the right to demand the repeal of such a measure as unconstitutional and the punishment in law of those who tried to implement it" (Vol 24 p 118). Lenin demanded in particular that "the strictest rules" be introduced regarding the use of the Russian and national languages in other republics and "that these rules be verified particularly painstakingly" (Vol 45 p 361).

It is worth recalling in this connection that the question of language is a question not only of culture but also of policy. In language policy, as Lenin noted repeatedly, artificial restrictions (especially enforced restrictions) and special privileges are equally unacceptable (he put them on a par, equating the second with the first).

The main thing is constitutional backup in all regions and republics for coexistence on the basis of equal rights and the social functioning of the national and Russian languages. In particular we should not "take fright at the 'terrible' idea that in a common parliament speeches will be heard in different languages" (Vol 24 p 117). A principled and constant struggle not only against petty national narrowness but also against any forms of national nihilism, including language nihilism—a phenomenon which often develops (especially on the soil of unrealized careerism) into its direct opposite, militant nationalism—is in the traditions of our party.

The CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum noted that questions of nationalities policy are fundamental, vital problems of our society. That is why we must engage in them very thoroughly—on the theoretical and practical plane. Indeed, now that restructuring has, with the light of glasnost, illumined in our common home not only the cracks in need of urgent repair but also the painstakingly concealed uncompleted work, we can judge the true scales and depth of the urgent tasks and problems which have accumulated in the sphere of national and inter-nation relations. Local, national interests and all-union, priority interests have become inextricably interwoven in them. And now that the hour has come for sober decisions, it is with a profound sense of civic responsibility that we must all realize that only in a harmonious family of peoples with equal rights rallied on the basis of genuinely democratic principles, within the framework of a single socialist state accepting the rule of law, that we can ensure the progress of our all-union fatherland.

Christian, Islamic Clergy on Fraternity, Unity

PM0505152788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 May 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Vut report: "We Have One Fatherland"]

[Text] A meeting of Christian churches and Islamic religious organization clergy from Transcaucasia and North Caucasus has been held in Rostov-Na-Donu.

Its participants noted the beneficial changes which are taking place in society and approved and supported ideas and propositions put forward during the recent meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, and Pimen, patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, and members of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. Vladimir, metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkassk, who had attended the meeting in the Kremlin, described its course.

Restructuring, democratization, and glasnost are close to the hearts of and understood by all people. Our duty, the meeting participants stressed, is to assist restructuring. Attention was drawn to the implementation of one of the behests—strengthening the fraternity of the peoples. The thoughts and hearts of believers, as of all Soviet people, had been clouded by the recent sad events in the region. They had put the historical friendship of Armenians and Azerbaijanis to a grim test. The meeting participants emphasized their unshakable faith in the fact that only unity can ensure the progress of our society and the successful implementation of the majestic tasks of

renewal, tasks which are in profound harmony with the aspirations of believers and the entire Soviet people, who have one society, one fatherland.

'Strikes' Cited at Leningrad Shipbuilding Plant

PM291511 [Editorial Report] An article by special correspondents V. Gerasimov and N. Demidov which describes a visit to Leningrad's Baltic Shipbuilding Plant and the proceedings at a specially convened plant meeting appears in Moscow PRAVDA on 25 April 1988 in its Second Edition on pages 1-2 under the headline "Must We Censure the Impatient Ones?" and featured under the rubric "To Meet the 19th All-Union Party Conference." An editorial introduction explains that this article was written in response to readers' reactions to a letter published in the 10 February PRAVDA, pages 1-2, Second Edition. In this letter, G. Pozhedayev, a foundryman at the shipyard, claims that he had lost his position as team leader and trade union organizer due to his enthusiasm for restructuring in general and, more specifically, his convening a shopfloor meeting, on his own initiative and without going through channels, to discuss the results of a 19 April 1986 subbotnik. The theme of the meeting, Pozhedayev stated, was "what is preventing us from working better," and it appealed to other areas of the plant "to follow our example." It appears from his letter—which is accompanied by a 300-word V. Gerasimov commentary on the case—that, while attracting a certain amount of support, Pozhedayev was perceived by many, and the plant administration and trade union leaders in particular, as rocking the boat and making things uncomfortable for them.

The correspondents' report in the 25 April PRAVDA examines the Pozhedayev case along with the general situation at the plant, stating, partially with reference to strike action taken in two of the plant's shops:

"No one can take away from the Baltic plant work force its indisputable renown and skills. We got to know many workers who truly constitute the pride of the enterprise, its dependable backbone. Nevertheless, let us frankly address another aspect. The plan can be achieved at any price, by strict decree, by threat of dismissal. In short, by administrative pressure. It is also possible another way: by awareness and activeness 'from below.' The second method is the more complex. It demands of the leadership, and primarily the party organization, the unfetteriing of individual initiative. Or, as Pozhedayev wrote, 'putting the worker in charge of production.'

"Discussion of the publication in PRAVDA was inevitably to raise questions of the brakes retarding this process. People on the plant party committee endeavored to avoid, or defer, a direct, open conversation. The editorial office's proposal to hold a discussion involving all those so inclined didn't cut much ice, as they say. Why muddy the water? It was decided to assemble the workers from two sectors of the shop and leave it at that. But let us observe that even a measure of such—if you will pardon the expression—local significance was attended by several senior party obkom and raykom officials. There had never ever been such representation even at more substantial meetings.

"All the same, we arrange these things splendidly here! We are excellent organizers when we want to be. For some party officials, meetings represent, if you like, that touchstone against which they verify their ability to keep everyone in their place, to subdue people. Such individuals are valued and get on in the world. We can cite as many examples as you like where it has been willed from above that promotion to party leader in a collective is earmarked not for the individual who demonstrates the ability to lead and knows how to command people's throughts and hearts, how to convince, and, most important, to penetrate—to penetrate to the core—a person's vital needs; not for this individual, but for the person who is adept at organizing meetings. Or who can put together a good paper.

"We had a long chat with the secretary of the plant party committee, A. Klyuchnikov. What complaints we heard about the day-to-day concerns, the avalanches of paper, the hassle of meeting upon meeting! There simply isn't the time, as he put it, to get down onto the shop floor. But what is curious is the fact that when we asked him how he would occupy his time if all this office work were to disappear, Aleksandr Sergeyevich lapsed into deep thought—and the result was that he was unable to say anything in response.

"Meanwhile, there is talk around the plant about two 'strikes.' Work was halted in the consumer goods production shop and the machine shop. In the one instance, because things were badly organized, and in the other, because of an unfairly distributed bonus. The Baltic Plant's work force is made up of intelligent people, and they resumed work after the appropriate explanations had been given. But you will agree that for the party committee, this is an alarm bell. No, not the chairman's handbell at a meeting, but a very real alarm bell proclaiming the low standard of party work at the enterprise.

"We acknowledge the plant's successes, but they cannot and must not conceal the lack of initiative, or also the feebleness, of the party committee and the party bureau in the shop organizations. In the middle of last year, a session of the party committee examined precisely the work of the consumer goods shop party bureau. It was noted that it had failed 'in every direction.' The party organization secretary was replaced.... And that was all. And just a few months later that same emergency situation occurred. And, moreover, there were also Communists among those who stopped work in midshift.

"One can understand the workers' dissatisfaction with the shortage of glasnost which people talk about so much, and with a lack of organization which has reached its limit. But surely the party bureau and the party

committee should be able to have a heart-to-heart talk with people and swiftly and accurately pinpoint the cause of what has occurred? Naturally, it is simpler to draw up a list of speakers at a meeting, to indicate what must and must not be said, to define the rigid standing orders, and to stifle in timely fashion any critic who clambers up onto the platform. And who needs this now? Someone does, it turns out, if we did indeed encounter all of this at the meeting."

The article proceeds with an account of the meeting convened at PRAVDA's suggestion to discuss Pozhedayev's original letter. The authors state that they personally interviewed some would-be speakers who were passed over by the meeting's chairman. They quote these and other workers who had various complaints to make.

More 'Non-Party Leaders' Noted in Turkmen SSR

LD0405113488 Moscow TASS in English 1105 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Ashkhabad May 4 TASS—TASS correspondent Natalya Charukhcheva reports:

The number of non-party leaders in the Turkmen Republic, Central Asia, has increased by 50 percent over the three years of perestroyka (the drive for restructuring) from April 1985 to April 1988. Speakers at a plenary meeting of the Ashkhabad Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenia, described this tendency in the work with personnel as a commendable one. Half of the reserve for promotion, which was formed in the republic, is composed of non-party people.

By way of an example references are made here to Aleksandr Lebedev, the 40 year-old chief engineer of the Integrated Building Materials Mill in the city of Bezmein. The non-party specialist was promoted to such a high post exclusively thanks to his expertise and business gumption. And Aleksandr Lyutov, not a member of the ruling party, was elected deputy chairman of the Executive Committee, a state government body in a large area of the republic. Other names are also mentioned....

Membership in the Communist Party ceased to be a condition for promotion to a senior executive position in the period of perestroyka. Still the majority of leaders elected in a democratic manner lately are Communists.

"It is not hard to explain this", Vladimir Chertishchev explained. "The best people are admitted to the Communist Party and labour collectives wish to elect as their leaders also the best specialists and best workers...so, even if the party card of the Communist is not a pass to the management sphere, people place trust with its holder...and, I think, they are right in this".

Kapitonov Tours Moldavian SSR 25-28 Apr

PM0405153588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Stay in the Moldavian SSR"]

[Text] I.V. Kapitonov, chairman of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, visited the Moldavian SSR 25 through 28 April. He visited Kishinev, Tiraspol, Bendery, the Moldavian "Tochlitmash" Production Association, the Kishinev "Alfa" Television Plant, the "Floare" Experimental Production Association, the "Varnitsa" Agrofirm, the "Dnestr" Science-and-Production Association, Kishinev's I. Creanga State Teacher-Training Institute, the No 64 Rural Vocational and Technical School and its sewn goods production cooperative, and Kishinev's No 25 Secondary School.

During the meetings and talks with workers, specialists, and leaders of industrial and agricultural enterprises they discussed the course of the radical economic reform and the activities of labor collectives in connection with their transfer to the principles of full economic accountability [khozraschet] and self-financing. The chairman of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission inquired about the state of housing construction, working and living conditions, and the working people's trade and medical services.

During the meetings with public education workers chief attention was paid to the need to strengthen the material and technical base of secondary and higher educational institutions, the broader introduction of progressive teaching methods, and the improvement of ideological educational work with the rising generation.

At the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee the chairman of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission had a meeting with members of the republic party organization's auditing commission, chairmen of city and rayon party organizations' auditing commissions, and first secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms. Questions of further improving auditing work in the republic party organization and galvanizing the activity of auditing commissions in the practical implementation of restructuring were examined in detail.

I.V. Kapitonov addressed a Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee plenum which discussed the results of the CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum and the tasks of the republic party organization.

I.V. Kapitonov was accompanied on his tour of the republic by S.K. Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

Agricultural

Nikonov, Slyunkov, Silayev Visit Institute

LD302052 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Apr 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrades Nikonov and Slyunkov today visited the All-Union Research Institute of Agricultural Machine Building, where they saw models of new tractors and fodder- and grain-harvesting machines. They paid the greatest attention to accelerating the organization of output of integral tractors and high-productivity fodder-harvesting combines which have already proved their worth.

At the Central Machine Testing Station in Solnechnogorsk they were shown new and improved sowing units. Combined sowing machines attracted attention here. Urgent questions on further improving the organization of ordering and production of machines for agriculture were examined. Comrade Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and other comrades were present at the machinery inspection.

Scientific

Mission of 'Progress-35' Cargo Spaceship Ends

LD0505104788 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 5 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—By a TASS correspondent reporting from Mission Control Centre:

The flight of the unmanned cargo spaceship Progress-35, put in near-earth orbit on March 24, is over.

On March 26, the cargo craft was docked with the manned complex Mir (Peace). The scheduled operations, including unloading and refilling of the orbital station's fuel tanks with fuel and oxidizer, have been completed. The station's flight path was adjusted using the cargo craft's propulsion unit.

Today, at 5:36 Moscow time, Progress-35 was automatically separated from the orbital complex Mir. It changed to a descent path, entered dense layers of the atmosphere and ceased to exist.

Vladimir Titov and Musa Manarov are continuing work on board the research complex Mir. Today, the crew are to conduct tests on studying the earth's ionosphere and magnetosphere, photograph individual areas of Soviet territory, maintain on-board systems and carry out physical exercises.

According to results of medical check-ups, both cosmonauts are in good health.

Their mission in orbit is continuing.

U.S.-Soviet Science Cooperation Accords Signed

PM0505093388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS reports under the rubric "On Meridians of Cooperation" and the general heading "Space and Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes"]

[Text] Washington, 3 May—On Monday representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences Space Research Institute and NASA signed in Washington two important documents which are designed to broaden U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space research for peaceful purposes. Protocols were signed on a joint Soviet-U.S. working group for solar and earth physics and on a joint Soviet-U.S. working group for space astronomy and astrophysics. Sessions of these working groups were held.

These documents were drawn up within the framework of the practical realization of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on cooperation in the investigation and utilization of space for peaceful purposes, which was signed by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in Moscow on 15 April last year. The protocols define specific spheres of cooperation between Soviet and U.S. specialists and provide for an exchange of accumulated scientific information and the implementation of joint research in the spheres of astrophysics, space astronomy, and the study of solar and earth physics.

"The Soviet space program is being implemented very energetically, and we have a mass of opportunities for joint research," Doctor Charles Pellerin, director of NASA's Astrophysics Department, emphasized.

New York, 3 May—A conference on preparations for International Space Year, scheduled for 1992, has ended at the University of New Hampshire in the U.S. city of Durham.

Dozens of scientists from various countries, including the United States, the USSR, and China, participated in this forum's work.

In the opinion of Academician R.Z. Sagdeyev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Space Research Institute, who participated in the conference's work, the first steps in drawing up major joint space projects, particularly interplanetary flights, could be taken within the framework of International Space Year. Cooperation in space, the conference organizers believe, will make it possible to involve many countries in joint work, including developing countries which do not have their own space programs.

Washington, 3 May—The seventh session of the Soviet-U.S. Joint Commission on Cooperation in the Sphere of the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy ended here Monday. During the talks in Washington, reports were heard on

the progress of joint scientific research, and a Soviet-U.S. memorandum on cooperation in the sphere of civilian nuclear reactor safety was signed. During its stay in the United States, the Soviet delegation visited the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, the nuclear power station at Calvert Cliffs (Maryland), and the General Atomics Company.

Military

Leaders Attend Military District Anniversaries

Yazov in Moscow

PM0605085788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Our correspondent report under the general heading: "Military Districts' 70th Anniversary"]

[Text] The Order of Lenin Moscow Military District—It is a source of particular pride for today's servicemen that the early days of its history are associated with the name of V.I. Lenin. He took a detailed interest in the district's affairs.

Vladimir Ilich's involvement in the oath-taking ceremony for troop units from Moscow's Zamoskvoretskiy Rayon was an exceptionally important event not only for the district but also for the entire Worker-Peasant Red Army.

From August 1941 through August 1943 the territory of the Moscow Military District was the scene of fiercest fighting with the German fascist invaders. The greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War took place here—the battles of Moscow and Kursk...

The ceremonial meeting to mark the 70th anniversary of the district was held in the Soviet Army's Central Academic Theater.

In the presidium were the following: L. Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom; Army General D. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; I. Larin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Administrative Organs Department; N. Shlyaga, sector chief in the CPSU Central Committee Administrative Organs Department; Lieutenant General G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; Army General S. Postinkov, first deputy commander in chief of Ground Forces; Colonel General M. Popkov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Ground Forces Political Directorate; generals; officers; and representatives of party, soviet, and Komsomol organizations.

The meeting was opened by Lieutenant General A. Makunin, member of the Military Council and chief of the district's Political Directorate.

Army General V. Arkhipov, commander of the district's troops, delivered the report.

V. Mesyats, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Obkom; V. Saykin, chairman of the Moscow Gorispolkom; Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General (retired) M. Makarychev, a veteran of the district; and S. Yepifantsev, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, congratulated the district's personnel.

Army General D. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, spoke at the meeting. He warmly congratulated the district's servicemen on the glorious jubilee and read out a greeting from the USSR Defense Ministry and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

The district's personnel, the greetings says, are persistently mastering modern combat equipment and weapons and are making a worthy contribution to the cause of strengthening the defense potential of the Soviet state and ensuring its security. Positive processes are becoming intensified in the district's troops, a new moral-political atmosphere is being established, and personnel are becoming more active. Exactingness and professionalism are being stepped up, formalism and stagnant phenomena are being combated, and the number of rated specialists and people rated excellent in training is growing.

The USSR defense minister expressed the conviction that the district's personnel will worthily greet the 19th all-union party conference and will apply all efforts, skills, and ability to successfully fulfilling its decisions and will continue to reliably guard the security of our socialist fatherland.

Lizichev in N. Caucasus

PM0605084588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 88 Second Edition p

[Our correspondent report under the general heading: "Military Districts' 70th Anniversary"]

[Text] In 1918 the North Caucasus Military District was established by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars. A ceremonial meeting to mark the 70th anniversary of the district's foundation was held 4 May in the district's House of Officers.

Veterans of the civil and Great Patriotic wars and representatives of party and soviet organs in Rostov Oblast and Chechen-Ingush, Kabardino-Balkar, and Kalmyk ASSR's came to congratulate servicemen on this date.

The ceremonial meeting was opened by Lieutenant General G. Donskoy, member of the Military Council and chief of the district's Political Directorate. Colonel General L. Shustko, commander of the district's troops, delivered the report.

Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, Hero of the Soviet Union Army General M. Zaytsev, and other comrades greeted the personnel of the North Caucasus Red Banner Military District.

Kulikov at Volga Ceremony

PM0505092388 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under the general heading: "Military Districts' 70th Anniversary"]

[Text] May 4—The Volga Red Banner Military District, one of the oldest in the country, today celebrates its 70th anniversary.

War veterans, party and soviet leaders of oblasts and autonomous republics on whose territory the district is situated, working people from Kuybyshev enterprises, and Volga servicemen came to the ceremonial meeting to mark this date. Colonel General V.A. Patrikeyev, commander of the district's troops, delivered a report.

The servicemen were greeted by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Nations.

Ye.F. Muravyev, first secretary of the Kuybyshev CPSU Obkom, congratulated the defenders of the motherland on the jubilee on behalf of the working people of the Middle Volga region.

Civil Defense Museum, Recent Problems Profiled

PM0405111588 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 3 May in its Second Edition carries on page 4 under the headline "Museum for... a Narrow Circle?" a 1,200-word "report with commentary" by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev on the USSR Civil Defense Museum in Moscow. Pashayev cites the museum's chief, Lieutenant Colonl V. Grishin, who points out that most people do not even know of the museum's existence because "we are under the same roof as the civil defense courses, entry to whose territory is restricted." The museum is visited mainly by those attending the courses, although, Grishin continues, organized groups do tour the museum by prior arrangement. "However, the existing restrictions do not of course promote the broad propaganda of civil defense knowledge," he notes.

Pashayev then describes a tour of the museum's rooms, showing the history of civil defense in the USSR, civil defense in Moscow, civil defense in the union republics, and "the exploits of those who eliminated the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES." In prewar years, Pashayev points out, every adult had to undergo special civil defense training. "The exhibits convincingly describe how this work was done." He continues:

"On familiarizing yourself with them you cannot help thinking that knowledge and skills of this kind are also needed now. The events connected with the accident at the Chernobyl AES confirm this most graphically. How can we fail here to regret the fact that for many of our contemporaries familiarization with elements of civil defense is often restricted to the passive contemplation of unexpressive posters and the leafing through of outdated manuals.

"Of course, this is not the only source of today's civil defense problems. Many questions—organizational and cadres questions—are set by life itself. A few days ago IZVESTIYA described the alarm call raised by error in Perm, a city with a population of 1 million. It again revealed the 'paper-based' style of leadership of local civil defense and showed people's confusion and their mental unpreparedness for a situation requiring prompt and single-minded actions.

"Only a little needs to be added to what has been said. The USSR Civil Defense Museum is in the capital's Voroshilovskiy Rayon. Its address is No 28 Zhivopisnaya Street."

There follows a 500-word commentary from Colonel General V. Novikov, USSR Civil Defense deputy chief for political affairs, who points out that the museum could shed light on the role of civil defense in peacetime, noting that "the years of silence and half-truth, the lack of authentic, objective information on catastrophes, accidents, and natural disasters taking place in the country psychologically inclined some of our compatriots to the idea that something 'like that' simply could not happen in our country. Consequently, there was no need for people who would eliminate the consequences of anything 'like that.' A dangerous misconception."

Novikov then notes that nuclear power stations and chemical plants all contain a "potential ecological danger" and points out that civil defense skills are also needed in dealing with accidents like the Yaroslavl train crash. There is a need to draw up a list of potentially dangerous production facilities, he says, and economically accountable organizations should not economize on civil defense either. The museum, he concludes, should be a center for "the propaganda of knowledge and leading experience" and "access to the museum will be open to all who want it."